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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates mobile electronic transfer of prescription (ETP) in
compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare
industry and proposes a framework for the development of an Android mobile
electronic prescription transfer application. Furthermore, and based upon the findings
and knowledge from constructing this framework, another framework is also derived
for assessing Android mobile ETP applications for their security compliance.
The centralised exchange model-based ETP solution currently used in the
Australian healthcare industry is an expensive solution for on-going use. With
challenges such as an aging population and the rising burden of chronic disease, the
cost of the current ETP solution’s operational infrastructure is certain to rise in the
future. In an environment where it is increasingly beneficial for patients to engage in
and manage their own information and subsequent care, this current solution fails to
offer the patient direct access to their electronic prescription information. The current
system also fails to incorporate certain features that would dramatically improve the
quality of the patient’s care and safety, i.e. alerts for the patient’s drug allergies,
harmful dosage and script expiration. Over a decade old, the current ETP solution
was essentially designed and built to meet legislation and regulatory requirements,
with change-averting its highest priority. With little, if any, provision for future
growth and innovation, it was not designed to cater to the needs of the ETP process.
This research identifies the gap within the current ETP implementation (i.e.
dependency on infrastructure, significant on-going cost and limited availability of the
patient’s medication history) and proposes a framework for building a secure mobile
ETP solution on the Android mobile operating system platform which will address
the identified gap.
The literature review part of this thesis examined the significance of ETP for
the nation’s larger initiative to provide an improved and better maintainable
healthcare system. The literature review also revealed the stance of each jurisdiction,
from legislative and regulatory perspectives, in transitioning to the use of a fully
electronic ETP solution. It identified the regulatory mandates of each jurisdiction for
ETP as well as the security standards by which the current ETP implementation is
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governed so as to conform to those regulatory mandates. The literature review part of
the thesis essentially identified and established how the Australian healthcare
industry’s various prescription-related legislations and regulations are constructed,
and the complexity of this construction for eTP.
The jurisdictional regulatory mandates identified in the literature review
translate into a set of security requirements. These requirements establish the basis of
the guiding framework for the development of a security-compliant Android mobile
ETP application. A number of experimentations were conducted focusing on the
native security features of the Android operating system, as well as wireless
communication technologies such as NFC and Bluetooth, in order to propose an
alternative mobile ETP solution with security assurance comparable to the current
ETP implementation. The employment of a proof-of-concept prototype such as this
alongside / coupled with a series of iterative experimentations strengthens the
validity and practicality of the proposed framework.
The first experiment successfully proved that the Android operating system
has sufficient encryption capabilities, in compliance with the security mandates, to
secure the electronic prescription information from the data at rest perspective. The
second experiment indicated that the use of NFC technology to implement the
alternative transfer mechanism for exchanging electronic prescription information
between ETP participating devices is not practical. The next iteration of the
experimentation using Bluetooth technology proved that it can be utilised as an
alternative electronic prescription transfer mechanism to the current approach using
the Internet. These experiment outcomes concluded the partial but sufficient proofof-concept prototype for this research.
Extensive document analysis and iterative experimentations showed that the
framework constructed by this research can guide the development of an alternative
mobile ETP solution with both comparable security assurance to and better access to
the patient’s medication history than the current solution. This alternative solution
would present no operational dependence upon infrastructure and its associated, ongoing cost to the nation’s healthcare expenditure. In addition, use of this mobile ETP
alternative has the potential to change the public’s perception (i.e. acceptance from
regulatory and security perspectives) of mobile healthcare solutions, thereby paving
the way for further innovation and future enhancements in eHealth.
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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, the processing power and storage capacity of
handheld computing devices has advanced exponentially. Today's smartphones and
handheld computing devices such as tablet PCs possess a processing power and
storage capacity far superior to those of desktop computers a decade ago. This
advancement opens up a whole new territory in mobile computing platforms, both
for the consumer and for industry partners such as social networking, health and
fitness and banking. These industries are seizing the opportunity to extend their
reach, while mobile computing devices are now ubiquitous in the consumer market.
This shift of focus enables mobile devices to become major candidates for
integral roles within the evolving eHealth systems. Utilisation of mobile/handheld
computing devices in healthcare systems will significantly alter how healthcare
services are delivered, improve the quality of patient experience and reduce the cost
of healthcare in general (West, 2012) by virtue of the better use of information
technology in facilitating the electronic access, transmission and recording of health
information. However, the adoption of mobile computing in healthcare inevitably
transforms the ways in which health information is acquired, used, disclosed and
stored. This transformation requires the establishment of sophisticated health
information systems and governance frameworks within which to facilitate and
dictate information sharing and exchange (Hodge, Gostin & Jacobson, 1999), explore
opportunities and seek solutions to the current and potential issues associated with
secure transmission and use of electronic data for health in a mobile environment.
Among many other facets of eHealth, mobile computing can be adopted in the
electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (eTP) for improved healthcare system outcomes
and better cost-effectiveness of healthcare services. ETP creates a pathway of
technological development from the current paper-based manual or web-based
hybrid prescription processes to a fully electronic, mobile and paperless initiative. It
is an important step towards an eHealth-enabled healthcare system which ensures
medicines information is accurately and securely shared, providing a range of
healthcare benefits to both prescribers and consumers (“NPS MedicineWise”, 2012).
When fully implemented, this sharing of high quality patient medication information
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between the prescriber and dispenser enables quality use of medicine, thus enhancing
the safety and quality of patient care (“AMA Position Statement”, 2009).

1.1

Background
Developed countries with digital health capabilities implement electronic

prescribing systems to some extent, depending on their acts, regulations and the
various levels (i.e. state and national) of their healthcare infrastructure. These
systems play a crucial role in connecting prescribers and dispensers, and deliver
indisputable benefits such as improved patient safety via reduced transcribing errors
during dispense; increased workflow efficiency in dispensing at the pharmacy;
reduced readmissions due to adverse drug events and preventable medication
prescribing errors and the better coordination and management of care between
doctors and pharmacists (“Boot”, 2011). An electronic prescribing system facilitates
the secure and efficient management and sharing of a client’s/patient’s medication
information and provides a wide range of benefits for all parties involved (i.e.
prescribers, dispensers and consumers) ("AMA Position Statement", 2009; "NPS
MedicineWise", 2012). The use of electronic prescription is also crucial in improving
patients’ safety by reducing preventable adverse drug events through accurate
medication information sharing and improved medication compliance. Since almost
70,000 hospital admissions per year are associated with adverse drug events, the
decrease in these occurrences as the result of the employment of an electronic
prescription would imply a significantly reduced demand on health funding.
(“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). It is not an overstatement to say that electronic
prescription is the key to enhanced patient safety, better medication compliance,
improved accuracy and efficiency in medication information sharing between
Clinical Information Systems (CIS) and reduced healthcare costs. However, these
benefits do not come without a significant impact on Australian healthcare
expenditure.
In Australia, the current electronic prescribing model for delivering electronic
prescription details from the prescriber to the patient/user-selected prescription
dispenser makes use of one of two Prescription Exchange Services (PES) – Script
Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure. Use of electronic
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prescription is cost-free for prescribers but each prescription downloaded from PES
services by a pharmacy attracts an electronic prescription fee of fifteen cents. At
present it is also cost-neutral to the pharmacies because the electronic prescription
fee of fifteen cents for each eligible prescription is subsidised by the 6th Community
Pharmacy Agreement (6CPA). Since December 2012, interoperability between the
two PES operators allows prescribers to upload the electronic copy of their
prescription to one PES service and the dispensers (i.e. pharmacies) to download
from the other PES service. Prior to achieving interoperability between the two PES
services the electronic prescription fees were as much as eighty-five cents per
prescription (McDonald, 2015). There has been a considerable increase in the use of
electronic prescriptions by pharmacies and doctors since the launch of eRX in 2009.
A significant milestone in Australia’s eHealth journey was achieved on 30th July
2015 when eRx, one of the two PES services, dispensed its one billionth prescription
(ibid). When combined with the prescriptions dispensed by the other PES service
operated by MediSecure (Script Vault), the numbers could be considerably higher.
This indicates improved confidence in the use of electronic prescriptions and a
substantial uptake by the pharmacies and doctors. On the other hand, eRx’s
announcement in August 2015 regarding the dispensing of its billionth electronic
prescription also proves that electronic dispensing had cost the nation at least
AU$150 million at that point in time (i.e. calculated using the current minimum fees,
although it was much more expensive in the earlier years) (ibid). Since there are two
PES services, the total cost of using both services will be considerably more, if not
twice as much. A recent survey by eRx found that pharmacies using eRx are
dispensing 753,000 electronic prescriptions per day, with up to twenty-five
prescriptions per second during peak periods (ibid). The fees alone for 753,000
electronic prescriptions on just one day represent a cost to the nation of AU$112,950.
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Figure 1.1: Number of prescriptions over an 11 year period (using PBS data)

Despite the decrease in the total number of prescriptions in 2016 compared to
that of 2015, there has been an increase of 13.3% in electronic prescription fees for
2016 (i.e. AU$8,091,750 in 2015 and AU$9,164,954 in 2016) (“Expenditure and
Prescriptions Twelve Months to 30 June 2016”, 2016). Since there has been no
change in the Electronic Prescription Fee for each prescription in recent years, this
increase indicates that more electronic prescriptions are being used in 2016 compared
to the previous year. Although this higher usage of electronic prescriptions perfectly
aligns with the nation’s eHealth initiatives, electronic prescriptions will continue to
contribute to the nation’s increasing healthcare expenditure unless more costeffective, long term alternatives with comparable security measures are put in place.

Figure 1.2: PBS expenditure over an 11 year period (using PBS data)
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Using statistics from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme website, Figures
1.1 and 1.2 show the PBS expenditure and number of prescriptions over an eleven
years period, 2006 to 2016. It is evident that, although the PBS expenditure
fluctuated slightly, the number of prescriptions increased steadily over the eleven
years period. This indicates that unless cheaper alternatives are found, the ongoing
cost associated with the current electronic prescription transfer model will continue
to increase with the increasing volume of use. Although the Commonwealth
subsidises the electronic prescription fee through a series of Community Pharmacy
Agreements, the significant ongoing cost implied by these statistics prompted the
exploration of cheaper or more cost-effective alternatives. Potential alternatives to
using the current PES services for transferring electronic prescriptions include
CD/DVD-ROM as used in Japan (“Japan Association for Medical Informatics”,
2014), Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drives, smartcards, mobile smart phones and
Health Level 7 (HL7) messaging via SMS or Secured Message Delivery (SMD)
services.
Of these potential alternatives to using PES services, this research focuses on
the use of the patient’s mobile device as the secure transfer media/mechanism for
electronic prescriptions. Figure 1.3 illustrates the participants of the current
electronic prescription model and its operation from a high-level perspective.

1. Upload

PES server
(eRx script exchange / MediSecure Script vault)

4. Download

Rx details

Pharmacy
Patient/Agent
Prescriber
2. Print
3. Present

Prescription
Patient/Agent

Figure 1.3: Current electronic prescription using PES services (overview)

This research examines the existing methods for the transfer of prescription
information around current practices and legislative and regulatory constraints as
well as enablers at Commonwealth, state and territory levels. Finally, it presents a
framework for the development of a secure mobile application for prescription
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transfer which is compliant with those constraints. This research also assesses and
then compares the security of prescription information in the current PES-based
approach to that of mobile devices using the proposed secure mobile ETP
application.

1.2

Significance of Study
This research offers potential financial, clinical and administrative benefits

for all parties involved in the prescribing process (i.e. prescriber, dispenser and
patient). Furthermore, it provides opportunities for future enhancements such as the
implementation and integration of a Clinical Decision Support System component as
part of the proposed mobile prescription solution. This component would require a
study of its own within the ETP context and is outside the scope of this research.

1.2.1

Financial Benefits
Since this research is to explore the potential of using a mobile electronic

prescription transfer mechanism as an alternative to the current approach which uses
PES services, the fifteen-cent electronic prescription fee associated with using PES
services might be eliminated. Although this fifteen cents sounds trivial for an
individual prescription, its elimination would save tens of millions of dollars in
annual healthcare expenditure. The savings on the 211.4 million prescriptions
dispensed in 2015 alone would have been as much as AU$31.7 million (see Figure
1.1). This research, therefore, has the potential to significantly reduce the nation’s
healthcare budget. The current cost-neutrality of using electronic prescription (i.e.
cost-free for all parties involved) is achieved via Commonwealth subsidy: the
electronic prescription fee provided through a series of Community Pharmacy
Agreements (i.e. 5CPA and 6CPA agreements). Whilst it is yet to be determined who
will bear this cost when it is no longer subsidised by the Commonwealth – the
prescriber, dispenser or patient – this research proposes a secure solution that allows
the electronic prescription process to remain cost-free for all parties involved.
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1.2.2

Clinical Benefits
This proposed alternative also opens up opportunities to incorporate certain

useful features such as prescription expiration alerts and last repeat alerts. Currently
the patient only receives this communication when a prescription is dispensed. More
importantly, this proposed solution enables the implementation of alert features for
drug allergies and harmful doses as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer
application. Whilst the implementation of these features is not part of the current
study, opportunities for this are opened up, with potential to significantly improve
patient safety and benefit all parties involved in the prescribing process.
Hospitals are also a major beneficiary of this solution. When the interface of
the proposed application is implemented and integrated with the hospital information
system, the application can directly transfer the full history of a patient’s medication
from the patient’s mobile phone into the hospital’s information system. Such access
to the patient’s complete medication history would be of inestimable clinical benefit
both to the healthcare professionals in delivering better quality of care and the patient
receiving it.

1.2.3

Administrative Benefits
Enabling the patient’s smartphone as the secure transfer medium for

electronic prescriptions allows the patient to be in control of their personal and
sensitive information without negative impacts on public health initiatives and
government recorded data such as the National Prescription and Dispense Repository
(NPDR). It empowers the patient to take more responsibility for their health and
places them in full control of personal, sensitive information, which in turn also
controls the secondary use of such information by third parties (i.e. public health
monitoring, program evaluation, research etc.). In addition to this, the proposed
mobile solution has the potential to both reduce the complexity of the electronic
prescription transfer process and remove the dependency on the current major
supporting infrastructure (i.e. PES services) and Internet connectivity. Free from
those dependencies, the proposed mobile solution will therefore function just as
effectively in remote locations with poor or non-existent Internet connectivity,
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making it suitable for remote regions of Australia where the network availability is
limited or unreliable.
From a wider perspective the proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer
application is hypothetically suitable for the other countries and jurisdictions, for
instance in Japan, where healthcare information is considered to be too sensitive to
be transferred via the public Internet network.
Furthermore, without

the requirement for the supporting network

infrastructure and associated ongoing costs, this proposed solution has another,
wider-reaching, facet: the potential to improve the quality of care in third world
countries with limited resources, or indeed anywhere with network availability
issues, by enabling the use of electronic prescriptions.

1.2.4

Conclusion
As an enabler for mobile electronic prescription and potential future

innovations in the mobile ETP context, this research was conducted with a focus on
the practicality of its outcomes both from development and utilisation perspectives.
ETP plays a fundamental role in Australia’s eHealth initiative to improve its
healthcare system. The mobile electronic prescription transfer solution proposed in
this research offers an alternative to the continued use of the current costly and
technologically constrained ETP implementation. The current ETP implementation
has a significant ongoing operational cost (i.e. the Electronic Prescription Fee) and,
while this represents only a small part of the nation’s overall healthcare expenditure,
the funds could be invested in direct improvements in healthcare rather than spent on
ongoing infrastructure.

1.3

Structure of the thesis
This research identified the relevant acts, regulations and standards governing

the ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare industry at Commonwealth,
state and territory levels. Further assessment and analysis of the relevant regulatory
mandates determined each jurisdiction's readiness for the fully electronic ETP
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implementation, and established the mandatory security requirements for mobile
ETP applications (in fact for any fully electronic ETP implementation in general).
The research outcomes were recorded in two tables: one table contains each
jurisdiction's readiness for fully electronic ETP and the other lists the mandatory
security requirements from the data at rest and data in transit perspectives. The table
listing the mandatory security requirements will also serve as the security compliance
matrix for ETP applications in accordance with the Australian healthcare industry's
regulatory mandates. This security compliance matrix was used in determining
whether mobile operating and wireless communication have sufficient security
measures for ETP in the Australian healthcare industry.
Furthermore, this research proposed a fully electronic mobile ETP solution
using a number of technologies which comply with the security requirements listed
in the security compliance matrix. In order to propose said solution, a further series
of research into the governing standards and experimentations was conducted on
each candidate technology, assessing their compliance with the security
requirements.
This research began with a preliminary study (Chapter 1) where the
researcher explored the nature of electronic prescriptions and its usages and expenses
over the past decade. Chapter 2 delved into the literature review on how the current
implementation of ETP functions using the PES services and its governing standards,
regulations and acts. This second chapter also examined the potential issues and
shortcomings of current ETP implementation from various aspects, including
availability and consistency of the patient’s medication information, its requirements
for the supporting infrastructure and finally the associated ongoing expenses. It
should be noted that before formulating the Research Questions – one primary
question followed by two subsidiary questions – the researcher had previously
investigated the functions of the current ETP in terms of infrastructure, security and
its regulatory enablers and barriers. This research contributed to the publication of a
paper titled, “The hare and the tortoise: the potential versus the reality of ETP
implementation”.
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Chapter 3 discussed the underlying principles (i.e. research methodology,
methods and theoretical framework) and developed the research design and
investigative approaches with which to answer the Research Questions devised in
Chapter 2. Chapter 4 presented the research results and, based on those results,
proposed an alternative mobile ETP solution using a number of potential candidate
technologies

in supporting comparable security assurances. Table 4.1 (Analysis

matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully electronic ETP solution) recorded
each jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic prescription system from the
regulatory perspective. The regulatory mandates were interpreted into a set of
security requirements, the outcomes of which were recorded in section 2 and 3 of
Table 4.2 (Analysis matrix of Security requirements for electronic prescription
information).
Chapter 5’s emphasis is on Android’s security features from the data at rest
perspective. Data at rest is information stored on a mobile device, PC hard drives or
removable media (Hochmuth, n.d.). The experiment conducted was targeted towards
the Android’s encryption being able to handle and comply with the security
requirements from the data at rest perspective. This is an output from a research
paper titled “Security of ePrescription: Security of data at rest in Prescription
Exchange Services vs on mobile devices”, published as proceedings of the 4th
Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference in 2015 (Htat, Williams, &
McCauley, 2015b).
The emphasis of Chapter 6 was on the security aspects of data in transit, with
a detailed study of NFC technology’s security features and governing standards. The
experiment in section 6.2 found that, due to development and portability issues, the
use of NFC technology is not a practical solution. It was then decided to examine
Bluetooth wireless technology as the alternative transfer mechanism. The in-depth
study and experimentation on the Bluetooth technology’s security features and
governing standards proved it to be suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution.
The findings from this in-depth Bluetooth technology research was published in
another paper titled “Security of ePrescriptions: Data in Transit Comparison Using
Existing and Mobile Device Services”, published as proceedings of the Australasian
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Computer Science Week Multiconference 2017 (Htat, Williams, & McCauley,
2017).
Chapter 7 extended, from a more holistic perspective, the discussion built
from the previous chapters, the literature review and the experimentation and
research results. These discussions also reflect against the Research Questions
devised in Chapter 2. Additional output from this research development phase
yielded another publication titled “Future of Australia’s eTP: Script Exchange,
Script Vault or secure mobile alternative”. This was published as proceedings of the
14th Australian Information Security Management Conference 2016. Note that the
publication dates of the third and fourth papers are not in sequential order due to the
difference in the lead time between their submission dates and publication dates.
Figure 1.4 depicts the thesis structure reflecting on the research activities and
published papers. Finally, Chapter 8 concluded the research by listing its potential
impact and contribution towards the body of knowledge and identifying ways of
extending this research.
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Figure 1.4: Thesis structure reflecting the research activities and published papers
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CHAPTER 2.
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview
The literature review explores the progression from the paper-based manual

prescription process to the current implementation of the electronic prescription, with
an emphasis on how it functions, its regulatory enablers and constraints at
Commonwealth, state and territory levels and its limitations and issues as depicted in
Figure 2.1.
Literature Review

A brief history and
eTP s role in eHealth

manual prescribing vs
current electronic
prescribing

How current model of
electronic prescription works

Potential issues and
challenges of current eTP
implementation

Security Model
Limitation of the current
model and potential
extensions to it
eTP Architecture

Governing Standards,
Regulations and Acts

Conclusion

Figure 2.1: Structure of ETP Literature Review

The literature review begins with the identification of the relevant acts,
regulations, standards and specifications (such as Australian Technical Specification
- ATS4888 series) governing ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare
industry. The identification process commences at the Commonwealth level,
gradually narrowing down to state and territory (jurisdictional) levels. Once the
relevant Commonwealth and jurisdictional acts and regulations for ETP have been
identified, a thorough analysis is conducted to document the security requirements
mandated by those law and regulations. Further study is then conducted on the
relevant standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation in order to
document the security requirements imposed on the current ETP implementation.
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These combined requirements define the minimal set of security measures for the
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application.

2.2

A brief history and ETP’s role in eHealth
Although eHealth has many unique definitions from various perspectives, the

World Health Organisation (WHO) defines it as the transfer of health resources and
healthcare by electronic means (“eHealth”, 2014). Despite its diverse definitions
from various standpoints, eHealth’s crucial involvement in improving the Australian
healthcare system and making it a better maintainable system is irrefutable (Bennett,
2013). The National eHealth Transitioning Authority’s (NEHTA) Electronic
Medication Management (eMM) program is one of the first few critical phases in
laying the foundation of eHealth for the Australian healthcare industry. The eMM
program offers the promise of better healthcare services delivery via significant
improvements in reduced medical errors (e.g. through the sharing of precise patient
medication information between prescriber and dispenser), better compliance, time
and cost savings and better drug safety ("AMA Position Statement", 2009;
Ostergaard, 2011).
The eMM program primarily focuses on designing and developing eHealth
specifications to improve medication-related outcomes through improving the quality
and availability of medication-related healthcare information across the Australian
health sector and supporting organisations in implementing these specifications. In
fact, despite the significance of eHealth on eMM’s agenda in recent years, improving
medication management has been the objective of several national medicines
policies, such as Quality Use of Medicines (QUM) and the APAC Guidelines
(Ostergaard, 2011; “NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011), for well over a decade.
In this eHealth journey, the implementation of ETP is the first step towards
more efficient and effective medication management and it delivers several
capabilities in realising the promise of eMM (“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). In
addition, since one of eMM’s highest priority initiatives was to have the ETP process
in place, an early opportunity was presented for connecting a significant group of
healthcare providers (i.e. prescribers and dispensers) on a national scale (Ostergaard,
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2011). With ETP in place, the client’s/patient’s medication information is accurately
and securely shared, and a wide range of benefits are provided for all parties
involved such as prescribers, dispensers and consumers ("AMA Position Statement",
2009; "NPS MedicineWise", 2012).
All of these benefits were made possible by the initial step taken in the
prescription process: converting the conventional manual prescription process/model
to a digital equivalent one. In Australia, the Commonwealth Government’s Practice
Incentive Program (PIP), introduced in the late 1990’s to encourage desktop
computing by General Practitioners (GPs), also contributed to the foundation which
made this conversion a success. (Quinlan, 2000).
Developed countries around the world implemented their electronic
prescribing systems depending on their acts, regulations and the various levels of
healthcare infrastructure (i.e. government or private funded etc.). In United States of
America, the electronic prescribing facilities are provided by various healthcare
information exchange networks such as Surescripts, RelayHealth, McKesson,
ProviderPay, Truveris, AmerisourceBergen and a few others. Surescripts is the
dominant electronic prescription network used by the majority of all community
pharmacies in the U.S (Gabriel and Swain, 2014) and similar to Australia’s Script
Exchange, half of the company is owned by the Pharmacy Associations
(Moukheiber, 2014). Communication between the systems using different software,
drug vocabularies and terminologies is mediated using RxNorm. RxNorm provides
normalized names for clinical drugs and links them to the drug vocabularies
commonly used in pharmacy management and drug interaction software (e.g. First
Databank, Micromedex, Gold Standard Drug Database, and Multum) and
terminology used in coding clinical drug properties sch as mechanism of action,
physiologic effect, and therapeutic category (“RxNorm”, 2018). Meanwhile,
Canada’s national e-prescribing service is called PrescribeIT™. At the national level,
it enables prescribers to electronically transmit a prescription to a pharmacy of
patient’s choice (“PrescribeIT™”, 2018). The programme is lead by Canada Health
Infoway, a government funded not for profit organization, and offers three options to
patients; Directed, Deferred and Paper (“Backgrounder”, 2018). The "Directed"
option securely delivers the electronic prescription directly to the pharmacy using the
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PrescribeIT™ service if the patient has a pharmacy of choice at the time of
prescribing. The "Deferred" option enables the prescriber to send the prescription
electronically to the PrescribeIT™ service from which a pharmacy participating in
PrescribeIT™ can retrieve it when the patient presents the prescription summary they
have received from the prescriber. The "Paper" option allows the patient to request
for paper prescriptions to be issued (ibid). In Spring 2018, PrescribeIT™ extended its
functionalities to provide secure physician-pharmacy messaging, and to allow
prescribers and pharmacists to create, receive, renew and cancel prescriptions
(“PrescribeIT™”, 2018). In Portugal, the Electronic Medication Prescription (PEM in
Portugal), is a service implementing the electronic process of prescription,
dispensing and reimbursement of ambulatory medication (Patrao, Deveza & Martins,
2013). It was developed by a Portuguese Government institution SPMS EPE with
original intention of implementing additional safety and control in the medication
circuit, as well as increases the potential to avoid fraud and to reduce costs. Access to
prescription by pharmacy is authorized by the patient using the electronic
personal/citizen identification card (i.e. with a chip) and prescription code. While
prescriptions are integrated into the patient's electronic records within healthcare
institutions and updated, it also allows access to chronic medicines, prescription
history and alerts for interaction with allergies and adverse reactions registered on a
nationwide electronic health records and conveyed to the national patient summary
(ibid).
Despite all the differences in governing Laws and supporting infrastructures,
all of these e-prescribing systems share the common objectives in improving the
quality of the prescribing process (i.e. reduced fraud and abuse, and easier
communication), increasing the safety of the patient (i.e. through greater accuracy
with fewer errors and safer drug use with stronger medication compliance) and
optimizing the health-related federal and territorial expenditures.
One critical aspect of electronic prescribing and eMM is how the prescription
information and electronic health records are securely communicated between
healthcare providers. Almost two decades ago, before the extensive use of
smartphones, Chan (2000) proposed how to achieve a highly mobile health
management framework by combining World Wide Web and smart card
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technologies. In this approach, using the SmartCard–Web Gateway Interface (SGI)
as a common interface to communicate and access the medical records stored in a
smart card, Chan (2000) demonstrated the feasibility of the concept in facilitating a
truly mobile access of patient’s medical records. After almost a decade later, Jürjens
and Rumm (2008) proposed the use of model-based security analysis to address the
risk associated with inherent vulnerabilities of such devices and the significant
complexities of the architectures based on the study of the German Health Card. In
their study, Jürjens and Rumm (2008) stated that the security analysis has to be
embedded in the development and management of the systems.

2.3

Manual prescription vs current electronic prescription
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the conventional manual prescribing model with the

prescriber writing on a pre-printed prescription pad. Once signed by the prescriber,
the prescription is handed over to the patient/agent, who at later time will present it
to the pharmacy. When the prescription is presented by the patient/agent at the
pharmacy, the prescription details are transcribed into the pharmacy’s Electronic
Dispensing System (EDS) for dispensing. This collected and transcribed information
is also used in subsequent processes such as Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS)
claiming and repeat dispensing processes. Before the dispensing occurs, the process
mentioned above may include verification of the prescription details with the
prescriber if any information is unclear or should the pharmacy have concerns about
the validity of the prescription. This is usually carried out through a telephone call to
the prescriber. However, this conventional model depicted in Figure 2.2 has
numerous associated risks and vulnerabilities, including the loss of the prescription
by the patient, transcription errors during the pharmacy data-entry process, illegible
or misread script elements (especially with handwritten scripts) and fraudulent
production or alteration of scripts.
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Prescribe

Present

(Rx details on paper)

(Rx details transcribed
into pharmacy system)

Rx details

Loss/damage of script.

Transcribing error.

Fraudulent/alteration of script.

Misread script elements.

Figure 2.2: Manual prescribing process (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015)

The current implementation of ETP addressed these issues by facilitating the
electronic generation of a prescription by a prescriber, encryption of the generated
electronic prescription using the prescriber’s Commonwealth issued PKI certificates,
its secure transmission to a dispenser along with the electronic authentication of the
prescriber and dispenser access to the transmitted prescription using Commonwealth
issued PKI certificates. Figure 2.3 describes the current electronic prescription model
in Australia (Henderson, et al., 2014).

Figure 2.3: Current electronic prescription transfer process (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015)

This model makes use of the Prescription Exchange Service (PES), Electronic
Prescribing System (EPS) and Electronic Dispensing System (EDS) as its
fundamental components. The PES is an intermediary service which enables secure
transmission of electronic prescription information between prescribers and
dispensers (“ePrescriptions”, 2012). It is mandatory for a PES system to meet the
speciﬁed security and privacy standards approved by the Commonwealth
(“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). To this day there are only two PES
systems in Australia, Script Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure
(“Set up Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). The EPS is a component of the
prescriber’s clinical software package for generating an electronic prescription,
digitally signing it and finally uploading it to the PES (“ePrescriptions”, 2012). The
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EDS is another key component of pharmacy software which facilitates downloading
the electronic prescription from the PES and submitting dispense records to the PES
upon dispensing (“ePrescriptions”, 2012).

2.4

How current model of electronic prescription works
In this model, the EPS component of the prescriber’s clinical management

software generates electronic copy of the prescription, encrypts it using the Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate and then uploads it to one or both of the
registered prescription exchange service (PES) whenever the prescriber prints a
prescription (Standards Australia, 2013a).
Once uploaded, the prescription is stored securely on the PES to await
download by the dispenser. In the meantime, the prescriber signs the prescription and
hands it over to the patient/agent as per the manual prescription model. However, this
printed prescription has one or more barcodes, depending on whether the prescriber
is registered with one or both PES systems. Upon the patient/agent presenting the
prescription, the pharmacy’s eTP-enabled pharmacy software scans the barcode on
the prescription in order to download and decrypt the prescription details from the
PES system. These downloaded prescription details provide the pharmacy’s EDS
with the necessary information for dispensing and other subsequent operations such
as PBS claiming and updating National Prescription and Dispense Repository
(NPDR) (Standards Australia, 2013a).
Initially, prescriptions needed to be downloaded from the specific PES
system to which the prescriber had uploaded it. This restriction not only imposed
limitations on the prescription process but also added additional work load; having to
register with both PES systems and upload the prescription to both systems upon
prescribing. If this was not done and the pharmacy’s registered PES system was
different to that of the prescriber, the prescription could not be downloaded
(McDonald, 2012). This interoperability issue between the two PES systems not only
disrupted the flow of the prescription process but also incurred a higher cost in
delivering the service, costing eight-five cents (i.e. compared to thirty-five cents after
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achieving interoperability and later down to fifteen cents) in electronic prescription
fees for each prescription downloaded from PES (ibid).
Furthermore, earlier studies on ETP revealed that despite the large number of
prescriptions uploaded to PES by prescribers, the number of prescriptions being
downloaded by dispensers was much lower. This was primarily due to the pharmacy
at which the patient presents the prescription not being registered with the specific
PES to which the prescription was uploaded by the prescriber (McDonald, 2012).
The two PES systems became interoperable in December 2012 and the prescription
process consequently became much more efficient, with prescribers able to upload to
either PES system and dispensers to download from any PES system.
As part of this initiative for better interoperability between PES systems, the
cost of downloading a prescription was reduced to fifteen cents per prescription. In
addition to the interoperability, the two PES systems agreed to split the electronic
prescription fees when a prescription was uploaded to one PES and downloaded or
dispensed by the other (McDonald, 2012). At present, both PES systems are free of
charge to prescribers (i.e. general practices and specialists etc.) and cost neutral to
dispensers (i.e. pharmacies). There are no fees associated with registration or
licensing for both prescribers and dispensers. However, whilst there is no transaction
fee for prescribers for electronic prescriptions, pharmacies pay fifteen cents for each
eligible transaction (i.e. an eligible prescription downloaded from PES). This fee has
been offset as part of the two Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPA); 5th CPA for
1st July 2010 to 30th June 2015 and 6th CPA for 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2020
(“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (ETP)”, 2013), which Agreements provide a
mechanism by which the PES infrastructure is subsidised by the Commonwealth.
In the current prescription model, the printed prescription serves a dual
purpose; firstly as a legal instrument when signed by the prescriber and secondly as a
prescription notification slip (token) with one or more barcodes on it. In the current
ETP system, each electronic copy of a prescription is identified by a set of
alphanumeric characters that are unique in combination as mandated by the Section
6.2.2 of the ATS 4888.2-2013. This unique set of alphanumeric characters is called
the Document Access Key (DAK). The barcode on the prescription is the printed
representation of this unique DAK. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, when the pharmacy’s
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eTP-enabled EDS scans this barcode from the printed prescription, the DAK enables
the pharmacy software to download the prescription details from their PES system
and decrypt it for dispensing and other secondary uses (Standards Australia, 2013a).
This eliminates potential transcription errors, the need to verify prescription details
with the prescriber and the ability to fraudulently alter prescriptions.
This electronic prescription model described in Figure 2.3 is, however,
vulnerable to new potential issues such as incorrect medication code mapping
between the prescriber’s EPS and dispenser’s EDS systems (e.g. the use of
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) coding, Australian Medicines Terminology
(AMT) coding or other third-party product-specific coding systems), and other
interoperability failures between the participating systems. After dispensing the
medication, the EDS system provides a record of the dispensed medication to the
PES (Standards Australia, 2013a). In the original implementation, upon receiving
this dispensed record information the PES sent an automatic dispense notification
back to the original prescriber. However, this automatic dispense notification service
has been disabled at the request of the Royal Australian College of General
Practitioners, due to potential implications for clinician duty of care (McDonald,
2013a).
In both PES systems the Cipher Key, a unique symmetric key generated using
a one-way function from the DAK, is never disclosed to the PES operators so as to
assure the security and privacy of confidential information such as patient and
prescription details (Standards Australia, 2013a). NEHTA and Standards Australia
released the first draft of ETP technical specifications in December 2010, ETP
version 1.1 (“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions v1.1”, 2010). The Script Exchange
from eRx, however, had been running live across Australia for seven months when
this technical specification was released. Script Exchange, eRx’s implementation of
PES was therefore built using XML and Web Services technology based on the
international and Australian standards (“ETP Standards”, 2016). On the other hand,
MediSecure’s Script Vault was implemented in compliance with the HL7 Standards
as set out in the Australian Technical Standards (ATS) 4888 series and has
undergone the compliance audit process (“Frequently Asked Questions”, 2015).
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2.4.1

Security model
The security of electronic prescriptions on PES systems is primarily governed

by the Australian Technical Specification (ATS) 4888 series, with 4888.2-2013
particularly emphasising the platform independent model. The security mechanism in
ETP from a data at rest perspective revolves around the use of the Document Access
Key (DAK), which is presented as a barcode on the paper prescription produced by
any eTP-enabled electronic prescribing system (Standards Australia, 2013a).
In the current ETP implementation using PES systems, the DAK is used for
encrypting the electronic prescription prior to uploading to the PES system,
authorising access to the prescription stored on the PES system and decrypting it
when downloaded from the PES system. In fact, the DAK is the primary pillar on
which the entire ETP security model is built (ibid). Section 5.3 of ATS 4888.2-2013
provides an overview of the security mechanism using the DAK for securing the
electronic prescription (i.e. in the form of Secured Clinical Documents) in the current
ETP implementation and Figure 2.4 illustrates this operating mechanism.
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Figure 2.4: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription with PES (Standards Australia,
2013a, Figure 19)

The DAK is the parent key from which all other keys such as Retrieval Key
(RK), Cipher Key and DAK Holder Proof Key are derived using a published
algorithm. Each DAK contains a Provider ID which uniquely identifies the
operator/provider of the PES system and an entropic random value from which all
other keys are derived. The RK is a random value which references a specific
Secured Clinical Document (i.e. a prescription) from the PES system once it has been
qualified with the Provider ID, hence it is called Qualified RK (Standards Australia,
2013a).
Because the DAK’s random value has sufficient entropy, it is impractical for
a party to have knowledge about it unless it is explicitly disclosed to that. Possession
of a Qualified RK derived from the DAK therefore acts as a bearer’s credential and
thus grants the holder the right to retrieve the Secured Clinical Documents associated
with that specific Qualified RK (ibid).
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The Cipher Key is a unique symmetric key generated using a one-way
function from the DAK and is used in encrypting and decrypting the payload/content
of the Secured Clinical Document (i.e. the prescription). This encryption of the
prescription by the electronic prescribing system is evident in Figure 2.4 prior to
pushing/uploading it to the PES system. This Cipher Key is never disclosed to the
PES operators, ensuring that the content of the Secured Clinical Document is not
accessible and thereby keeping secure the individual’s private-information. This
process also eliminates the need to gain the consent of the prescription subject (i.e.
patient) to PES operators having access to their private information (ibid).
The DAK Holder Proof Key is another important key derived from the DAK
using a one-way function and is used by a dispensing pharmacy to prove to the PES
system that it holds a DAK. Figure 2.5 shows the various data types portraying the
implementation independent characteristics of a DAK (ibid).

Figure 2.5: DAK and its constituent data types (Standards Australia, 2013a, Figure 21)

To ensure the security of electronic prescriptions stored in PES system, each
of DAK’s mandated characteristics is accompanied by a list of security conformance
points. The security mechanism from the data at rest perspective makes use of the
DAK for encryption mechanisms within the PES system. Storing the DAK or its
derived Cipher Key on any stable storage (i.e. a permanent storage) requires a
minimum of 128 bits encryption. In addition to this, derivation of any Cipher Key,
Retrieval Key or DAK Holder Proof Key from a DAK by any system is strictly
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prohibited unless the user of that system is authorised to access the prescription
subject’s information from the Secured Clinical Document (i.e. the prescription)
associated with that particular DAK (ibid).
The specification ATS 4888.2-2013 also prohibits sharing of a DAK Holder
Proof Key as well as storing it in any non-transient recoverable form. Figure 2.6
depicts the structure and data types of an electronic prescription; the crucial piece of
information upon which the entire ETP system is built (ibid).

Figure 2.6: Electronic prescription and its constituent data types (Standards Australia, 2013a, Figure
23)

Despite being a platform specific implementation for web services, the
technical specification ATS 4888.6-2013, section 3.4, outlines how the Secured
Clinical Document is to be encrypted and decrypted for ETP or eHealth in general.
The way in which a Secured Clinical Document is created has no direct
impact on the security of electronic prescriptions on the PES from a data at rest
perspective. However, due to both the document type resulting from and the actions
required during this creation process it is crucial in determining whether the use of
mobile devices for transferring electronic prescription is achievable. The technical
specification ATS 4888.6-2013 mentions that the Secured Clinical Document is a
Signed Clinical Document encoded as Base64 binary data within the Message
Payload element in compliance with clause 7.3.1 of the specification ATS 58222010. In turn, the Signed Clinical Document is indeed an IHE’s Cross-Enterprise
Document Media Interchange (XDM) representation of an HL7 CDA form as
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defined in the specification ATS 4888.3-2013 (Standards Australia, 2013b; Standards
Australia, 2013c).
In summary, the security and integrity of prescription information within the
PES system from the data at rest perspective is governed by a set of specifications
and standards such as ATS 4888.2-2013, HL7 CDA and IHE, while facilitating the
national transition towards eHealth. On the other hand, the specification states that
the security of electronic prescription from the data in transit aspect is specific to the
implementation platform (Standards Australia, 2013a). This research found that the
security of the data in transit between ETP participants (i.e. Prescriber, Prescription
Subject, Prescription Exchange and Dispenser) relies principally on the encryption
mechanism of the specific implementation platform (ibid).

2.4.2

Limitation of the current model and potential extensions to it
The primary limitation of the current ETP model in our progress towards

more effective medication management is the availability of the patient’s medication
history. Despite the existence of the National Prescription and Dispense Repository
(NPDR), availability of patients’ medication history is limited and generally
acknowledged to be an issue for healthcare professionals. Moreover, the medication
information stored in NPDR has varying levels of clinical value and usefulness since
not all the information stored in NPDR is coded as per the Australian Medication
Terminology (AMT) coding system. Depending on where the information was
collected/submitted (i.e. the source of information), the medication information
stored in NPDR can be in image form, uncoded text or coded text using medication
coding systems other than AMT. The AMT system delivers unique codes to
unambiguously identify trade products and medicines approved for use in Australia
(McDonald, 2014; “Australian Medicine Terminology”, 2016).
In response to this, as a second step towards more effective medication
management, pharmacy software vendor FRED IT rolled out the first phase of
MedView Medicines Workspace during the later stages of the Northern Queensland
trial for the opt-out model of the My Health record (MyHR). This is a secured web
application to enable doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and patients to have shared
access to a patient’s critical medicines information in a summary form (McDonald,
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2016a, 2016b). The following figure, Figure 2.7, depicts the various sources from
which MedView will retrieve medication information in order to compile a
consolidated list of a patient’s medication history. Because it is still in early trial
stage, its practical usefulness and benefits to the healthcare industry are yet to be
witnessed.

Figure 2.7: MedView for consolidated patient’s medication history (“MedView and eRx”, 2012)

Another area yet to be explored to improve healthcare services is mobile
health or mHealth (“M-HEALTH”, n.d.). Along with both hardware and software
advancements in mobile technologies, the term “going mobile” is a recent trend in
digital transformation, affecting many industries such as retail, social networking,
banking and the legal industry. This even includes such highly regulated fields as the
public healthcare sector. The first instance of this assimilation into Australian
healthcare is the child health extension of the Commonwealth’s Personally
Controlled Electronic Health Records (PCEHR), which allows parents to enter
information such as immunisations, growth parameters and developmental
milestones for children up to the age of 14 years (McDonald, 2013b).
In the pursuit of better medication management, the mobile health option was
explored. As a result, a mobile application called eRx Express was released by eRx in
2014 to enhance the current electronic prescription process model described in
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Figure 2.3. It enabled patients to scan the DAK barcode from the prescription to their
mobile phone and securely submit it to their choice of pharmacy for a scheduled
pickup at later time (“Express Scripts”, n.d.). However, this application still requires
the printed prescription notification from which the DAK barcode was scanned
before being transmitted to a specific pharmacy. As a result, the prescriber’s
signature on the printed prescription is still mandatory as it is mandated by relevant
acts/regulations in each state and territory (e.g. Poison Regulation 1965 Regulation
51 (1B) in Western Australia). This requirement will only be replaced once the use of
digitally signed electronic prescriptions has legislative approval.

2.4.3

eTP Architecture
Over the past a few years, the healthcare industries in developed countries

have witnessed a significant increase in adopting electronic prescribing systems
(Monegain, 2013). The majority of these ETP adoptions were initially led by the
Government to improve the quality of healthcare and reduce Adverse Drug Events
(ADEs), while significantly reducing long-term costs via better prevention of ADEs
and readmissions (Reeve & Sweidan, 2011; Roughead, Semple & Rosenfeld, 2013).
However, once eHealth components are in place, even if partially operational, the
improved healthcare infrastructure, such as electronic healthcare records, will
increase the demand for electronic prescribing systems and unlock massive potential
for future growth. The level of ETP adoption in various countries, states and
jurisdictions varies based on diverse interpretations and implementations of data
protection as well as confidentiality laws, availability of required infrastructure and
resistance to embrace the change by the stakeholders at various levels (Jolly, 2011).
Figure 2.8 depicts the levels of ETP adoption, the extent to which ETP is
implemented, its influence on the information workflow and the form in which the
information is communicated (Gregory, 2013). Despite being a key government
initiative to improve the delivery and quality of healthcare, the level of ETP adoption
varies across the different sectors of the healthcare industry such as primary care
clinics, aged care facilities and hospitals.
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Figure 2.8: Level of ETP adoption (Gregory, 2013)

According to Figure 2.8, the printed prescription is both the legal prescription
for dispensing and the transfer medium for delivering the DAK identifier to the
dispenser in Level 1 ETP adoption. Having the prescription details printed with the
DAK benefits the patient because the printed prescription details may be used for
dispensing if the pharmacy’s EDS system is not eTP-enabled or access to PES is not
available (Gregory, 2013; “Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). However,
this requires the prescriber’s handwritten signature on the printed prescription as
mandated by the s. 51(1B) of the Poisons Regulations 1965 in WA and similar
legislation in other states.
On the other hand, using a data storage device as the transfer media for the
electronic prescription rather than the printed paper version eliminates the
requirement for the prescriber’s written signature, as this is exempted by the s. 51
(1A) and s. 51(1C) of the WA’s Poisons Regulations 1965 and s. 9(1) and s. 9(3) of
the Commonwealth’s Electronic Transaction Acts 1999.
In Level 2 ETP adoption, represented in Figure 2.8, the printed prescription
notification is used as a transfer medium for delivering the identifying DAK to the
dispenser. The printed prescription notification also contains the same prescription
details as the electronic prescription thereby facilitating dispensing if access to PES
system is not available (Gregory, 2013; “Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”,
2016). Nonetheless, due to this potential alternative use, the same principles and
restrictions apply to the prescriber’s handwritten signature as in Level 1 ETP
adoption.
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In the current electronic prescription transfer process, upon receiving the
printed prescription or the prescription notification submitted by the patient/agent,
the pharmacy’s eTP-enabled EDS system downloads the prescription details from the
PES system using the DAK. Finally, the Level 3 ETP adoption replaces the paper
notification with a fully-electronic notification thereby eliminating the requirement
for handwritten signature by the prescriber (Gregory, 2013).
However, since the digitally-signed electronic prescription is the legal
document in both level 2 and 3 of the ETP adoption, legislative approval for the use
of digitally signed electronic prescription is necessary. According to Figure 2.8, the
current implementation of ETP in Australian healthcare can be categorised as
between level 1 and 2 because, despite having the ability to use the electronic
prescription notifications in certain sectors of the healthcare industry, the printed
paper prescription remains the legal document and the legislative approval for the
use of digitally signed electronic prescription is yet to occur.

2.4.4

Governing Standards, Regulations and Acts
In order to remove the legislative barriers to the electronic communication of

health information and the consequent facilitation of an improved healthcare system,
numerous standards have been adopted and/or developed by various national
programs and authority bodies over the past decade, with the Commonwealth and
state governments repealing and/or amending acts and regulations for the same
purpose. The Australian Commonwealth government, for instance, has removed
Commonwealth legislative barriers to electronic prescribing and dispensing of PBS
medicine by implementing changes to the National Health (Pharmaceutical Benefits)
Amendment Regulations 2006.
However, state and territory legislative barriers remain unchanged despite
being identified for necessary changes. Alignment with Commonwealth amendments
is occurring slowly and this will provide rules for electronic prescribing and
dispensing in the respective jurisdictions. The following table briefly lists the
Commonwealth, state and territory acts and regulations which have been repealed
and amended to accommodate the implementation of ETP for Australian healthcare.
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Table 2.1: Commonwealth, State and Territory Acts enabling ETP implementation

Jurisdiction

Acts/Regulation

Commonwealth Electronic Transactions Act 1999
Commonwealth National Health Act 1953; National Health (Pharmaceutical
Benefits) Regulations 1960
NSW

Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008

VIC

Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Regulations 2006

QLD

Health (Drugs and Poisons) Regulation 1996

WA

Poisons Act 1964; Poisons Regulations 1965

SA

Controlled substances Act 1984; Controlled substances
(Poisons) Regulations 2011

TAS

Poisons Act 1971; Poisons Regulations 2008

ACT

Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2008;
Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulations 2008

NT

Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2012
Table 2.1 lists the acts and regulations which govern the implementation of

ETP at Commonwealth, state and territory levels. Figure 2.9 shows how these
governing acts and regulations fit together at Commonwealth, state and territory
levels in order to accommodate current nationwide ETP implementation. Figure 2.9
also demonstrates the relationship between legislation and regulations in Australia,
along with the complexity of this construction for eTP.
The outermost circle represents the encompassing regulation for the entire
nation. The next inner circle defines the regulations for each state and territory
amended as per jurisdictional legislative requirements. These two circles enable the
use of electronic transactions at national, state and territory levels, making the use of
ETP and other electronic transactions possible. The third circle lists acts and
regulations governing the poisons and therapeutic goods for each jurisdiction, which
play a key role in enabling the use of ETP system. The centre circle contains various
standards and specifications developed in compliance with those national and
jurisdictional legislative requirements. Because the closer the circle to the centre of
the diagram the more ETP specific it becomes, this diagram is named “Dante’s 4
circles of eTP”; its concept analogous to 14th century poet Dante Alighieri’s Nine
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Circles of Hell from Divine Comedy, where the lower circles are for more severe
sins.
(Commonwealth)
Electronic Transaction Act 1999

eTP related

Medicines, Poisons and Health (Drugs and
Therapeutic Goods Act Poisons) Regulation
2012 1996

Poision Act 1964
Poisons Regulation
1965

Implementation
•
•

ATS 4888.1 – 6 (2013)
AS 4700.3 (2014)

Poisons Act 1971
Poisons
Regulations 2008

Poisons and
Therapeutic
Goods Regulation
2008
Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods
Act 2008
Medicines, Poisons
and Therapeutic
Goods Regulations
2008

Controlled
Drugs, Poisons and
Substances Act 1984
Controlled Substances
Controlled substances
Regulations 2006
(Poisons) Regulations
2011

eTP related

Electronic Transaction Act 1999
(Commonwealth)

Figure 2.9: Dante’s 4 circles of eTP

The Electronic Transaction Act 1999 (Commonwealth) facilitates the use of
electronic means and enables the use of electronic communications in dealings with
government, business and community for future economic and social prosperity of
Australia. Various states and territories amended and adopted this overarching act
according to their jurisdictional legislative requirements. These jurisdictional
Electronic Transaction Acts, along with various acts and regulations governing the
poisons and therapeutic goods for each jurisdiction, dictate the requirements for ETP
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implementation

in

that

jurisdiction.

Additionally,

various

standards

and

specifications have been developed reflecting those requirements. The ATS4888
series and AS4700.3, which primarily govern the implementation of eTP, are
examples of those standards and specifications. Table 2.2 briefly describes the
constituent standards and specifications in Figure 2.9, Dante’s 4 circles of eTP, and
their usages and applications in ETP implementation.
Table 2.2: Standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation
Standards/Specification

Usages/Applications in implementing eTP

ATS 4888.1-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
independent (logical)
information model to
support electronic
transfer of prescriptions

Specifies the essential clinical data groups and elements required in an eprescription exchange for prescriptions that are generated by registered
medical practitioners and dispensed by pharmacists, and the constraints
that should be applied. In addition to specifying the requirements it also
identifies how the data elements of a typical printed prescription are
recorded in the structure of an e-prescription.

ATS 4888.2-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
independent (logical)
services model to
support electronic
transfer of prescriptions

Describes a technology platform independent model which describes the
constituent primary functionalities, processes and their interactions.
Implementing those functions allows conceptualizing and synthesizing of
a new model using mobile storage devices.

ATS 4888.3-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
implementation specific
e-prescription HL7
Clinical Document
Architecture
implementation guide

Defines the representation of a prescription using HL7 Clinical Document
Architecture (CDA) Release 2 for the electronic exchange of eprescriptions between healthcare providers as per Electronic Transfer of
Prescriptions (eTP) Specification.

ATS 4888.4-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
implementation specific
dispense record HL7
Clinical Document
Architecture

Describes the Dispense Record for Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions
(eTP).

This document guides implementers step by step through mapping each
data component of ATS 4888.1 to a corresponding CDA attribute or
element and specifies the descriptions of constraints on the CDA and
custom extensions to the CDA in order to fulfil the requirements for
Australian implementations of an electronic prescription (e-prescription).
It also contains conformance requirements against which implementers
can attest the compliance of their systems.

Dispense Record is primarily used in current ETP specification for
updating the Dispensing State, issuing Dispense Notifications to the
prescriber and sending the dispense information to the National
Prescription and Dispense Repository (NPDR).
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Standards/Specification

Usages/Applications in implementing eTP

implementation guide

ATS 4888.5-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
implementation specific
prescription request HL7
Clinical Document
Architecture
implementation guide

Describes the Prescription Request Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions
(eTP).

ATS 4888.6-2013
Electronic transfer of
prescriptions - Platform
implementation specific
web service

Defines a platform-dependent technical services specification for an
Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (ETP) package using web services. It
defines the roles, behaviours and service interfaces for the implementation
of an interoperable E-prescribing, E-dispensing, Prescription Exchange,
Facility Based Supply Manager and Last Supply Notification Agent
system. Compliance with ATS 4888.2 (i.e. platform independent
Specification) is implied by conformance with this Technical
Specification.

AS 4700.3-2014
Implementation of
Health Level Seven
(HL7) Version 2.5 Electronic messages for
exchange of information
on medicines
prescription

It is based on AS 4700.3-2005 and supersedes AS 4700.3(Int)-2007. It
covers the implementation of the Health Level Seven (HL7) Version 2.5
protocol for communication between prescribers, dispensers and their
healthcare trading partners in Australia and is an alternative approach to
the use of HL7 Clinical Document Architecture Release 2 (CDA) as
described in ATS 4888.x. The Standards Australia Working Group IT014-06-04, Prescription Messaging, has reviewed and interpreted data
segments and data elements as either mandatory, conditional or optional,
and provided relevant usage notes in the Australian health environment.

This would primarily be used by a dispenser for requesting a formal
prescription to legitimate the dispensing of therapeutic goods following an
instruction from a prescriber to supply a therapeutic good without a
prescription.

In addition to these standards and specifications listed in Table 2.2, the
following standards and technical specifications listed in Table 2.3 may also be
useful to support and govern various aspects of ETP implementation in the
Australian healthcare industry.
Table 2.3: Additional standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation
Standards/Specification

Usages/Applications in implementing eTP

AS 5550-2013 E-health
web services profiles

Specifies a Standard for interconnectivity between implementations using
Web services toolkits. Three profiles are specified - a base Web services
profile, and profiles for securing Web services using either TLS or WSSecurity. These can be used to secure Web services using existing toolkits
instead of bespoke approaches.
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Standards/Specification

Usages/Applications in implementing eTP

AS 5551-2013 E-health
XML secured payload
profiles

Describes a standard method for securing an XML document and defines
mechanisms for representing signed and/or encrypted XML fragments
using digital signatures, cryptographic encryption, or a combination of
these at multiple levels as required.
Unlike theW3C recommended XML structure where the signature and
encryption contains optional and implementation defined/specific
features, this standard only defines four XML elements for representing
secured XML fragments. One or more of these XML elements can be
used to secure the data as long as they are in XML fragments and the
signature and the XML fragment being signed, or the encryption keys and
cipher text, are represented together in the same XML document.

AS 5552-2013 E-health
secure message delivery

This standard defines an interoperable mechanism, a set of roles and their
associated interfaces and behaviour, for clinical messaging between
software systems at two distinct organizations over the Internet using the
industry-standard Web services protocols.
Clinical messaging requires a network infrastructure, broad
interconnectivity, end-to-end privacy and assurance of delivery.
Organisations which cannot rely on significant infrastructure or
technology expertise within the organization are accommodated by the
standard interfaces that cater for hosted services while retaining end-toend privacy and delivery assurance.
Key constraints/characteristics are (a) its only intended for use for
transmission of message payloads from an identified sender organization
to an identified receiver organization (b) Does not constrain the message
payload content. Only the control and routing information necessary for
transmission in a safe and secure manner is defined (c) Business processes
or business services are not included. Only the externally visible
behaviour necessary to implement interconnected messaging is defined.

ATS 5546-2013 E-health
endpoint location service

Provides a scalable and easily maintainable discovery mechanism for an
information sender to dynamically locate a relevant known target recipient
in the national e-health environment where communications between
different healthcare organizations is facilitated through the use of various
kinds of service invocation.
This document defines the technical service specification for the Endpoint
Location Service (ELS) and contains the requisite data types, interfaces
and their behaviours for unambiguous operation between clients and
service providers. It also provides the sender with technical information
required to invoke the instance.

HB 308 2011 Location
of digital signatures in

Despite not being a comprehensive guide to the security concerns of
digital signatures, it proposes a method for creating and storing digital
signatures in HL7 V2 messages that meet Medicare Australia (MA)
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Standards/Specification

Usages/Applications in implementing eTP

HL7 V2 Messages

requirements for a healthcare sector electronic transaction. It enables
paperless digitally signed documents to be implemented in place of
physically signed paper documents.

The Standards and Technical Specifications listed in both Table 2.2 and
Table 2.3 are neither complete nor comprehensive as only those relevant to this
research are shown. Also listed, however, are the applicable standards and
specifications; for the future implementation of digital signature usage in electronic
prescriptions, for instance, or for a different implementation such as replacing the
simple Subscriber-Provider architecture used in current ETP systems with Endpoint
Location Services (ELS). Their applicability varies depending on both the design and
the architecture of their implementation such as development of a web service or a
client-server application.
Whilst Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 list the relevant eHealth standards for
implementation of ETP and secure communication for healthcare information, as
well as the clinical documents in general, the Figure 2.10 depicts how some of these
eHealth standards fit together with other existing industrial standards from various
areas such as Extensible Mark-up Language (XML), Web services, cryptography and
communication protocols. While Figure 2.9 focused on the Acts and Regulations
specific to ETP implementation, Figure 2.10 emphasises how eHealth standards and
specifications sit within the existing industrial standards and protocols from a more
generic perspective of communicating healthcare information securely. Figure 2.10
was constructed by studying the relationship and dependencies between AS55502013, AS5551-2013, ATS5546-2013 and AS5552-2013.
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eHealth Application

E-health standards

AS 5552-2013 E-health secure message delivery (SMD)

ATS 5546-2013 E-health endpoint location
service

AS 5551-2013 E-health
XML secured payload
profiles

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

RFC2246
RFC2616
RFC4122
SOAP2007b
SOAP2007c
WSA2006
WSAM2007
WSDL2001
WSPL2007
WSS2006
WSSPL2007
X509-2005

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

ACSI33
EXC2002
FIPS197
MCIN2005
PKCS-1993
RFC3986
XENC2002
XEXSD2002
XML2008
XSBP2009
XSD2004a
XSD2004b
XSSP2002

Figure 2.10: eHealth standards and industrial standards
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XML and encryption standards

Communication, web service
and encryption standards

AS 5550-2013
E-health web
services profiles

2.5

Potential issues and challenges of current ETP implementation
Current ETP implementation using PES has enabled us to progress forward

according to the national strategy for improving Australian healthcare system
outcomes in a sustainable manner. However, the current implementation is not
without significant issues.
Current ETP implementation requires a supporting infrastructure and
involves an ongoing cost. Due to this dependency on the supporting infrastructure
(i.e. the Internet connection), current ETP implementation is not suitable for remote
regions of Australia where network availability is limited or unreliable. Moreover,
the associated ongoing fee of fifteen cents for each prescription downloaded, whilst
negligible for an individual prescription, represents a substantial amount nationwide
and will have a significant impact on the nation’s healthcare expenditure in the long
run.
The announcement by eRx in August 2015 regarding the dispense of their
first billionth electronic prescription indicated that this approach had cost the nation
at least $150 million at that point in time (McDonald, 2015). When combined with
the figures of the only other PES service in Australia, the total electronic prescription
fees incurred so far was significantly more. According to eRx’s survey outcomes,
eRx is currently dispensing approximately 22.5 million electronic prescriptions each
month, resulting in AU$3.3 million dollars for electronic prescription fees alone
(“One billion eRx electronic scripts”, 2016).
Predictably, an annual increase of at least five percent in the number of PBS
prescriptions is shown in Figure 1.1. This increase will eventually lead to an increase
in cost over time while making use of the current PES implementation, and this cost
will continue to rise significantly over time unless a more cost-effective alternative
approach is implemented.
Another challenge with the current PES infrastructure is the availability of the
patient’s medication history (Productivity Commission, 2015; “MedView Medicines
Workspace”, 2016). Since the medication information stored in the NPDR is not
coded according to the AMT coding protocols, it has varying levels of clinical value
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and usefulness for the healthcare professionals (McDonald, 2014). In fact, this
shortcoming resulted from another issue which was the failure to adhere to a single,
consistent coding system (ibid). The Jurisdictions require that the AMT coding be
used in medication-related clinical activities such as prescribing, recording,
medication review, prescription dispensing, medication administration and transfer
of medicines information between and within healthcare organisations. Despite this
requirement, however, getting all the stakeholders to conform to this practice has
proved very challenging (“Electronic Medication Management Systems”, 2012).
For instance, although PBS data should match AMT data in most cases, some
AMT codes in PBS distribution are different to those in the AMT distribution from
the National Clinical Terminology and Information Service (NCTIS) (“AMT PBS
FAQs”, 2016). This is due to PBS system creating its own description and using its
own namespace identifier – the 7 digit ID which appears within the full identifier
string – where a product needs to be described differently for legislative and
reimbursement purposes, or even where the AMT concept does not meet PBS
requirements, for example the PBS description requires more or less detail than the
associated AMT description provides (“AMT PBS FAQs”, 2016).
In addition, AMT and PBS have different release cycles, making the change
incorporation more difficult and increasing the chances localised changes being
required (i.e. non-AMT PBS codes). Both the NEHTA, which is now known as
Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA), and PBS have been working together to
ensure quality mapping processes and alignment between both the AMT and PBS
releases (“Answers to questions on notice”, 2016).
This inconsistent use of coding systems nonetheless has the potential to create
interoperability issues between the stakeholders, which would represent significant
delays in reaching eTP’s full potential. Furthermore, this potential interoperability
issue discouraged the EPS and EDS software vendors from adopting the AMT
coding system (“MSIA Issues presented at the eHealth ICT meeting”, 2013). In any
case, adoption of AMT coding by EPS and EDS software vendors may not be an
issue in the future as AMT coding has been provided as a formal subset of the
SNOMED CT-AU release since late 2015 (“Australian Medicine Terminology”,
2016).
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Another inconvenience of the current ETP implementation is the remaining
legislative requirement for a handwritten signature by the prescriber in most
jurisdictions. While awaiting the legislative changes supporting the use of digital
signature in electronic prescriptions, the printed, paper-based prescription remains
the legal document, requiring the prescriber’s signature as per current acts and
regulations. Because the current ETP implementation uses a printed, paper-based
prescription to transfer the identifying DAK to the dispenser, the necessity of a paper
token from the prescriber remains active and in place, along with all the legislative
and regulatory constraints. This requirement for prescriber’s handwritten signature
impedes the adoption of the electronic prescription process and its full potential such
as remote prescription.
Compared to the prior challenges such as the ongoing operation cost, the
inability to assist in recording the patient’s medication history and the requirement
for the prescriber’s hand-written signature, the following two issues are specifically
from the technical and implementation perspectives. Despite interoperability between
the two PES systems, further information sharing is unlikely to be straightforward, as
their implementation and governing standards differ from one another; MediSecure’s
Script Vault complies with HL7 standards as mandated in ATS 4888 series, while
eRx’s Script Exchange is built using XML and Web Services technology drawn from
different International and Australian standards (“ETP Standards”, 2016; “Frequently
Asked Questions”, 2015).
This being the case, unless significant modifications are made to both
systems for better information flow, further interaction or information sharing is
more likely to require a third-party tool/utility such as a protocol translator or
integration engine, for instance Orion Health's Rhapsody, NextGen Healthcare’s
Mirth Connect or Infor's Cloverleaf. This introduction and utilisation of third-party
tools would produce not only an additional cost to the system but also the
considerable associated risks and vulnerabilities.
One definition of vulnerabilities is “weaknesses in a computer’s makeup that
allows it to be exploited by cybercriminals” (“Vulnerabilities”, 2017). Since tools
and programs are written by humans, they are inherently imperfect and are not free
of errors and therefore have the potential to create avenues for would-be attackers
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(Holt, 2017). The current PES implementations do not utilise the established eHealth
infrastructures for transferring prescription information. Over the course of the
eHealth journey, a tremendous amount of time, effort and funding has been expended
on putting in place various eHealth specifications and infrastructures such as the
Health Identifiers (HI) Services, Secure Message Delivery (SMD) and Endpoint
Location Services (ELS).
However, the PES prescription exchange model uses none of these features.
Instead of making use of HI and ELS services, PES implements a simple SubscriberProvider pattern. Use of SMD is also irrelevant for PES prescription exchange model
as it is not a dedicated point-to-point transmission; the prescriber’s submitted
prescription is stored on PES to await its download by a subscribed dispenser (i.e.
pharmacies). Therefore, these costly eHealth services are of little use for current PES
implementation although they could have been utilised for better security and
consistency.

2.7

Summary
The literature review presents and discusses the issues and shortcomings

surrounding the current implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry
from a number of aspects including availability and consistency of the patient’s
medication information and the nation’s healthcare expenditure.
Beginning the literature review on ETP is a brief history of Australia’s
eHealth journey under the guidance of NEHTA, which signifies a crucial step
towards Electronic Medication Management and many other programs on the
eHealth agenda. This is followed by an outline of the transition from manual
prescribing to the current implementation of ETP using two PES services. The
functioning of ETP implementation is briefly and clearly described, along with its
interactions with external systems such as NPDR and the PBS online claiming
system. The technical details of ETP are explored next, including its security
measures using DAK and the requirement for the prescriber’s signature on printed
prescriptions.
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The ongoing associated cost of a fifteen-cent electronic prescription fee and
its current subsidisation by the Commonwealth is briefly discussed before
emphasising the inability of ETP to provide patients’ complete medication history to
the clinician and other healthcare provider despite the existence of the National
Prescription and Dispense Repository (NPDR). The fact that NPDR’s varying levels
of clinical value and usefulness is primarily due to the use of different coding such as
AMT coding and non-AMT PBS coding is highlighted. Following this is a
description of FRED IT’s current attempt, using MedView Medicines Workspace, to
facilitate shared access of critical medicines information among healthcare service
providers such as doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and patients.
The current “going mobile” trend in the Australian healthcare sector is
highlighted by a brief mention of the release and use of the child health mobile
application extension of the Commonwealth’s Personally Controlled Electronic
Health Records (PCEHR) and the eRx Express mobile application. This is followed
by an explanation, from the architectural perspective, of the various levels (i.e. Level
1-3) of ETP adoption and its influence on the information flow, the form in which
the information is communicated and the legal document format (i.e. printed or
electronic form) in each ETP adoption level.
The next section identifies and examines the relevant Acts, regulations,
standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation at Commonwealth,
state and territory levels in terms of their influence on current ETP process and the
security measures they mandate. How they fit together and form a complex
legislative and regulation construct for ETP is depicted by Figure 2.9 (Dante’s 4
circles of eTP), whilst Tables 2.2 and 2.3 briefly describe each of the eTP-related
standards and specifications relevant to this research. Figure 2.10 helps to explain the
positioning of eTP- and eHealth-specific standards within the existing industrial
standards from contexts such as communication, web services, XML and encryption.
The literature review concludes by highlighting the shortcomings of the current ETP
implementation such as its reliance on the supporting infrastructure and associated
ongoing cost, its inability to provide a patient’s complete medication history and its
requirement for the prescriber’s handwritten signature, which presents an obstacle to
becoming a fully electronic process.
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The literature review also contributes by providing a clear awareness of the
fact that, despite being a crucial development in eHealth initiatives towards a safer
and better outcome in Australian healthcare, current ETP implementation has some
significant and costly flaws in terms of availability and consistency of the patient’s
medication information and an ongoing expense which can only rise with the
increase in population. Given the advancements in security and widespread user
acceptance of mobile computing, it is imperative to explore a viable alternative
electronic prescription transfer mechanism with comparable security assurance at a
cheaper cost, if not completely cost-free.
From the legislative and regulatory perspectives, the Commonwealth and the
states and territories have repealed and amended Acts and Regulations and developed
and/or adopted numerous standards and specifications in order to pave the way for
implementing eTP. However, legislative approval for the legal use of digitally-signed
electronic prescriptions is still pending, thereby impeding one of the final processes
supporting the efficient use of electronic information communication in electronic
prescribing.

While

awaiting

further

legislative

changes

supporting

ETP

implementation to the next level, it is therefore necessary to explore alternatives
which can be implemented within the existing legislative framework - alternatives
with reduced complexity, comparable security measures and controls and without the
need for major supporting infrastructure and its associated ongoing costs.
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2.8

Research Questions (RQs)

2.8.1

Main Research Question
The primary research question is:

Can a technical framework be constructed to serve as a guide for development of
ANDROID mobile electronic prescription transfer applications in compliance with
the security requirements mandated by Australian healthcare laws, regulations and
standards?
The Primary Research Question was addressed through the exploration of
two supporting Research Questions. Based upon the findings from the supporting
questions, this research determined whether a technical framework can be
constructed for development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer
applications in compliance with the relevant laws, regulations, standards and
specifications governing the Australian healthcare industry.
Based on the outcomes and preliminary analysis of the Primary Research
Question in the creation of such technical framework, an associated series of
procedures was then developed to validate and verify a functional, practical and
implementable solution, which could potentially serve as an alternative approach in
the adoption of a mobile electronic prescription transfer mechanism for the
Australian healthcare industry. The first supporting question relates to the security
requirements for electronic prescription transfer applications in the Australian
healthcare industry.

2.8.2

Subsidiary Research Question 1

How can the security requirements imposed by the relevant laws, regulations and
standards in the Australian healthcare system be integrated into a framework for the
assessment of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications?
Answering this Subsidiary Research Question involved analysing the acts,
regulations, standards and publications related to the security requirements and the
electronic prescription transfer specifications for prescribing in the Australian
healthcare context. The publications included those produced by the Australian
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Digital Health Agency (formerly NEHTA), Standards Australia, the Department of
Health, the Pharmacy Guild and other relevant authorities. The resultant analysis
formed the assessment criteria for the next phase of the research: further
investigation of and experiments on the candidate technologies such as operating
system platform, encryption and wireless communication.

2.8.3

Subsidiary Research Question 2

How can the assessment criteria framework developed in Subsidiary Research
Question 1 be used in assessing the native security features and third-party tools on
the Android for the security compliance of mobile electronic prescription transfer
applications?
This second supporting question required a detailed study of the capability of
the Android’s native security features, other third-party security tools/frameworks
and wireless communication technologies, to fulfil the security requirements
identified by the previous Research Question. Through a series of experiments,
potentially some in an iterative manner, this research identified the candidate
technologies and studied their relevant security measures/mechanisms which address
the security requirements specified in the outcome of Subsidiary Research Question
1. The experiment outcomes were assessed for technical viability and practicality in
the development and deployment of potential solutions for the Australian healthcare
industry.

Research Thesis - 45 of 269

2.9

Learning from the Research
This study of the current implementation of ETP emphasises on how it

functions, its regulatory enablers and constraints at Commonwealth, state and
territory levels as well as its limitations and issues. This study states the vital role of
ETP in improving the Australian healthcare system and its future maintainability. It
examines the security model of current ETP implementation, which revolves around
the use of DAK for securing prescription information. It investigates the levels of
ETP implementation/adoption and subsequently categorises the current ETP
implementation in Australia as between level 1 and 2, according to Gregory's (2003)
levels of ETP adoption. The limitations of the current ETP implementation are
discussed, along with its potential extensions for improvements. Next it identifies the
relevant laws, regulations, standards and specifications governing the ETP
implementation at Commonwealth, state and territory (i.e. jurisdictional) levels.
These findings establish the minimal security requirements for Android mobile ETP
applications.
This study concludes with the construction of the Primary Research Question
and two Subsidiary Research Questions, which in turn lead to the next stage of the
research. The paper produced at the end of this stage (i.e. Research Paper 1 in
Appendix A) firstly briefly describes these findings and secondly contrasts the
current ETP implementation with its full potential as a mobile implementation. The
research findings published in the paper produced were verified by the “tripleblinded peer review” process.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015). The Hare and the Hortoise
[sic]: The Potential Versus the Reality of eTP Implementation. In
Proceedings of the 23rd Australian national Health Informatics Conference
2015, Brisbane, Australia (pp. 114-120).
Contributions: Htat (65%), Williams (25%) and McCauley (10%)
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CHAPTER 3.
3.1

RESEARCH METHODS

Overview
This chapter begins by exploring some qualitative research methods relevant

to this research and is followed by a discussion of the underlying principles, designs
and investigative approaches employed in endeavouring to answer the Research
Questions.

3.2

Methodological Approach
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) suggest that there are three essential components

to understanding the nature of qualitative research. The first component declares that
qualitative research is interpretive, the second states that it is multimethod and the
third articulates that it is conducted in the field or in the person’s natural setting and
surroundings.
Christensen et al (2011) refer to the use of several methods (i.e. multimethod)
as triangulation because it is believed that “the use of several methods provides better
understanding of the phenomenon being investigated”. Whilst Moore (2002) defines
research methods as the tools selected by researchers to provide the data that
explores research questions (i.e. subsequently analysis conducted, and conclusions
are drawn upon), Williamson (2002) stresses their importance by suggesting that the
selection of an appropriate methodology is crucial to the success and applicability of
the research. Pickard (2007) supports the importance of selecting an appropriate
method, as well as the researchers’ understanding of the methods in establishing the
validity of the research findings. Williamson then cites that “truth value”,
“applicability”, “consistency” and “neutrality” are the four concepts with which to
gauge the value of the research. In qualitative research such concepts are mapped to
“credibility”, “transferability”, “dependability” and “confirmability” respectively
(Pickard, 2007).
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In order to establish such value and credibility for the research, the following
section explored and investigated different research methods selected for their
apparent relevance to the nature of this research.

3.2.1

Hermeneutics
Initial investigation of the hermeneutics approach was conducted, since

answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 required deciphering the true meaning of
what the legal texts imply and interpreting them into a set of security requirements.
The name hermeneutics comes from the Greek word “hermeneuein”, meaning “to
interpret or translate”, and it offers a theoretical framework for interpretive
understanding, or meaning, with an emphasis on context and original purpose. It
originally provided guidelines for scholars in interpreting biblical texts into actual
explanation (Crotty, 1998).
Ree & Urmson (1991) point out the radical redevelopment of hermeneutics
by modern thinkers from a method used by theologians to investigate the inner
meanings of sacred texts to a reflective practice of unmasking hidden meanings
beneath apparent ones. In 2003, Laverty described the data generation and analysis
processes conducted in a Hermeneutical Circle method as being comprised of
reading, reflective writing and interpretation with rigour. Laverty also depicted these
processes as shown in the Figure 3.1.

Interpreting
Reflective Writing
Reading

Figure 3.1: Hermeneutical Circle (Laverty, 2003)

The initial intent of this research was to utilise the hermeneutics approach to
derive a set of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) from the applicable
legislations, regulations and standards for the security of electronic prescription
information in the Australian healthcare industry. However, further investigation
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revealed that hermeneutics was not a suitable method, since this research is seeking
neither the transcendental interpretations of the text nor the meaning determined by
the researchers using their interpretation for further discussion and understanding
(Crotty, 1998; Cole & Avison, 2007). This research simply needed to interpret the
legal texts and standards in order to create a set of technical and security
requirements.

3.2.2

Document Analysis
Bowen (2009) defines document analysis as “a systematic procedure for

reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and electronic (computer-based
and Internet-transmitted) material”. He also mentions that it is a low-cost,
unobtrusive and non-reactive way to obtain empirical data. Although it has been used
primarily as a complement to other research methods for triangulating and theory
building, its uses as a stand-alone method have increased considerably within the
public health research environment, especially in evaluating the impact of initiatives
such as a committee-led venture to increase immunisation uptake in an area or a
Board-led approach to reduce sexual ill-health (“Document Analysis”, n.d.; Bowen,
2009).
In the document analysis approach, documents containing texts and images
produced without the researcher’s intervention are examined and interpreted in order
to elicit meaning, to gain a more in-depth understanding and to develop empirical
knowledge (ibid). The documents can be in a variety of forms retrieved from various
sources such as libraries, newspaper archives and organisational or institutional files.
Researchers using this approach would normally review prior literature as part of
their studies and then incorporate that information in their reports (Bowen, 2009).
According to Bowen (2009), document analysis is an iterative process which
combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis involving skimming
(superficial examination), reading (thorough examination) and interpretation. In this
approach, the use of content analysis organises the information into categories
related to the phenomena of interest and entails a first-pass document review which
identifies the meaningful and relevant passages of texts or other data (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). Through a more in-depth and focused re-reading and review,
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thematic analysis in this approach identifies patterns within the data, as well as
emerging themes, as the basis for further analysis, coding and category construction
based on the data’s characteristics (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).
Like other research methods, document analysis is not without inherent
limitations (Bowen, 2009). However, limitations such as “insufficient detail” and
“low retrievability” were not applicable to the documents used in this research, and
the benefits of the method outweighed its limitations. Based on these findings, this
research employed the document analysis method for evaluating documents (i.e. the
applicable legislations, regulations and standards) in such a way that empirical
knowledge was produced.
Through document analysis an understanding was developed to derive a set
of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) from those documents with the aim
of securing electronic prescription information in the Australian healthcare industry.
The value and credibility of this particular research was strengthened by the use of
triangulation. Whilst Angers and Machtmes (2005) stress the necessity of
triangulation to minimise bias and establish credibility of the data obtained during
the research, Patton (1990) claims that the use of triangulation helps in preventing
the introduction of vulnerabilities due to the research findings being an artefact of a
single method or source, or influenced by a single investigator’s bias. The research
findings are corroborated by the supervisory review at the end of each research stage.

3.2.3

Experimental Research
Pickard (2007) defined experiment as “a controlled research situation” in

which the researcher can establish the experimental conditions down to the smallest
details, where the experimental environment can be isolated from the unwanted
variables and external influences. The extent of error (i.e. experimental error) must
be identified when these conditions cannot be met entirely (Pickard, 2007). Pickard
also stresses that understanding the nature of experimentation and experimental error
is crucial in establishing the value and significance drawn from the research.
The basic model of the true experiment not only demonstrates that “If X then
Y” but also “If no X then no Y” (Pickard, 2007). The inherent difficulties in
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measuring the extent of error and identifying the variables responsible for it classify
many studies which claim to be “experimental research” as “quasi-experimental
research”. Whilst the true experiment aims towards covariance between the identified
variables, with deliberate manipulation of the independent variables, the quasiexperiment aims to establish levels of correlation between observable variables
without any intervention and temporal restrictions (Pickard, 2007; Field & Hole,
2002).
Christensen et al (2011) describe experimental research as an attempt to
identify cause-and-effect relationship by conducting controlled experiments. From
the most simplistic perspective, cause is something that produces something else and
effect is the difference between what would have happened without the manipulation
of the independent variables and what did happen with the manipulation of those
(ibid). Christensen et al (2011) also state that it is impossible to obtain the true
measure of an effect as it requires the situation to both be X and Y at same time,
when they are in fact mutually exclusive (i.e. impossible).
Before developing enough understanding of the experimental research
method, it was initially assumed that answering Subsidiary Research Question 2
would follow the quasi-experimental research method. With better understanding of
the method, however, and since Subsidiary Research Question 2 only sought “how to
use the findings from Subsidiary Research Question 1 in assessing security
compliance of an Android electronic prescription transfer application” rather than
pursuing the “cause-and-effect” of using those findings in such a security compliance
assessment, it was concluded that the use of the experimental research method was
not an appropriate approach for this particular research.

3.2.4

Action Research
Seale (2007) state that action research is “grounded in the belief that research

with human brings should be participative democratic”. Reason and Bradbury (2001)
second this by declaring that “A primary purpose of action research is to produce
practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives”. It
is more often used in the fields of information and communication research due to its
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value in improving service provision, encouraging reflective practice and structuring
and disseminating experience to the wider community (Pickard, 2007).
Kurt Lewin, who first used the term “action research”, believes that some
form of action/change has to be part of the research design from the beginning in
order to make a difference (Pickard, 2007). Therefore, an investigation leads to some
form of action and it is then followed by an evaluation (ibid). However, Williamson
(2002) calls this design the “most basic action research cycle” and describes it as in
Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: The most basic action research cycle (Williamson, 2002)

Williamson states that the “reflection is based on experiences of action” and
describes the whole practice as a learning process. She portrays it iterative nature of
action research’s thusly: “Action research is usually carried out in discrete cycles,
where later cycles are used to challenge, support and refine insights and results from
previous cycles” (Williamson, 2002). The Action Research cycle, with multiple
elements for more complex scenarios, is depicted in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: A typical action research cycle (Williamson, 2002)

Whilst participation in the research context leads to the thorough
understanding of the problem, the action/change introduced and the outcome of that
action/change, the researcher actually being part of the context being researched and
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having such tacit knowledge of the situation posed the greatest challenge for this
research method, which calls into question the credibility or validity of the outcome
because it relies on the researcher’s notion of objectivity. Nevertheless, Herr and
Anderson (2005) point out that it is irrelevant to use the same validity criteria used in
judging the positivistic and naturalist researches, and provided “democratic validity”,
“outcome validity”, “process validity”, “catalytic validity” and “dialogue validity” as
the five criteria applicable in measuring the credibility of action research.
Although this research is not a perfect candidate for the use of the action
research method, better understanding of this method enabled the researcher to
derive from it an iterative experimentation and reflection approach for this particular
research. This derived approach still agreed with Williamson’s (2002) brief
description of the action research cycles as “mini-experiments in practice”.
In each cycle of research, the reflection on the experimentation result
indicated whether or not the candidate technology complied with the mandated
security requirements, that is to say whether or not it could be used in the proposed
mobile ETP solution, and whether or not the experimentation needed iteration with a
different technology.

3.3

Theoretical Framework for the Research
Williamson (2002) uses the architect’s house-plan metaphor to depict a

theoretical framework; a theoretical framework describes the key ideas underpinning
the research and how they are related in the same way in which a house plan
describes the rooms of the house and how they are interconnected. Crotty (1998)
says that the starting point in developing a research proposal is to identify the
methodologies and methods that will be utilised in the research and consequently
justifying the choice. Therefore, this section identifies and describes the relevant
theoretical framework to be employed in addressing the Research Questions.
This research falls into the realm of mixed methods, these being qualitative
and iterative experimentation and reflection. It used qualitative data from the
document analysis research followed by iterative experimentation to explore and
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verify potential solutions and subsequently derive a framework to answer the main
Research Question.
Miles and Huberman (1994) mention that the qualitative aspects are based on
observation, interviews or reading documents, whilst Wolcott (1992) describes it as
“watching, asking or examining”. The objective of this study is to interpret the
requirements mandated by acts, regulations and standards into a set of acceptance
criteria (i.e. security requirements) to be fulfilled by such potential candidate
technologies as Android’s native security features and third-party tools and shortrange wireless communication technologies such as NFC and Bluetooth.
Williamson (2002) categorises research as basic research, primarily
concerned with deriving new knowledge and focusing on theory building and/or
hypothesis testing, and applied research, which concerns solving specific problems in
real-life situations and is immediately usable as solutions to actual problems. While
basic research mainly contributes to the advancement of the general knowledge of
society, applied research intends to help practitioners to be better informed about
their work environment and to do their job better (Williamson, 2002). According to
Williamson’s categorisation, this particular research is of applied research type with
exploratory nature.
Despite qualitative research being a widely used approach and offering many
ways of being conducted, there are some pervasive issues associated with qualitative
research such as labour-intensive data collection, the distinct possibility of researcher
bias, time demands for processing and coding data and the credibility and quality of
conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The reliability and validity of the
qualitatively derived findings in particular can be seriously in doubt (Dawson, 1979,
1982; Ginsberg, 1990; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Kvale, 1989a; LeCompte & Goetz,
1982) as it is mainly dependent on the competence of the analysis process.
Williamson (2002) suggests the use of triangulation, which encourages validation of
interpretivist research findings by adding rigour, breadth and depth to the
amalgamation, analysis and writing up of the data. This is achieved by using multiple
methods and theoretical constructs; (1) the use of data triangulation which allows the
researcher to access variety of data sources for the study, (2) the use of several
different researchers and/or evaluators, (3) the adoption of multiple theories and/or
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perspectives to interpret a single set of data and (4) undertaking multiple methods to
study a single problem or phenomenon.
May (2002) also states that the relationship of the researcher to the research is
important since the researcher’s ability to interpret data sensibly and avoid reading
too much or not enough into a situation will depend on firsthand experiences.
Moreover, Liamputtong (2009) adds that it is crucial for qualitative researchers to
have a good understanding of the methodology so that they can interpret data
sensibly and with insight and not simply interpret data in the light of preconception
and prejudice which has the potential to perpetrate unsatisfactory or inappropriate
understandings of the phenomenon of interest.
As this research was conducted in eHealth, an emerging field at the
intersection of medical informatics and public health and information security, there
was little literature about theoretical frameworks for use in this integrated field. Since
this study was designed to decipher the true meaning of the legal texts, interpret them
into a set of security requirements and build a framework to guide the development
of a mobile ETP application in compliance with those security requirements, a
combination of document analysis and repetitive/cyclic experimentation research
approaches was employed.
Bowen (2009) describes document analysis as a systematic procedure for
reviewing or evaluating documents in textual or graphical forms that have been
recorded without the researcher’s intervention. Similar to other analytical methods in
qualitative research such as hermeneutics, document analysis method examines and
interprets documents in various forms in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding
and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen, 2009). However, unlike the hermeneutics
approach, the interpretation using document analysis did not reflect the researcher’s
perception of the phenomena transcending its textual meaning. Instead, using
document analysis, the artefacts were examined and interpreted by the researcher to
derive their genuine meaning relevant to the context of interest.
In this study the document analysis research approach was used to derive the
acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) via analysis and interpretation of the
existing artefacts, namely the applicable laws, regulations and standards related to
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electronic prescribing and dispensing, together with information security in the
Australian healthcare industry.
The data generation/collection phase involved extensive study and analysis of
the applicable legislations, regulations and standards. However, this research
extended the interpretation of artefacts to construct the relationships between the
legal explanations and a practical understanding for real-life application. Manen
(1990) suggests that there is no fixed set of methods to perform this type of study.
Both the data generation and analysis processes used a document analysis circle
method which mainly comprised skimming, reading and interpretation (Bowen,
2009). By adding the process of “knowing the research context and finding relevant
artefacts” to Bowen’s (2009) description of the document analysis method, Figure
3.4 portrays the Document Analysis Circle for this particular research and is adopted
from the Laverty’s (2003) depiction of the Hermeneutical Circle.

Knowing context & finding materials
Skimming
Reading

Interpretation

Figure 3.4: Document Analysis Circle derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle

Initially, the interpretations and conclusions drawn from this study were to be
reviewed by the expert panel as part of the source triangulation process, involving
cross-checking, for better reliability and validity, for consistency of information
derived at different times and from different people. After much deliberation
however, the use of the expert-panel for the triangulation and verification process
was considered redundant since firstly, all the significant findings of the research
were published in a series of four double-blinded peer-reviewed papers during the
course of the research and secondly, because the research findings were reviewed by
the internal supervisory panel of domain experts who were actively involved in the
research context.
The data collection and analysis phases for exploring the native security
features and third-party tools on Android in fulfilling the security requirements were
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designed using the iterative experimentations and reflection approach. Once the
interpretation of the legal texts had been sufficiently conducted using the document
analysis approach to identify the security requirements and construct the acceptance
criteria, the rest of the research mainly involved a series of experimentations and
reflection based upon the experimentation outcomes as to whether they satisfied the
identified security requirements.
In agreement with Maxwell (2005), who says “Sequential models are not a
good fit for qualitative research, in which any components of the design may need to
be reconsidered or modified during the study in response to new development or to
changes in some other component”, the iterative experimentation and reflection
approach employed for the rest of the research was very similar to the action research
approach. For each security requirement identified, a series of potentially repetitive
experimentations were conducted to explore and determine which candidate
technology fulfilled the security requirement and complied with the constructed
acceptance criteria. In a similar way action research is used to bring about change of
practice while creating knowledge at the same time (Williamson, 2002) the selected
iterative experimentation and reflection approach is employed for the exploratory
research to bring about improvement of practice or to propose new solutions to
practical problems. Figure 3.5 depicts the constituent elements of each experiment iteration
for this research in a detailed form.

Figure 3.5: Iterative Experimentation and Reflection Cycle

McNiff and Whitehead (2002) define action research not as a set of concrete
steps but as a process of learning from experience: a dialectical interplay between
practice, reflection and learning. In a similar way, each iteration of the
experimentation for this research explored the available options by learning further
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details about the tools, technologies and features, conducting an experiment to verify
its viability and finally reflecting whether the outcome is a suitable one for the
specific security requirement, before proceeding to the next experimentation for
another legislative/security requirement or repeating the iteration with necessary
changes based on the lessons learnt and the experience gained. Similar to
Williamson’s (2002) description of the typical action research cycles, these repetitive
experimentations are employed in this research as a process through which findings
and insight are generated in an explorative manner, since details of each iteration are
seldom planned up-front and new insights and experience gained through
experimentation and reflection may necessitate repeating the iteration.
This approach is designed to be critically reflective, the need for reflection
existing in times when current action did not produce the desired results and the
change was needed (Williamson, 2002). However, unlike the extensive version of the
action research approach, not much rigour was anticipated to be utilised in these
iterations. All the research findings and conclusions drawn from this stage were also
subject to review by the experts as part of the triangulation process (i.e. reviewed by
the supervisory panel of domain experts).
Every step of the analysis and derivation of conclusion from this entire
research was designed and carried out with the utmost care as the strength of
qualitative data mainly relies on the competence of the analysis process and iterative
experimentation process. The analysis process was performed using the analysis
matrix populated from answering the two Subsidiary Research Questions.
Although referred to as analysis, the process actually consisted of three
integrated activities: data reduction, conclusion-drawing and verification. Data
reduction itself generally consisted of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting
and transforming the data to assemble into the information required for conclusiondrawing and other necessary actions. It also allowed the researcher to understand
what was happening and enabled further actions based on that understanding.
Conclusion-drawing and verification followed data analysis. Triangulation process
was used to ensure the validity of qualitative data by means of experts testing its
plausibility, sturdiness and conformability. Reviewing may take as little as a few
seconds, while extensive conclusion-drawing required replicating the findings in
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another data set. In all the expert review activities of the triangulation process the
dialectics action research technique was exercised by welcoming disagreement as a
way to generate better information and by achieving consensus through focusing on
disagreement and its resolution (Williamson, 2002).

3.4

Research Design
This research focused on a specific facet of mobile health, that being the

security of electronic prescription data on Android mobile devices, which in turn is a
segment of the national eHealth program. Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that
the Research Questions in qualitative research should be general enough to permit
exploration but focused enough to delimit the study. Accordingly, the two supporting
Research Questions were carefully designed so that they clearly defined the
boundary of this research context while allowing exploration from different
perspectives. In addition, for better segregation of the emphasis and in-depth
understanding of the findings, all the studies and experimentations for this research
were conducted from two perspectives: security of the prescription information from
the perspectives of both data at rest and data in transit.
As a result of the document analysis, the first supporting question derived a
set of security requirements from the applicable national as well as eHealth-specific
standards, laws and regulations for security of prescription information in Australia.
This document analysis process also developed the practical understanding of the
security requirements for real-life application from the legal explanation. The
preliminary study identified that standards and publications such as “AS 4700.32014”, “ATS 4888.1-2013 ~ ATS 4888.6-2013”, “AS 5550-2013”, “AS 5551-2013”,
“AS 5552-2013”, “ATS 5546-2013”, “ATS 5822-2010” and “HB 308 2011” by
Standards Australia will be emphasised in answering the first Subsidiary Research
Question. In addition, other standards and publications from organisations and
authority bodies such as the Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA, previously
NEHTA), International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), Health Level 7
(HL7), Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) and the International Health
Terminology Standards Development Organisation (IHTDSDO) will also be
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considered for their relevance to ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare
industry.
Subsequently, through a series of experimentations the second supporting
question explored and verified the native encryption features of Android which could
potentially fulfil the security requirements for the electronic prescription information
from a data at rest perspective. The later iterations of the experiment explored and
verified the candidate short-range wireless communication technologies such as NFC
and Bluetooth for security assurance from the data in transit perspective while
transferring the electronic prescriptions between the ETP participating devices (i.e.
between the patient’s smart phone, prescriber’s EPS and pharmacy’s EDS).
Despite an initial plan to use a panel of domain experts (i.e. external expertpanel) for triangulation and verification of the research findings, the significant
findings from different stages of the research were in fact published as a series of
four double-blinded peer-reviewed papers. The first paper, published at the end of
the preliminary study of the research, portrayed the current implementation of ETP
and compared it against its full potential. It was published as the proceedings of the
23rd Australian National Health Informatics Conference 2015. The second paper
revealed the research findings on securing the electronic prescription information
from the perspective of data at rest and compared how it is achieved in the current
implementation using PES services against the proposed mobile alternative. This
paper effectively covered the research findings of Experiment 1 and was published as
the proceedings of the 4th Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference
2015. The third paper focused on the security of electronic prescription information
from the data in transit perspective and the comparison of how it was implemented in
current ETP versus its implantation in the proposed mobile solution (i.e. using the
potential candidate wireless communication technologies such as NFC and
Bluetooth). This paper is in fact a summary of the research findings from
Experiments 2 and 3. It was published as the proceedings of the Australasian
Computer Science Week Multiconference 2017. The final published paper from this
series presented the comparison between the current ETP and the proposed mobile
alternative from a more holistic perspective, basically reflecting the “Discussion of
Results” and “Conclusion” sections of this thesis. This last paper was published as
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the proceedings of the 14th Australian Information Security Management Conference
2016.
Based on these research findings, the Primary Research Question was
formulated to determine whether it is possible to create a framework for the
development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application in
compliance with security requirements mandated by relevant standards, laws and
regulations.
This study reveals that such a framework can be built from the legislative and
security perspectives and, as such, this developed framework could be used to guide
the development of an Android mobile ETP application for the Australian healthcare
industry, thereby creating a significant contribution towards the national eHealth
program. The following diagram graphically depicts the scope and context of this
research.

Figure 3.6: Scope and context of the research

The extensive document analysis and rigorous iterative experimentation and
reflection derived from Williamson’s action research cycle were used for data
collection and analysis processes, in conjunction with the triangulation process
employing the dialectic action research method for verification and scrutiny from
different perspectives before progressing further to the next step, iteration or final
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conclusion (Williamson, 2002). The document analysis emphasised on the current
established acts, regulations and standards and publications mainly produced by the
Department of Health and Aging, NEHTA and Standards Australia. Data collection
populated the analysis matrix with applicable security requirements and the
candidate technologies (i.e. Android’s security features, NFC and Bluetooth) which
would potentially fulfil those requirements.
Data analysis surveyed the collected information against the essential criteria
and measured the outcomes accordingly for synthesis and conclusion. The synthesis
and conclusion process derived a framework to guide the development of an Android
mobile ETP application in compliance with the security requirements or drew a
conclusion as to why it cannot be achieved. The conclusions made from the previous
iteration become part of the input for the next iteration. A rigorous internal review
was conducted by the researcher and the thesis supervisors after every stage to ensure
that the data collection, analysis and synthesis processes were carried out
appropriately and that any necessary adjustments were applied.
These data collection, analysis, synthesis and conclusion and review
processes continued in an iterative manner within the defined context until the
research had produced the final report. The following figure graphically depicts these
iterative processes.

1. Data
collection
3. Review
(internal/expert)
2. Data
analysis
4. Synthesis &
Conclusion

Figure 3.7: Conceptual framework derived from the iterative data collection and analysis model of Miles &
Huberman (1994)

Table 3.1 briefly describes how the data collection and analysis were
performed for each research question during the iterative processes of the entire
research. The principal supervisor's active involvement with national and
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international digital health systems and eHealth standards, as well as the associate
supervisor's extensive experience and knowledge in the clinical and health IT
industry provided the researcher invaluable guidance, support and critical review
throughout the learning journey.
With access to such extensive knowledge and guidance the internal review
process was effectively a triangulation and verification process for the research
findings at every stage.
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Table 3.1: Data collection and analysis for each research question

Subsidiary Research Question 1

How can the security requirements, imposed by
the relevant laws, regulations and standards in
the Australian Healthcare system, be integrated
into a framework for the assessment of mobile
electronic prescription transfer applications?
The procedures to be followed in this study are
crudely depicted in Figure 3.9.
Analysis and synthesis of the applicable laws,
regulations, standards and interpretations of
those for the desired context.

Data collection method

Participants in data collection

Researcher

Data analysis method

Extensive reviews and research by researcher
and then followed by an internal review by the
thesis supervisors who are also domain experts.

Researcher and then followed by an internal
Participants in data analysis and review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area
review (triangulation process)
experts).
Not applicable/necessary.

Recruitment process

Subsidiary Research Question 2

How can the assessment criteria framework
(from subsidiary research question 1) be used in
assessing the native security features and thirdparty tools on the ANDROID for the security
compliance of mobile electronic prescription
transfer applications?
The procedures to be followed in this study are
roughly depicted in Figure 3.10.

Data collection method

Conduct the experiment with knowledge from
reading books, research papers and technical
discussion forums of relevant areas.

Participants in data collection

Researcher

Data analysis method

Performing experiments using appropriate tools
for each security requirements documented then
followed by an internal review by the thesis
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supervisors who are also domain experts.
Researcher and then followed by an internal
Participants in data analysis and review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area
review (triangulation process)
experts).
Recruitment process

Main research question

Not applicable/necessary.
Can a technical framework be constructed to
serve as a guide for development of ANDROID
mobile
electronic
prescription
transfer
applications in compliance with security
requirements mandated by the Australian
Healthcare laws, regulations and standards?
The procedures involved in this study are
roughly depicted in Figure 3.8.

Data collection method

Populating the analysis matrices (i.e. Table 4.1,
4.2 and 7.1) with the research findings from
subsidiary question #1 and #2.

Participants in data collection

Researcher

Data analysis method

Analyse the contents of the analysis/compliance
matrices collated by the two subsidiary research
questions.

Researcher and then followed by an internal
Participants in data analysis and review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area
review (triangulation process)
experts).
Recruitment process

Not applicable/necessary.
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Explore and identify all the relevant Acts, regulations, standards and
publications for the security of electronic prescription information by
the Australian Digital Health Agency (formerly NEHTA), Standards
Australia, Department of Health, the Pharmacy Guild and other relevant
authority bodies in Australian Healthcare Indistry

Analyse each relevant laws, regulations and standards in the Australian
Healthcare industry for transfer of electronic prescription (eTP)

Examine the security features/tools on Android platform against the
security requirements and assessment criteria for transfer of electronic
prescription (eTP)

Derive/Create a technical framework or a guide for development of
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer applications

Reviewed
(Supervisory expert review)

Require
Adjustment

Figure 3.8: Building a framework for examining Android mobile electronic prescription transfer
applications for compliance with security requirements

Figure 3.8 is a high-level depiction of the overall process of the entire
research. It began with a preliminary study which explored and identified the
relevant acts, regulations and standards of and publications by the relevant authority
bodies in the Australian healthcare industry for the security of electronic prescription
information. The draft of the analysis matrix template, which was later finalised and
populated by the studies answering the supporting questions 1 and 2 (Figure 3.9 and
Figure 3.10), was also designed as part this stage. The first study (Figure 3.9)
translated the acts, regulations and standards into security requirements and its
findings populated the analysis matrices. Through a series of repetitive experiments
and reflections, the second study explored and examined the security features of the
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candidate technologies (i.e. Android platform’s encryption, security of NFC and
Bluetooth) for security requirements translated from a plethora of acts, regulations
and standards in the previous study. The outcomes of this examination were recorded
in the analysis matrices for the final assessment. Based on the content of these
matrices, the final research conclusion was drawn and a framework was derived if
the study revealed that it was viable as well as practical. The review process at the
end of this stage may also result in additional iterations, potentially starting from any
stage of the study.

Selection of applicable Acts, regulations and standards on the
security for the transfer of electronic prescription (eTP)

Study/Examine each

Interpret into security requirements and
construct the acceptance criteria for each
requirement

Populate the analysis matrix with research
findings (i.e. security requirements)

Repeat for each

Analysis Matrix collation
and supervisory review

Require
Adjustment

Figure 3.9: Constructing the technical/security requirements and acceptance criteria

As depicted in Figure 3.9, this study began with the selection of applicable
acts, regulations and standards related to the security for the transfer of electronic
prescription in the Australian healthcare industry. Each selected act, regulation and
standard was examined in detail and interpreted into a set of security requirements,
which in turn formed the acceptance criteria for later experimentation and analysis
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stages. This study populated the analysis matrices with its findings, and the same
process was repeated for all the rest of the selected acts, regulations and standards.
The review process at the end of this study could potentially lead to further iterations
with certain adjustments. Based on the required adjustment and the ground for the
repetition, the next iteration may start from any step within this stage of the study.

Selection of features/tools on Android platform which potentially
fulfil the security requirements identified in the prior stage of the
research

Study/Examine each

Determine whether the feature/tool can be tested

N

Can be tested?
Y
Conduct the experimentation

Assess whether the experimentation outcomes satisfy the security
requirement and comply with the acceptance criteria

Y
Repeat?
N
Populate the analysis matrix with
the successful test result

Y

N
Comply?

Populate the analysis matrix with
the failed test outcome

Repeat for each

Analysis Matrix collation and supervisory review

Require
Adjustment

Figure 3.10: Examining the security and privacy features/tools on Android platform
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This study started with the selection of security features of the candidate
technologies (i.e. Android’s encryption capability and security of NFC and
Bluetooth) which would potentially fulfil the security requirements for the transfer of
electronic prescription as identified in the previous study. Each feature was then
studied for further details to determine whether it could be tested. When the study
revealed that it could not be tested, this failed outcome was recorded in the analysis
matrices. When the study proved that it was testable, an experimentation was
conducted to verify whether the selected feature satisfied the security requirement
(i.e. complied with the acceptance criteria) and whether its application was practical
for the industry. Depending on the experimentation outcome from both viability and
practicality perspectives, another iteration of the investigation was repeated with the
necessary changes. At the end of the potentially iterative experimentation the
outcome was recorded in the analysis matrices for later analysis and derivation of the
framework.
This process was repeated for each security requirement identified in the prior
study. As previously, the review process at the end of this study would potentially
lead to further iterations with certain adjustments.

3.5

Equipment or Apparatus
Internet access was critical for the research, as was unlimited access to the

related standards and regulations and local and federal laws of the Government and
relevant authority bodies. This included access to the departmental libraries,
document archives and repositories.
As part of the hardware requirements, experiments conducted for this
research required a computer running Windows 8.1 with decent hardware
configuration (e.g. Intel i5 or equivalent processor, 4 GB RAM with 256 GB HDD),
and a smartphone with Android OS version 4.0 or higher with NFC and Bluetooth
capabilities. In addition, a generic (i.e. no manufacturer-specific) NFC card reader
with USB connection and a generic (i.e. no manufacturer-specific) Bluetooth USB
dongle or a laptop with Bluetooth capabilities were also mandatory for the
experiments involved.
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At this point in time, no other associated cost anticipated such as licenses and
subscription fees.

3.6

Procedure

The research to address Subsidiary Research Question 1 commenced after research
ethics was granted. This was followed by a supervisory expert review to verify and
validate the outcome from this phase. Similarly, for Subsidiary Research Question 2,
the outcome was subjected to review a by supervisory expert panel to ensure the
outcome was relevant and appropriate for progression to the next phase of the
research. Based on these outcomes, the assessment was performed against the
acceptance criteria as part of the iterative experimentation and reflection, and the
conclusion drawn on whether it was possible to build a framework for development
of electronic prescription transfer applications on Android platform in compliance
with the security requirements of the Australian healthcare industry. This conclusion
was also reviewed and validated by the supervisory expert panel for necessary
adjustments. If the final conclusion, verified by supervisory expert panel, reveals that
such a framework can be built, a working framework will be produced, representing
substantial contribution towards the national eHealth program.
During the course of the study, these supervisory expert panel reviews and
feedback processes were planned as part of the fortnightly meeting. The materials
and outcomes were reviewed and emailed to the supervisors prior to the scheduled
meeting. When any disagreement occurred as part of the meeting’s dialectic
triangulation process, it was decided that the supervisors’ feedback was to be
incorporated back into the study before the next round of experiment.
For each stage, a set of applicable acceptance criteria for assessing the
outcome was prepared prior to the data collection and analysis. Where applicable, the
assessment metrics and mechanisms were measured and defined, as they have
significant impact on the outcomes and accuracy of the analysis and review
processes. During the study, each review process could result in further repetitions
and this iterative process was governed using the methodology of repetitive
experimentation and reflection.

Research Thesis - 70 of 269

In each repetition of the experiment, the necessary adjustments were applied
before continuing with another round of iteration and review. Depending on the
context of the experimentation and the required adjustments, some repetitions took
different approaches to those in prior repetitions and were not pre-planned or
designed up front (as in Williamson’s description of the typical action research
cycles in 2002). These reviews were designed to examine not only the collected data
and synthesised product but also the assessment metrics and criteria within the
context, such as the legislative and regulatory requirements and mobile security.
In order to divide the research into manageable components, investigations
for both Subsidiary Research Questions 1 and 2 were carried out from two different
security perspectives: (1) security of the electronic prescription information at rest
and (2) security of the electronic prescription information in transit. All the research
outcomes from exploring and identifying the mandatory security requirements (i.e.
derived from a plethora of acts, regulations and Standard) and how to fulfil them (i.e.
technically on the Android platform) were assessed from these two security
perspectives. Figure 3.11 shows how the security measures for prescription
information in the current electronic prescription transfer model were categorised
into these two security perspectives.

eRx script exchange / MediSecure Script vault

Data at rest

Data at rest

Rx details

Data at rest
Data in
transit

Data in
transit

Figure 3.11: Current ETP model from security of data at rest and in transit perspectives

Given that the research context is not only highly regulated but also highly
proprietary, this research investigated how these two aspects of security are
implemented in the existing implementation, for example how acts and regulations
are complied with, how standards are implemented and how security mechanisms are
employed. The research then explored and verified how these implementations could
be achieved on the proposed Android platform (i.e. using its native security features,
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existing technologies

and third-party tools) with

a short-range

wireless

communication technology. Figure 3.12 depicts the roadmap of this research, its
results, the papers produced from the research findings and the frameworks
constructed.
Literature review

Research paper 1

Governing Regulations
and standards
identified

Investigate security of
data at rest

Investigate security of
data in transit

Minimum
requirements

Experiment 1:
Encryption on Android

Research paper 3

Result not practical:
repeat experiment

Research paper 2

Minimum
requirements +
different options

Experiment 2:
NFC transfer

Review and compare
current vs proposed
implementation

Research paper 4

Collate Analysis matrices
& Build framework

Analysis matrices
+
Framework

Figure 3.12: Research roadmap
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Experiment 3:
Bluetooth transfer

3.7

Data analysis
Using qualitative research methods, a significant amount of analysis activity

was implicitly involved in the data collection for both Subsidiary Research
Questions. The study for Subsidiary Research Question 1 analysed the applicable
acts, regulations and standards and transformed these legal explanations into a set of
practical understanding and security requirements.
The second Subsidiary Research Question involved analysing the
experimentation outcomes on the Android’s native security features and short-range
wireless communication technologies (i.e. NFC and Bluetooth) which potentially
fulfil the security requirements. The review process validated the study outcomes by
triangulation at the end of each study. During the triangulation process (i.e. expert
supervisory review) for each study, the collected data, applicable assessment metrics
and derived essential criteria were reviewed. The feedback from this review was then
incorporated back into the study, which resulted in either making necessary
adjustments prior to the next iteration of experiment or proceeding to the next stage
of the study.
Table 3.1 depicted the generic template format of the analysis matrices (i.e.
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 7.1) which were populated by the research findings from the two
studies involving Subsidiary Research Questions 1 and 2. The “Feature or usage”,
“Jurisdiction”, “Governing regulations, standards & specifications” columns of the
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 7.1 were populated by the research findings from answering
Subsidiary Research Question 1. In addition, findings from Subsidiary Research
Question 1 also populated the "Requirements mandated and impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process" and "Jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic
ETP solution" columns of the Table 4.1, and “Security requirements mandated”
column of the Table 4.2.
Investigations for Subsidiary Research Question 2 were then conducted for
each of these security requirements recorded in Table 4.2. The “Technology
conforming to the mandated requirement” column of the Table 7.1 contains the
research findings from a series of iterative investigations, as well as experimentation
outcomes fulfilling the mandated requirements identified in the prior stage of the
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research (i.e. the investigation to answer the Subsidiary Research Question 1). These
iterative investigations and experimentations also examined the practicality of the
outcomes from development, deployment and operational perspectives.
The researcher then performed the analysis based on the holistic knowledge
and understanding acquired from these studies. Once the supervisory expert review
panel had verified the analysis outcome and the conclusion drawn, a framework was
constructed to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP application in
compliance with security requirements of the Australian healthcare industry. Once
again, this synthesised product was also subjected to review by the supervisory
expert panel for further adjustment.
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Table 3.2: Template of the Analysis matrix

No

Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Requirements mandated and
impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process
(or)

Jurisdiction’s readiness for the
fully electronic ETP solution
(or)

Security requirements mandated

Technology conforming to the
mandated requirement

(1) Legislative and regulatory requirements
1

…

…

…

…

…

2

…

…

…

…

…

Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective
3

…

…

…

…

…

4

…

…

…

…

…

Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective
5

…

…

…

…

…

6

…

…

…

…

…
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3.8

Limitations
Conducted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Professional Doctorate

Degree in Information Technology (DIT), this thesis inherently focuses less intensely
on the research aspect so as to emphasise making a difference in the workplace
and/or profession via directing and informing change (“Difference between
Academic and Professional Doctorate Degrees”, 2017; “Professional Doctorates”,
n.d.), as well as the practicality of the research outcome. The shorter allocated
timeframe for the research element in the DIT course (i.e. 1.5 years for DIT
compared to 4 years for PhD) certainly imposed some limits on various aspects of
the research process as a whole compared to those of the PhD research thesis.
Another limitation is the precision of the research outcomes, which can only
be as accurate as the assessment metrics allows. If the research conclusion had
showed that a framework cannot be built to guide the development of an Android
mobile ETP application in compliance with security requirements, synthesising a
custom security mechanism was not within the scope of this research. Moreover, this
research was not designed to be flexible enough to accommodate provision for future
changes in the technologies used in the proposed model or amendments in the
relevant laws, regulations and standards. Another significant limitation of this
research is that it provides no insight into the potential use of iOS despite its large
consumer base comparable to Android OS.
This research did not explore its potential impacts and usefulness beyond the
Australian Healthcare Industry despite its prospective applicability in countries with
ETP capability. The research findings of Subsidiary Research Question 1 only
concerned the current acts, regulations, standards and publications issued by the
Department of Health and Aging (DoHA), the Australian Digital Health Agency
(ADHA previously NEHTA) and Standards Australia. Although the research
findings of Subsidiary Research Question 1 are generally applicable to any fully
electronic prescription transfer applications in the Australian healthcare industry,
both Subsidiary Research Question 2 and the Primary Research Question strictly
intended to explore the Android’s native security features and other candidate
technologies which were currently available on the market, and to build a framework
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using those features and technologies. Despite the widespread use of the prior
versions of Android Operating System (OS) on the market, the exploration and
experimentations for Subsidiary Research Question 2 were only concerned with the
Android OS version 4.0 or later.
In addition to the abovementioned limitations specific to this particular study,
there were also limitations inherited from the chosen research methodology. Some
inherent limitations due to being a qualitative research are:
❖ The credibility and quality of the research findings may be limited by the
competence of the analysis process (Dawson, 1979, 1982; Ginsberg, 1990; Kirk
& Miller, 1986; Kvale, 1989a; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).
❖ The relationship of the researcher to the research may limit the researcher’s
ability to interpret data meaningfully (May, 2002).
❖ The credibility and quality of the research conclusions may be influenced by the
distinct possibility of researcher bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
This research was initially designed to address these limitations by employing
the triangulation process using a panel of external/independent domain experts at the
end of each stage. However, having two research supervisors with active
involvement in the research context (i.e. one actively involved with both national and
international digital health systems and eHealth standards, the other with extensive
experience and knowledge in clinical and health IT industry) rendered the need for
such expert panel redundant.
The research findings at the end of each stage were therefore verified by the
internal “supervisory expert review” process before proceeding to the next stage.
Furthermore, the final outcomes were also reviewed by the supervisory panel of
domain experts in order to strengthen the credibility or value of the research’s
outcomes.

Research Thesis - 77 of 269

CHAPTER 4.
SOLUTION
4.1

RESEARCH RESULTS AND PROPOSED

Overview
This chapter begins by presenting the research findings from the analysis of

the various jurisdictions’ legislation and standards conducted for Subsidiary
Research Question 1. Subsequently, and based upon the knowledge gathered from
the second chapter, Literature Review, this fourth chapter proposes a potential
alternative solution to the current ETP implementation (i.e. the mobile electronic
prescription transfer application on Android smartphone) and, more so, sought
additional details on the technologies involved in the proposed solution for further
assessment.
This chapter presents the research findings in an extended form, although a
significant part of the chapter’s content has been published in a more concise form
through four papers listed in Appendix-A (i.e. published in chronological order).

4.2

Research Results
This research found that although the Commonwealth Electronic Transaction

Acts 1999 and those jurisdictional Electronic Transaction Acts at the various state
and territory levels enable the use of electronic means in general, they do not directly
impose or mandate any specific requirements on the electronic prescribing process.
Both Table 4.1 and 4.2 list the research outcomes in a consolidated form for
verification via potentially iterative experimentations.
The analysis of the experiments subsequently promoted the derivation of a
conclusion and ultimately led to the development of the framework. All the research
outcomes listed in these two matrices were categorised into three groups as listed
below:
(1) Each jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic ETP solution
(Table 4.1)
(2) Security requirements for electronic prescription from the data at rest
perspective
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(3) Security requirements for electronic prescription from the data in transit
perspective (Table 4.2)
Based on the research findings for Subsidiary Research Question 1, various
acts, regulations and standards influencing the use of electronic prescription and how
they affected the use of a fully electronic prescribing system (i.e. jurisdictions’
regulatory readiness for fully electronic prescription) were listed in the Table 4.1.
The research findings from Subsidiary Research Question 1 also populated
the first four columns (from left to right) of Table 4.2. In fact, the fourth column of
Table 4.2 recorded the security requirements for electronic prescription information
translated from those regulatory mandates by this research. Fundamentally, this
defined the acceptance criteria or the minimal security requirements for the proposed
mobile prescription transfer model. The last column of Table 4.2 documents the
outcomes from the further research and iterative experimentations conducted for
answering Subsidiary Research Question 2.
Effectively, these documented experimentation outcomes were to indicate
which candidate technology and third-party tools would comply with the security
requirements listed in the fourth column of Table 4.2 (i.e. security requirements
translated/derived from the regulatory mandates).
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Table 4.1: Analysis matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully electronic ETP solution

No. Feature or usage

1

2

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Use of electronic
prescription

Western
Australia

Poisons Regulation 1965

Use of electronic
prescription

Queensland

Health (Drugs and Poisons)
Regulation 1996

32A, 32B and Appendix K

Requirements mandated and
impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process

Jurisdiction’s readiness for the
fully electronic ETP solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

No special mention on the use of
electronic system

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

82 (1)(b), 193 and 197 (2)
3

Use of electronic
prescription

New South
Wales

Poisons and Therapeutic Goods
Regulation 2008
35 (2)(b) and 80 (2)(b)

4

Use of electronic
prescription

Australian
Capital
Territory

Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods Regulation
2008
The “Note” part of the section 40

5

Use of electronic
prescription

Victoria

Drugs, Poisons and Controlled
Substances Regulations 2006
26 (1)(b)
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No. Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Requirements mandated and
impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process

Jurisdiction’s readiness for the
fully electronic ETP solution

6

Use of electronic
prescription.

South Australia

Controlled Substances (Poisons)
Regulations 2011 33 (5)

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

7

Use of electronic
prescription

Northern
Territory

Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods Regulation

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

The section “Note for Division 1”
8

9

10

Use of electronic
prescription.

Tasmania

Implies prescriber's
hand-written signature
not required in
electronic prescription

Western
Australia

Implies prescriber's
hand-written signature
is not required in
electronic prescription

Queensland

Poisons Regulations 2008
16 (1) and (2)

Poisons Regulation 1965
Schedule 4: 37. (1A) (1B)
Schedule 8: 51. (1A) (1B) and
(1C)
Health (Drugs and Poisons)
Regulation 1996
79 (7) and 190 (5)
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No. Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

11

Implies prescriber's
hand-written signature
is not required in
electronic prescription

South Australia

Implies prescriber's
hand-written signature
is not required in
electronic prescription

Tasmania

Prescriber’s signature
is required.

New South
Wales

12

13

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Requirements mandated and
impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process

Jurisdiction’s readiness for the
fully electronic ETP solution

Controlled Substances (Poisons)
Regulations 2011

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

This enables the use of fully
electronic prescribing process

Ready for proposed fully
electronic solution

Unless there is regulatory change
for the use of electronic/digital
signature in prescriptions, this
requirement prevents the use of
fully electronic prescription

May require regulatory change
as the regulation requires
prescriber’s signature. But it
neither explicitly approves the
use electronic/digital signature
nor exempt electronic
prescription from requiring
written signature.

Unless there is regulatory change
for the use of electronic/digital
signature in prescriptions, this
requirement prevents the use of

May require regulatory change
as the regulation requires
prescriber’s signature. But it
neither explicitly approves the
use electronic/digital signature

33 (5) and 34 (3)
Poisons Regulations 2008
16 (5)

Poisons and Therapeutic Goods
Regulation 2008
35 (2) and 80 (2)

14

Prescriber’s signature
is required.

Australian
Capital
Territory

Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods Regulation
2008
40 (a) and the “Note” part of the
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No. Feature or usage

15

Prescriber’s signature
is required.

Jurisdiction

Victoria

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Requirements mandated and
impact on proposed fully
electronic prescribing process

Jurisdiction’s readiness for the
fully electronic ETP solution

section 40 (a)

fully electronic prescription

nor exempt electronic
prescription from requiring
written signature.

Drugs, Poisons and Controlled
Substances Regulations 2006

Unless there is regulatory change
for the use of electronic/digital
signature in prescriptions, this
requirement prevents the use of
fully electronic prescription

May require regulatory change
as the regulation requires
prescriber’s signature. But it
neither explicitly approves the
use electronic/digital signature
nor exempt electronic
prescription from requiring
written signature.

Unless there is regulatory change
for the use of electronic/digital
signature in prescriptions, this
requirement prevents the use of
fully electronic prescription

May require regulatory change
as the regulation requires
prescriber’s signature. But it
neither explicitly approves the
use electronic/digital signature
nor exempt electronic
prescription from requiring
written signature.

26 (3)(d)

16

Prescriber’s signature
is required.

Northern
Territory

Medicines, Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods Regulation
8. (m)
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Table 4.2: Analysis matrix of Security requirements for electronic prescription information

No. Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Security requirements mandated

Technology conforming to the
mandated requirement

Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective
1

2

3

Encryption of the
electronic prescription

Nationwide

Saving the DAK and
any of its derived keys
on any permanent
storage

Nationwide

HL7 message structure
for electronic
prescription

Nationwide

ATS 4888.2-2013
section 5.3.6
ATS 4888.2-2013
section 7.3.3

AS 4700.3-2014

The electronic prescription is to be
encrypted using a symmetric key
derived from DAK

?

Minimum of 128 bit encryption for
storing DAK or any of its derived
keys on any stable storage

?

Mandated HL7 message structure
for the electronic prescription

?

Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective
4

Security of electronic
prescription

Nationwide

ATS 4888.2-2013
section 5.3.5

Security of data in transit between
ETP service participants are
specific to the implementation
‘platform’
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?

From the legislative and regulatory perspectives, this research revealed that
although the use of electronic prescription was supported in all jurisdictions, the use
of electronic/digital signature for the electronic prescription in place of prescriber’s
written signature was neither explicitly approved nor prohibited in ACT, NSW, VIC
and NT.
These states’ regulations mandated that the prescriber’s signature be present
on the prescription but did not specify whether it has to be a handwritten signature or
electronic/digital signature of the prescriber. Since the current ETP implementation
also produces the printed prescriptions, serving dual-purpose as a legal prescription
document as well as a transfer mechanism for DAK from the prescriber to the
dispenser (i.e. serving as the printed prescription notification), the presence of the
prescriber’s written signature on the printed prescription also legalises it by
complying with these regulatory requirements. However, once it has been converted
to a fully electronic prescribing process it would be impossible to accommodate the
prescriber’s written signature, necessitating minor amendments/modification to the
regulation before transitioning to the fully electronic prescribing process.
Despite the mixed results obtained (i.e. non-definitive outcomes for the
presence of prescriber’s signature in written/digital format) from Subsidiary
Research Question 1 (i.e. from the legislative and regulatory perspectives), the
experimentations conducted for Subsidiary Research Question 2 revealed that the
proposed mobile solution complied with all the security requirements mandated by
the existing standards and specifications governing the current ETP implementation.
In addition, while the proposed mobile solution (any fully electronic
prescribing process in this case) does not fully adhere to some jurisdictions’
regulatory mandates for the presence of the prescriber’s signature, the Electronic
Transaction Act recognises and approves alternative ways to use written signature in
identifying

a

person

and

indicating

the

approval

of

the

information

contained/communicated (“The Electronic Transactions Act 1999”, n.d.).
Therefore, this research was justified and hence proceeded further by
proposing a cheaper, if not completely cost-free, fully electronic prescription transfer
solution with comparable security assurance (i.e. comparable to the current ETP
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implementation using PES systems) which utilised the patient’s Android smartphone
as an alternative secured transfer medium.

4.3

The proposed alternative solution using Android smartphones
The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 primarily supports the creation,

transfer and storage of the electronic prescription, amendments 51(1A), 51(1B) and
51(1C) of the Poisons Regulations 1965 for Western Australia effectively allows an
electronic prescription to be a legal document without the prescriber’s written
signature when issued electronically. These two amendments, combined with other
changes in the governance of the Commonwealth, states and territories to enable
eHealth, are sufficient to support an ETP Level 3 model.

Figure 4.1: Proposed fully-electronic mobile prescription transfer process (Htat, Williams, &
McCauley, 2015)

In the proposed fully electronic mobile prescription transfer model, the EPS
generates an electronic prescription, encrypts it using the DAK as per the data
security conformance guidelines in ATS4888.2, encrypts the DAK with the 128-bit
symmetric encryption and then transfers it to the patient’s mobile device (i.e.
Android smartphone) through a wireless connectivity using either NFC or Bluetooth.
The encrypted electronic prescription is stored on the mobile device (i.e. the
patient’s or agent’s Android smartphone) in the same way in which it is stored within
the PES in the current prescribing model. When the mobile device is presented at the
pharmacy by the patient/agent, the encrypted prescription, together with the DAK, is
transferred to the pharmacy system. The prescription is then decrypted by the
pharmacy system using the DAK. This proposed fully electronic mobile ETP transfer
model bypasses the PES entirely by using the mobile device as the transfer medium
for the electronic prescription.
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Once the medication has been dispensed, the pharmacy’s EDS uploads the
dispensing information into the NPDR. In this proposed mobile ETP model the
prescription is issued and transferred in fully-electronic form, thus being exempted
from the requirement to have the prescriber’s written signature in accordance with
the various acts and regulations governing the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods for
each jurisdiction (e.g. section 51(1A), 51(1B) and 51(1C) of the Poisons Regulations
1965 in Western Australia).
This proposed ETP transfer model supports ETP adoption Level 3 as long as
there is a fully electronic mechanism to securely transfer the electronic prescription
from the prescriber’s EPS to the mobile storage device and from the mobile storage
device to the dispenser’s EDS. This proposed mobile ETP model is envisaged to use
Near Field Communication (NFC) or Bluetooth technology as the alternative
prescription transfer mechanism.
NFC was designed for use in close proximity (i.e. up to a few centimetres) for
secure data transfer and supports strong security features that facilitate the highly
secure transfer and storage of data. The NFC technology’s reliability and practicality
is evident by its use in the banking industry, including its use by the Commonwealth
Bank for its product, Tap & Pay. Nevertheless, this preference of employing NFC for
data transfer was not solely based on the technical viability but also on the consumer
acceptance of and confidence in the technology. NFC’s simplicity from a user
perspective enables easy information sharing and NFC is now enabled on the
majority of recent model mobile phones by various manufacturers (“NFC phones:
The definitive list”, 2016).
Bluetooth, on the other hand, is a mature, short-range wireless
communication technology with widespread support from almost all mobile phone
manufacturers and with many applications in the healthcare industry ("Medical &
Health", 2017; "Mobile Phones & Smart Phones", 2017). With the advent of
Bluetooth Low Energy (Bluetooth LE) in recent years, it has extended its application
to millions of medical devices and countless Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices
(“Bluetooth”, 2016). As the global standard enabling the IoT by assuring the
connectivity between various devices from various industries (ibid), it is also a strong
candidate technology for the proposed mobile ETP model.
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In the current hybrid ETP model, the PES makes uploaded prescriptions
available to dispensers and also prevents access to prescriptions which have been
cancelled, expired or fully dispensed. For the latter purpose, PES updates the
dispensing state of each prescription after each dispense.
In the proposed model, the smartphone utilised as the mobile storage device
makes the prescription available to the dispenser and then the dispensing state of the
prescription is updated by the dispenser’s EDS directly to the mobile storage device.
Due to the connectionless nature of the proposed model, cancelling the prescription
by the prescriber will require use of an additional service such as SMS to remotely
update the dispensing state of the prescriptions stored on the smartphone.

Prescribe

Present

(Rx details stored on smart
phone or PDA)

(Rx details transferred to
pharmacy system)

Transfer

(All scripts stored on smart
phone or PDA)

Figure 4.2: Sharing of patient’s medication history in proposed solution

As described in Figure 4.2, this proposed mobile ETP application also
functions as a mobile repository of the patient’s medication history, thus making it
available to hospitals and other healthcare service providers once the interface for
integrating this mobile solution with the hospital information systems and clinical
information systems has been implemented. This interface will allow direct transfer
of the patient’s full medication history from the patient’s smartphone to the
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hospital/clinical information system. Such access to the patient’s complete
medication history would be of tremendous clinical advantage to the healthcare
professionals in delivering better quality of care, substantially benefiting both
patients and the healthcare providers.
Further assessments to determine whether this proposed mobile ETP solution
complies with the mandated security requirements for electronic prescription will
require further detailed investigations and potentially iterative experimentations on
the security measures and the governing standards of the potential candidate
technologies such as the Android operating system’s encryption capability (Chapter
5), NFC (sections 6.1~2 of Chapter 6) and Bluetooth wireless communication
(sections 6.4~6 of Chapter 6).

Data at rest

Data at rest
Data in
transit

Data at rest
Data in
transit

Figure 4.3: Proposed solution from security of data at rest and in transit perspectives

Whilst Table 4.2 of this chapter listed the mandatory security requirements
constructed from answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 and section 4.3
proposed an alternative mobile ETP solution, the two subsequent chapters (Chapter 5
and Chapter 6) assess the technologies used in the proposed solution against those
identified security requirements and will determine whether it complies with the
same regulatory requirements as the current ETP implementation. In the same way
that the security of the prescription information in the current ETP implementation
was assessed, security of the prescription information in the proposed solution will
also be evaluated from the very same security perspectives; the security of the
prescription information at rest and the security of the prescription information in
transit.
Figure 4.3 depicts how the proposed solution can be divided into different
sectors and assesses the security measures from the perspectives of both data at rest
and data in transit.
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CHAPTER 5.
5.1

SECURITY OF THE DATA AT REST

Android Native Security
The investigation conducted in this section studied details of the Android

OS’s architecture, process and security model and its potentials as a candidate
technology for the proposed mobile ETP solution. This section also identified the
possible issues associated with Android for the proposed mobile ETP solution.

5.1.1

A brief history and overview
Android is arguably the world most popular mobile operating system

platform, rapidly taking the world by storm from its first release in 2009. It is the OS
which oddly names each release after sweets and tasty desserts in an alphabetical
order. Its market share in Australia from 2013 to 2017 is depicted in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Market share by smartphone OS in Australia 2013-2017 (“Market share held by
smartphone operating systems in Australia from 2013 to 2017”, 2018)

Despite its choice of sweet names for each release, Android ruthlessly
conquered the world of mobile operating systems with rigour, as is evident in Figure
5.1.
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The Android Inc. of Palo Alto, California, was founded in 2003 by four
young computing experts, Andy Rubin, Rich Miner, Nick Sears and Chris White,
with the initial intention to develop an operating system for mobile devices, such as
digital cameras, which would be aware of both a user’s location and their personal
preferences (Callaham, 2017). The focus was later shifted to cellular phones as they
realised that only targeting digital cameras would have a potentially low demand
(Brachmann, 2014).
In 2005, Android Inc. was procured by Google as part of its venture into
mobile operating platforms (ibid). Foundation of the Open Handset Alliance (OHA)
by Google in 2005 was one of the primary forces behind Android’s rapid success and
dominance of the mobile computing world. The OHA is a consortium of technology
manufacturers working together to create open mobile device standards (ibid).
Wireless telecommunications providers such as T-Mobil, mobile handset
manufacturers such as Motorola and High Tech Computer (HTC) and chipset
manufacturers such as Texas Instruments and Qualcomm were among the constituent
34 companies when the consortium was founded (ibid). Being a product from a
coalition of various technology manufacturers dedicated to creating open mobile
device standards, compatibility plays a crucial role in Android’s ecosystem.
The Android community believes that “Android ecosystem thrives with
device compatibility” and this is depicted in Figure 5.2 (“Android Compatibility”,
n.d.).

Figure 5.2: Android ecosystem (“Android Compatibility”, n.d.)

Before its world dominance, HTC Dream’s debut in late 2008 with Android
version 1.0 was the Android’s first appearance as a commercial smartphone
operating system. Then, in April 2009, with HTC Magic, Android introduced its
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tasty name series to the world with the release of Android version 1.5, more
commonly known as Cupcake (Brachmann, 2014; Callaham, 2017). In September
2009, Android version 1.6 (Donut) was released with various significant updates and
began its course of dominating the mobile operating system world with the highest
adoption rate (ibid). Android’s rapid popularity and adoption rate is well matched by
the pace of development of the operating system itself (Brachmann, 2014).
The fledgling work commenced in 2009 has transformed repeatedly over the
past few years and has been refined into the feature-packed suite we see today on
many devices of various sizes and shapes (ibid). However, despite being the most
widely adopted mobile operating system with frequent updates and rapid
improvements, it is a far-from-perfect OS with a number of vulnerabilities. In fact,
until the release of Android version 5 (Lollipop) it was vulnerable to privilege
escalation attack (Avkash, 2014) and it still has numerous vulnerabilities associated
with varying levels of complexity and risks (“Android Security Bulletin”, 2017).
These vulnerabilities do not, however, prevent the Android OS from being one of the
best candidates for this research’s proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer
application.
Among many sources of information, the full extent of the Android’s
publicly-known vulnerabilities can be found in vulnerabilities databases such as
AndroidVulnerabilities.org (AVO) and Varutra’s Mobile Vulnerabilities Database
(MVD). These vulnerabilities databases and additional information can be linked
together by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List (CVE), sponsored by
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) (“All
vulnerabilities”, n.d.; “MVD: Mobile Vulnerability Database”, 2013; “Android:
Security Vulnerabilities”, n.d.). Further information such as the fixes for these
vulnerabilities can be found at the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
(ibid).
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5.1.2

Architecture and Security
From an architectural perspective, the Android OS was designed to be truly

open for developers to build innovative applications whilst offering an application
environment with security assurance for users, data, applications, the device and the
network (“Security”, n.d.). Whilst providing the freedom to implement own/custom
device specifications, drivers, interfaces and enhancements, each Android device
must pass the Compatibility Test Suite (CTS) to ensure the compatibility, reliability
and a high level of quality with consistent user experience (“Android Interfaces and
Architecture”, n.d.). Figure 5.3 roughly depicts the Android software stack and their
core nature/functionalities.

Figure 5.3: Android software stack (“Security”, n.d.)

Over the past decade, the consumer focus has shifted from desktop to mobile
computing devices (West, 2012). Nowadays, mobile phones are so much more than
mere telecommunication devices: they have become an essential part of our lives for
many other purposes such as social networking, health and fitness and performing
financial transactions.
However, in a similar way to security on the Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
these mobile devices were not originally designed and built with security as a top

Research Thesis - 93 of 269

priority requirement, despite becoming an integral part our daily life in various
aspects including such security sensitive contexts as personal banking and healthcare
(Maddox, 2016). In addition to this inherent nature (i.e. security not being a high
priority feature by design), the strengths and vulnerabilities of the OS platforms used
also contribute significantly to the security factors of the device. In its early days,
Android OS was created based on the Linux Kernel version 2.6 with adapted security
mechanisms

for

the

mobile

and

flash

memory environment

(“Tutorial:

Understanding Android's Security Framework”, 2010; “Which Android runs which
Linux kernel?” 2013). It utilised component-based framework for application
development where each of them is made of different types of components, such as
Activity, Service, ContentProvider and BroadcastReceiver (“Tutorial: Understanding
Android's Security Framework”, 2010). This openness is one of Android’s most
attractive features over other OS platforms, and it also has the least restricted
application deployment strategy, which allows applications to be published easily
(“Publish Your App”, n.d.).
On the other hand, however, this openness also allows publication of
malicious applications without scrutiny (ibid). Android permits the developers to
self-sign their applications for the ease of upgrading or patching their own software,
and the applications signed with the same key can request to run with the same user
identifier (UID). This mechanism also allows developers to copy data from existing
versions without creating complicated interfaces and permissions.

5.1.3

Process and Security Model
In Android OS architecture, just a small amount of Android OS code runs as

root (i.e. superuser with unrestricted control over the device) and all the rest of the
OS code above the Linux Kernel is restricted by the Application Sandbox
(“Security”, n.d.). Then, all the applications are isolated from each other by
individually running in separate processes under distinct low-privileged UID. Each
of these UIDs has a distinct set of permissions limiting them from accessing other’s
data or code (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011).
Handling of the Application Programming Interface (API) calls are carried
out in three steps through the layers of the Android’s OS architecture (see Figure 5.4
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for details), and each call consists of a permission check determining the caller’s
privileges to access that particular API prior to the actual invocation. In the Android
version 2.2, there were 134 permissions categorised into four different levels, such as
Normal, Dangerous, Signature and SignatureOrSystem, according to their associated
risks/threats, and security was primarily achieved by enforcing these permissions at
various points (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011). Figure 5.4 explains the
Android’s process and security architecture.

Figure 5.4: Android’s Security and Process Model

The Android API framework consists of two parts: a library that resides in
each application's virtual machine and the implementation of the API that runs in the
system process (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011). It handles all the API
calls in three steps as mentioned below:
1. The application invokes the API library in its virtual machine (VM)
2. The library then invokes the private interface, which is a Remote Procedure Call
(RPC) stub in the same library
3. The RPC stub finally initiates an RPC request with the system process that asks
a system service to perform the desired operation
Another simple yet effective mechanism supplementing the process isolation
method is the use of manifest permissions assigned to applications during the
installation-time (“Application Fundamentals”, n.d.). This demands that every
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application declare upfront which permissions it requires, and then during the
installation the user is notified which permissions the application will be granted.
These permissions/privileges determine what the application can perform such as
taking pictures, using Global Positioning System (GPS) or making phone calls.
The user permits or denies the requested permissions during the installation
of the application via a dialog and the application’s permissions are then stored in the
AndroidManifest.xml file, which cannot be changed after the installation process. A
user’s denial to grant permission to the application will result in cancellation of that
installation process. This security mechanism allows users to have control over their
privacy and helps reduce the impact of bugs, as well as vulnerabilities in the
applications. These permissions are also used in controlling access to privacy-related
and security-related parts of API invocations (ibid).
However, this mechanism would be ineffective if the application request
more permissions than it actually requires, or the user does not recognise the
importance of this notification and its consequences (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song &
Wagner, 2011).

5.1.4

Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution
Since one of the intentions of this research was to find a viable alternative

transfer mechanism for the electronic prescription with minimal infrastructural
requirements and associated cost, the Android’s huge market base (see Figure 5.1)
enables it to be the top potential candidate for this research. Once this research has
proven the suitability and practicality of the proposed mobile electronic prescription
transfer model on Android mobile devices, Android’s huge consumer base will
create enough traction in the Australian healthcare industry for the major players to
give their attention to this alternative approach, ultimately becoming an alternative
transfer mechanism for electronic prescription.
Android’s assurance for compatibility is another good reason for Android
being an excellent candidate for this research’s proposed solution. It is impossible for
any device manufacturer to speculate all the software that users could ever
conceivably need and provide them as pre-installed applications with their products.
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Therefore, Android was designed as an open and secure environment for running the
aftermarket applications developed by the third-party developers to write the
application users wanted. The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) aims at making
the application development as easy and open as possible (“Security”, n.d.; “Android
Compatibility”, n.d.; Hildenbrand, 2017). At the same time, the necessity to comply
with the Android Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) and pass the
Compatibility Test Suite (CTS) ensures the compatibility among various devices and
operating system platforms. This assurance guaranteed the compatibility and it was a
significant incentive for the choice of the Android platform (“Security”, n.d.;
“Android Compatibility”, n.d.) for this research’s proposed solution.
As the most popular mobile operating system, with the highest adoption rate
and largest consumer base, the Android inevitably has extensive developer
community support. This support was another viable reason for choosing the
Android platform to be a candidate for this research. Last but not the least, the
Android’s developer friendliness, its open architecture and its availability of
abundant tools and frameworks in the market made it a very natural and easy choice.

5.1.5

Potential issues of Android for the proposed solution
Despite its numerous benefits, the Android’s openness also attracted

individuals and organisations which had malicious intent. Despite other potential
vulnerabilities, the following ones could pose serious impacts on the security of the
mobile ETP application’s data and hence require the devising of counter measures
for securing against them.

5.1.5.1 Vulnerabilities as of 2013
As previously mentioned, the vulnerabilities listed below had significant
impacts on the sensitive data stored by the mobile ETP application. However, this
assessment was initially performed at the early stage of the research in 2013, and the
following findings are those of that time.
Lack of device level data encryption: Device level encryption mainly
protects data from unauthorised access via Android Debug Bridge (ADB) port,
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dumped device image or booting from the SD card. Until 2014, Android stored data
unencrypted both on the internal file system and on the removable mass storage
media such as Secure Digital (SD) memory card (“Encryption”, n.d.; Raphael, 2017).
Whilst the data stored on the internal file system of the device received little
protection by the process isolation and permission control mechanisms, the data on
the removable media was unprotected due to the use of Virtual File Allocation Table
(VFAT) file system for the ease of data transfer between different devices (“Mobile
Application Security on Android”, 2009). However, the device level encryption
feature was supported in some devices running Android version 2.3.4
(“Gingerbread”) such as Samsung Galaxy S II and Motorola Droid Bionic, tablets
running Android 3.0 (“Honeycomb”) and Android 4.0 devices (“Ice Cream
Sandwich”) (“Android 4.0 Platform Highlights”, n.d.). In the Android 4.0, the
encryption of the removable storage such as SD card was not supported natively.
User rooting the device: Rooting offers freedom or power at the expense of
security. It allows side-loading, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the carrier, use
of third-party software and custom Read-Only Memory (ROM). Despite the user
becoming more powerful locally, rooted Android devices are likely to have a few or
all of the following vulnerabilities:
❖ Rooted device may no longer receive over-the-air (OTA) updates from the
carrier, exposing the devices’ vulnerabilities to new threats due to being left
unpatched (Kassner, 2011).
❖ On a rooted Android phone the hardware is the only limitation for an application
with root access. For instance, the mobile OS boot-loader, other programs'
private data, system settings and files and SMS are all at the mercy of an
application with the root access.
❖ A rooted application can also hide itself from the system and user, or pretend to
be uninstalled while being perfectly well and alive. (“What are the security
disadvantages of rooting an Android phone?”, 2011)
❖ The rooting process of a device usually leaves the ADB port open, providing an
open invitation to all other perpetrators to bypass security measures like screen
lock. (“Issue 17918: Device can be accessed via ADB when encryption is
enabled”, 2011)

Research Thesis - 98 of 269

❖ On a rooted android phone device, the mobile OS system is more vulnerable to
malware due to a weakened overall security and integrity of the device.
Privilege Escalation: All Android versions so far are still subject to this
vulnerability. This vulnerability enables an infected but seemingly harmless
application to install additional applications with a lower level of permission,
allowing operations such as accessing call records, texts, Web browsing history and
storage media without the user’s install-time approval for those permissions (Chavez,
2011; Webster, 2011).

5.1.5.2 Vulnerabilities as of 2016
Android’s vulnerabilities and their impacts on research were revised in 2016
during the experimentation and analysis stage of the research thesis. Most of the
findings were fairly different to those from the initial investigation and therefore
their impacts on this research have been updated accordingly.
The full-disk encryption was supported in Android version 4.0+ and, since
the number of the devices running prior to Android version 4.0 is only 2.3% in total,
the impact of the vulnerability due to the lack of device level data encryption is now
significantly low. In the Android version 6.0, the removable storage such as the SD
card can be treated as internal storage and is therefore encrypted by default. In prior
versions, however, it was up to the device manufacturer building the firmware to
enable the encryption feature for the SD card, although Android provided the
capability for filesystem encryption ("Does Android's Full Filesystem Encryption
also encrypt the SD card?", 2012).
Despite the various changes in the Android operating system platform over
the past a few years, the vulnerabilities associated with user rooting the Android
device remains the same and still pose serious security risks for its data and
applications.
Many privilege escalation vulnerabilities have been identified and rectified
either as a patch for the current version or in the later version. At the time of this
research, the most recent privilege escalation vulnerability patched up in Android
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version 5.0 (Lollipop) was the one due to the flaw resided in the
java.io.ObjectInputStream (Avkash, 2014). However, since these vulnerabilities
originated from various sources such as logic bugs in the applications, bugs in the
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) frameworks or in the Kernel drivers, it is
impossible to say that privilege escalation vulnerabilities are a thing of the past even
though it would appear there are none at large at present.
Another important factor in Android security is the Linux Kernel version on
which the Android was built. Linux Kernel sits at the bottom of the Android software
stack as shown in the Figure 5.4 and generally Android inherits its strength and
weaknesses from the Linux Kernel on which it was built. Table 5.1 lists which
Android versions make use of which Linux Kernel version for further investigation.
However, there is no hard and fast rule defined in the association or dependency
between Android and Linux Kernel versions since devices from different
manufacturers running the same Android version can run on different Linux Kernels.
Table 5.1 merely lists the common association or dependency between Android and
Linux Kernel versions.
Table 5.1: Android version and Linux Kernels (“Which Android runs which Linux kernel?”, 2013)

Android Version
1.5
1.6
2.0/1
2.2.x
2.3.x
3.x.x
4.0.x
4.1.x
4.2.x
4.3
4.4
5.x
6.0

Name
Cupcake
Donut
Éclair
Froyo
Gingerbread
Honeycomb
Ice Cream Sandwich
Jelly Bean
Jelly Bean
Jelly Bean
Kit Kat
Lollipop
Marshmallow

API Level
3
4
5-7
8
9, 10
11-13
14, 15
16
17
18
19, 20
21, 22
23

Linux Kernel in
AOSP
2.6.27
2.6.29
2.6.29
2.6.32
2.6.35
2.6.36
3.0.1
3.0.31
3.4.0
3.4.39
3.10
3.16.1
3.18.10

In addition, the Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of various Android versions
currently being used. This information is vital in estimating the impact of certain
vulnerabilities based on a specific version of Android.
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Figure 5.5: Distribution among Android versions (“Dashboards”, n.d.)

5.1.6

Conclusion
Since one of this research’s objectives was to eliminate the requirement of the

special supporting infrastructure along with its associated costs, the Android’s
existing strong consumer community made it a suitable candidate for this research.
Android’s openness in its architectural design and its firm support for the
development of innovative applications by the third-party developers was another
major driving force behind the selection of Android for this research. Its wellestablished development community with widely supported compatibility among
various devices from different manufacturers and its assurance for the security of
data and application whilst providing a consistent user experience with a high level
of quality are the added benefits of using the Android platform. Therefore, the
vulnerabilities identified did not prevent Android OS from being selected as the
candidate OS because the strength/benefits it offers outweighs its vulnerabilities for
this research.
All the research findings so far indicate that the use of Android as the OS
platform for the proposed mobile ETP application will benefit both the healthcare
industry and its already-established large consumer base. Whether it has the
necessary encryption capability for securing electronic prescriptions is yet to be
determined by the experiments in the following section (section 5.2).
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5.2

Experiment 1: Android’s Encryption – Security of the data at rest

5.2.1

Overview
The “Confidentiality of data at rest” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 (i.e.

section 5.3.6 of ATS4888.2-2013) mandates that the payload of the Clinical
Document managed by the Prescription Exchange is to be encrypted using a
symmetric key derived from the Document Access Key (DAK). In addition, the
“Data security conformance points ETP 22-2” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 also
mandates that DAK and any of its derived cipher keys need to be encrypted with a
secret cipher key of at least 128 bits before being stored on any stable storage.
Therefore, the aim of this experiment was to verify that the Android OS
platform can support the required encryption capabilities with adequate performance.
The prototype developed to test the Android’s encryption was initially executed
using the Android device emulator. Then, in order to verify how it performs on the
actual Android smartphones, it was deployed and tested on two Android phones from
two different manufacturers, HTC One and Samsung Galaxy A3 model smartphones.

5.2.2

Experiment details
The prototype application for this experiment was developed using the

Android Studio package, which was downloaded from the official Android Studio
website (“Android Developers”, n.d.), and the development environment was
configured to use the Android version 5.0.1 with API 21. The installation and
configuration process for this experiment went seamlessly compared to the
researcher’s prior experience with earlier versions of Eclipse Integrated Development
Environment (IDE) bundled with Android Developer Tools (ADT).
Initially, the development environment for this experiment was set up using a
laptop with 64-bit Windows 7 Operating System, 16 GB of RAM and 200 GB of free
storage space on the disk drive. The researcher verified the setup of the development
environment by writing a simple “Hello World” application and executing it within
the emulator. During the early stage of this experiment it became necessary, due to
work requirements, to upgrade the operating system of the laptop to 64-bit Windows
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8.1. When this experiment was resumed after the Windows upgrade, the Android
Studio failed to compile even the simplest “Hello World” application, showing the
following compile-time error.

Figure 5.6: Compilation error after OS upgrade from Windows 7 to Windows 8.1

The encoding issue shown in Figure 5.6 was resolved by the setting the
project’s encoding and the build’s encoding to the same encoding system as shown in
Figure 5.7.

`
Figure 5.7: Project encoding (Android Studio)

Although rectifying the encoding issue fixed the prototype’s compilation
error, the execution of the Android emulator threw more errors, depicted in Figure
5.8, and failed to start up.

Research Thesis - 103 of 269

Figure 5.8: Emulator start-up error (Android Studio)

Further investigation and research for this issue discovered that it was due to
the Hyper-V feature, Microsoft’s virtualisation technology introduced by the
Windows 8.1, and found a range of workarounds on technical forums and discussion
pages on the Internet. The approach taken by the researcher to overcome this
situation was to create a dual boot option without Hyper-V feature. Once the
Windows OS was loaded with this “No Hyper-V” option, the Android emulator
executed well without any issue as shown in Figure 5.9.

Figure 5.9: Successful emulator start-up with “No Hyper-V”

In fact, this “No Hyper-V” option not only enabled execution of the Android
emulator but also other virtualisation technologies such as VMWare and Oracle’s
VirtualBox. With this approach, the experiment progressed and the prototype
application to test the encryption on Android platform was created using the
Android’s “javax.crypto” libraries.
This prototype used the sample HL7 CDA (Clinical Document Architecture)
document, which was downloaded from the Gleaning Resource Descriptions from
Dialects of Languages (GRDDL) Primer section of the W3C website for its
encrypting and decrypting operations, in order to reflect the file size and complexity
of the actual electronic prescriptions. However, to avoid the unnecessary technical
complexity in the development of the prototype for this experiment, it stored the
entire content of the CDA file into a literal string variable and performed the
encryption and decryption operations using this string variable instead of reading and
writing to/from the Android file system. An illustration of how the prototype
operated and how it was executed in the Android emulator is depicted in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Prototype running in Android emulator

Since this prototype used the 128-bit AES encryption as shown in Figure 5.11
for encrypting and decrypting the CDA content, it proved that the Android satisfied
the technical requirements mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 for security of data at
rest for electronic prescription.

Figure 5.11: Use of AES 128-bit encryption

However, since all the development and testing so far were conducted only
within the development environment using an emulator, the prototype needed to be
deployed onto an actual Android device to test the performance of the operating
system and device in performing these encryption and decryption operations in
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reality. The first device to be tested on was the research’s HTC One handset running
Android version 5.0.2.
The first issue encountered in the attempt to repeat this test on HTC One
handset was that the Android Studio did not recognise the HTC One handset and
therefore it was not possible for the prototype to be deployed and tested on that
particular HTC One device.
This was due to not having the USB driver for the HTC One device on the
development machine, and, after several hours of investigation and analysis, it was
found that the USB driver for the HTC One phone only came as part of the HTC
Sync Manager utility program. Therefore, the HTC Sync Manager was downloaded
from the HTC Support web site (HTC, 2016) and successfully installed as shown in
the following figures: Figure 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14.

Figure 5.12: The HTC Sync Manager downloaded from HTC Support web site

Figure 5.13: HTC Sync Manager (installation step 1)
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Figure 5.14: HTC Sync Manager (installation step 2)

Once the HTC Sync Manger was installed, both the Windows Device
Manager and the Control Panel’s “Programs and Features” section displayed its
presence as illustrated in Figure 5.15 and 5.16 respectively.

Figure 5.15: Windows Device Manager

Figure 5.16: Windows Program and Feature

However, the Android Studio and its Android Device Monitor utility still did
not recognise the HTC One device correctly in order to deploy and execute the
prototype application on it. Figure 5.17 demonstrated that the Android Device
Manager detected the presence of the HTC One device but its status was showing as
being offline.
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Figure 5.17: Android Device Monitor (Android Studio)

The USB connection from the laptop to the HTC One device seemed to be
only responsive to the HTC Sync Manager alone and not to any other programs at
all. Further investigations on this issue revealed that after the installation of the HTC
Sync Manager, it was necessary to uninstall the HTC Sync Manager from the system
so that it will leave only the HTC USB driver on the system. The following Figure
5.18 and 5.19 depicted how the Windows Device Manager and the Control Panel’s
Programs and Features section looked like once the HTC Sync Manager had been
uninstalled from the system.

Figure 5.18: Windows Device Manager (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled)
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Figure 5.19: Windows Program and Feature (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled)

Once the HTC Sync Manager was removed from the system, the HTC One
device started working correctly with the Android Studio as shown in Figure 5.20.

Figure 5.20: Android Device Manager (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled)

Figure 5.21 showed the prototype application deployed and executed on the
actual Android device. This experiment also revealed that the encryption and
decryption operations took less time when the prototype was executed on the actual
device compared to the time taken when it was executed in the emulator. On the
actual device, it took between approximately 0.05 to 1 second to decrypt or encrypt
the HL7 CDA document which is 36.2 KB in size.
Subsequently, the experimentation was repeated on the Samsung Galaxy A3
handset without any changes or reconfiguration.
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Figure 5.21: Prototype executed on actual Android device

5.2.3

Experiment 1: Results/Outcomes.
From this experiment, it was found that security features available on

Android platform were more than sufficient to ensure the security of data at rest as it
was mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 with adequate performance. This experiment
outcome indicated that the use of an Android device as the alternative data transfer
mechanism for exchanging the electronic prescription between prescriber’s EPS
system and pharmacy’s EDS system will provide comparable security assurance to
that of the current mechanism using the Prescription Exchange Services.

5.2.4

Experiment 1: Lessons learnt
During the experiment, the deployment of the prototype application from the

Android Studio development environment to the HTC One device encountered the
HTC USB driver related issue. However, this issue was only associated with a
specific scenario where the application was directly deployed to an actual device
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from the Android Studio development environment and it is completely irrelevant
when the application is deployed via the Google PlayStore.
Some of the issues encountered during this experiment, such as the Android
emulator issue on Windows 8.1 with Hyper-V feature and the HTC Sync Manager
issue, would have taken a much longer time with a lot more effort and frustration
without the combined knowledge and support from various online communities,
technical forums and discussions web pages. The researcher spent many hours
researching, investigating and rectifying through these digital resources in search of
any relevant information on the issues encountered, and they provided crucial
information and potential solutions for resolving those issues over the course this
experiment.

5.2.5

Experiment 1: Modifications.
Neither additional modification nor another round of experimentation was

required as this experiment successfully proved that the Android operating system
platform has sufficient encryption capabilities to satisfy the security requirements
mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 for storing electronic prescription.

5.2.6

Conclusion
Experiment 1 successfully proved that the Android operating system platform

has sufficient encryption capabilities to satisfy the security requirements mandated
by the ATS4888.2-2013 for storing electronic prescription.

Research Thesis - 111 of 269

5.3

Learning from the Research
The analysis of the relevant regulations and standards allowed this research to

determine the readiness of each jurisdiction for a fully electronic prescription system,
and established that the use of DAK and 128-bit symmetric encryption were the
minimal requirements for securing electronic prescriptions from the data at rest
perspective. These findings were collated in Table 4.1 and Section (1) of Table 4.2.
Subsequently, Experiment 1 verified that the proposed Android operating
system has sufficient encryption capability for securing electronic prescriptions by
complying with the requirements mandated by ATS4888.2-2013. The experiment
which encrypted and decrypted the sample HL7 CDA document not only proved that
it does not require any third-party utility or tools for performing the 128-bit
symmetric encryption, but also exhibited the fact that such encryption can be done
with a decent performance (i.e. between 0.2-1 seconds for encrypting the HL7 CDA
document of 36k).
The experimentation outcomes indicated that the proposed Android mobile
ETP application offered the security assurances equivalent to that of the current ETP
implementation from the data at rest perspective. This stage was therefore concluded,
leading to the next phase of the research. The paper produced at the end of this stage
(i.e. Research Paper 2 in Appendix A) briefly describes the current security
mechanisms for ETP from the data at rest perspective, how these can be achieved on
Android OS platform and proposes an Android mobile ETP application with NFC as
the alternative transfer mechanism for electronic prescriptions between ETP
participants. The research findings published in the paper were verified by the
double-blinded peer review process at the time of publication.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015). Security of ePrescription:
Security of data at rest in Prescription Exchange Services vs on mobile
devices. In Proceedings of the 4th Australian eHealth Informatics and
Security Conference 2015, Perth, Australia. (pp. 15-22). doi:
10.14221/aeis.2015.2
Contributions: Htat (80%), Williams (15%) and McCauley (5%)
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CHAPTER 6.

SECURITY OF THE DATA IN TRANSIT

The “Confidentiality of data in transit” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 states
that “The mechanisms used to ensure the confidentiality of data in transit between
ETP service participants are specific to the implementation ‘platform’”. However, as
much as the ATS4888 series mentions the implementation details on securing
prescription information from the data at rest perspective, there was no further
information on what the recommended approach is or how it should be implemented
to secure prescription information from the data in transit perspective.
In addition, the research context turned out to be not only highly regulated
but also highly proprietary. This made it impossible to investigate how the electronic
prescriptions were transferred in the current implementation and search for an
alternative transfer mechanism with comparable security measures. Therefore, using
more of a “black-box” approach, this research endeavoured to find a transfer
mechanism (i.e. a short-range wireless communication technology) that is
comparable in security measures to using the Internet.
This chapter studied the details of the NFC and Bluetooth wireless
communication technologies followed by experimentation determining their
suitability for the proposed mobile ETP solution.

6.1

Near Field Communication
The investigation conducted in this section studied details of the NFC

technology’s architecture, security model and its potentials as a candidate technology
for the proposed mobile ETP solution. This section also identified the possible issues
associated with NFC for the proposed mobile ETP solution.

6.1.1

A brief history and how it works
As the name suggests, near field communication (NFC) is a short-range, high

frequency and low bandwidth wireless communication technology which enables
secure two-way interactions between NFC enabled devices in a ubiquitous manner
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(Coskun, et al., 2013). This new technology, which is now supported by majority of
the smartphone manufacturers (“NFC phones: The definitive list”,2016), was
invented in 2002 by Franz Amtmann, Philippe Maugars and researchers working at
NXP Semiconductors and Sony ("Winners the European Inventor Award 2015",
2015).
Various industries’ widespread acceptance and support of this NFC
technology became evident at an early stage when it was adopted as a standard by the
European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) International in December
2002 (Coskun, et al., 2013). The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) adopted NFC technology in
December 2003, and in 2004 the NFC Forum was founded by NXP Semiconductors,
Phillips and Sony to further promote the technology and its interoperability among
devices and services (Coskun, et al., 2012).
Technically, NFC is a subset of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
technology (“The Difference between RFID and NFC”, 2011) which was extended
by using smart card technologies’ interfaces (Coskun, et al., 2013). The NFC devices
communicate at a frequency of 13.56 MHz, which is that originally used by RFID,
and so the communication occurred only when the devices are in close proximity
(ibid).
In a way, NFC is an evolution of RFID, influenced by the synergy of several
technologies

including

wireless

communications,

mobile

devices,

mobile

applications and smart cards ("Winners the European Inventor Award 2015", 2015).
Being a descendent of the RFID technology, NFC’s evolution dates back to 1940s
with the use of Barcode technology, and its ancestry is roughly depicted by Coskun
et al. (2013) as in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012)

NFC restricted its communication range to maximum of 4cm, with the data
transfer rate of up to 424 Kbps (Coskun, et al., 2013). While Figure 6.2 presents a
broad comparison of NFC’s communication range and data transfer rate against other
wireless communication technologies, further details such as operating frequency,
data rate and range of each technology are listed in Table 6.1.

Figure 6.2: NFC’s communication range in comparison with other wireless communication
technologies (Coskun, et al., 2012)
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Table 6.1: Frequency, data rate and range of wireless technologies (Coskun, et al., 2013)

This new technology’s success (i.e. widespread usages) and the emergence of
its ecosystem evolved around its simple and ubiquitous nature (Coskun, et al., 2013).
Just as personal computers (PCs) have changed the way users interact with a
computer using keyboards and monitors instead of punch cards, and touch screens
have drastically changed the human-computer interactions, NFC has changed the
way connection is established between devices by simply requiring very close
proximity, also known as “touching” (ibid). Instead of users having to perform the
various pairing and authentication steps required by the technology such as Bluetooth
and WiFi, NFC technology adjusts to normal human behaviour in performing
activities. From a higher perspective, NFC’s seamless pairing and communication
nature takes us a step further toward ubiquitous computing where human-computer
interaction is integrated into our everyday life to the highest level with little effort in
using them (Reisenhofer, et al., 2016; Coskun, et al., 2012).
An NFC device is categorised as either an active or a passive device, based
on whether it has its own power source (Coskun, et al., 2013). An active device has
its own power/energy source whereas a passive device is powered using the energy
created by an electromagnetic field generated by an active device (ibid).

Research Thesis - 116 of 269

In a similar way to RFID data exchange and other existing client-server
communication paradigms, NFC communication involves two parties: (1) the
initiator and (2) the target. The initiator, an active device, initiates the
communication with the target device and this responds to the initiator’s request
(ibid). In the case of the target being a passive device, it uses the initiator’s
power/energy in responding to the initiator’s communication request. On the other
hand, the initiator always needs to be an active device as it requires a power source to
initiate the communication even if it does not have to power the target (i.e. in
scenarios where the target is also an active device) (ibid).
In addition to these active or passive device types and communication modes
(i.e. being an initiator or target), NFC has three operating modes: (1) reader/writer
mode which reads data from and writes to a target, (2) card emulator mode which
acts like an RFID tag when they are within communication range of another NFC or
RFID device and (3) peer-to-peer mode where data exchange occurs in both
directions (Igoe, et al., 2014). Coskun et al. (2012) depict these operating modes and
the governing standard for each in Figure 6.3.
1

2

3

Figure 6.3: Three operation modes of NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012)
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At present, despite being governed by myriad standards and specifications,
this research found that the NFC ecosystem is mainly made up of action components
belonging to the following three categories: NFC mobiles, NFC readers and NFC
tags.
•

NFC mobiles: These are NFC-enabled mobile phones or smartphones. The
integration of NFC technology with these devices was the primary enabler which
unlocked vast opportunities for various innovative uses and widespread
acceptance of the NFC ecosystem (Coskun, et al., 2012)

•

NFC readers: These perform data transfer with an NFC component/device. Some
real life uses would be the contactless POS (Point of Sale) terminal which
supports contactless NFC payments such as CommBank Tap & Pay and ANZ
Mobile Pay. ("COMMBANK Tap & Pay", 2016; “ANZ Mobile Pay”, 2015)

•

NFC tags: Technically, these are classified as passive RFID tags that have no
integrated power source of their own. During the communication, a small
amount of power is taken by the NFC tag from the reader/writer in order to
power the tag’s electronics and perform the data transfer to the reader/writer (i.e.
NFC enabled device) (Poole, n.d.)

The category to which an NFC device belongs dictates how security will be
implemented and which standards and specifications it will be governed by.

6.1.2

Architecture and Security
Security is NFC’s most critical concern as its primary motivation being

integrating personal and private information such as credit/debit card data into
mobile devices. Like many other information systems, NFC’s vulnerability to attacks
and its defence mechanisms are mostly subject to different use cases (Coskun, et al.,
2012). Due to the context of this research thesis, this section will only emphasise on
NFC’s generic security features and those security features specific to the NFC
smartphones operating in peer-to-peer mode and card emulation mode.
Similar to the 7 Layers Model by Open System Interconnection (OSI), the
mental model of NFC architecture (i.e. Figure 6.4) by Igoe et al. (2014) helps in
visualising and understanding each layer of the NFC stack. Figure 6.4 also maps each
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layer of the NFC stack with their specific governing standards. Further details on
those governing standards will be discussed in the next section, “Governing
Standards”.

Figure 6.4: NFC protocol stack (Igoe, et al., 2014)

From the NFC’s security perspective, RFID technology’s wireless
communication range was considered too far, and this long communication range
exposed the radio signal to signal-interception. Therefore, NFC technology
significantly shortened its communication range to a maximum distance of 4 cm
between devices. This requirement for device proximity strengthens security as the
chances of the devices’ radio signals being intercepted is significantly reduced over
such a short distance (Hamblen, 2012).
Another security feature of NFC is its native support for encryption. As per
NFC Forum’s specification, the secure element (SE) or secure access module was
designed to be programmable and capable of running small programs on its own
(Coskun, et al., 2013). It can generate hashes and verify codes/values using public
key encryption and decryption (Igoe, et al., 2014). Any NFC-enabled smartphone has
at least one SE for performing secure proximity transactions with external NFC
devices (Coskun, et al., 2013). The SE also enables secure storage of data such as
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users’ credit card information and the secure execution of NFC-enabled services such
as contactless payments (ibid). Despite SE being a combination of hardware,
software, interfaces and protocols, a variety of modules such as Universal Integrated
Circuit Cards (UICC), secure memory cards or embedded chip/hardware can serve as
SEs (Coskun, et al., 2012). These various types of SEs and their interaction with
other components of the NFC technology are depicted in Figure 6.5 by Coskun, et al.
(2012).

Figure 6.5: Various SE configurations in NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012)

Among these various SE types, the use of UICC based SEs is ideal for current
use as they are portable and easily manageable via Over-the-Air (OTA) technology,
while ensuring the secure execution of transactions (Coskun, et al., 2013). OTA is
the standard for exchanging applications and application related information via
wireless communication.
Even with all of these security features, NFC is not without security
vulnerabilities. NFC has inherent security issues which can be categorised into
reader/writer related issues, smart card related issues and communication related
issues. However, these issues are being addressed using many standardised security
protocols developed and maintained by organisations such as ECMA International,
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Electrotechnical
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Commission (IEC) and NFC Forum founded by Nokia, Philips, and Sony (Coskun, et
al., 2013). Further details on each standard are given in the next section, “Governing
Standards”, as well as information such as which security issue that standard is
addressing, and which organisation is governing it.

6.1.3

Governing Standards
This research found that many device manufacturers currently support NFC

and its uses are promoted by many organisations. Due to its origin involving a few
technologies (i.e. such as smart cards, mobile phones and card readers etc.) and
complex use cases such as mobile wireless payment systems, several standards were
developed and governed by numerous respective organisation bodies.
Among many organisations with influence over NFC, the principal
standardisation bodies are: NFC Forum, GlobalPlatform, GSM Association (GSMA),
International

Organisation

for

Standardisation/International

Electrotechnical

Commission (ISO/IEC), European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA)
International European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and ETSI
Smart Card Platform (ETSI SCP), Java Community Process (JCP), Open Mobile
Alliance (OMA), 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and EMVCo.
Whilst interoperability is essential to the functionality of the technology,
security is another mandatory aspect as Coskun et al (2013) stated “a service is
useful only when it is both functional and secure enough”. Integration and
implementation of these standards is to be secure while remaining functional. Some
major standards for NFC technology were briefly listed in the following table, Table
6.2.
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Table 6.2: NFC standards (Coskun, et al., 2013)
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6.1.4

Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution
Nowadays almost everyone carries a smartphone, and the majority of the

smartphone manufacturers support NFC. The use of NFC technology is therefore a
very practical solution for short-range data transfer. Another reason for the candidacy
of NFC technology is its implicit security feature, the very short and restricted
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communication range providing a very low probability of signal-interception
(Coskun, et al., 2012).
In addition to its functionalities and security, NFC, unlike other wireless
communication technology such as Bluetooth and WiFi, does not require much
human intervention in establishing connection between devices. Intuitively, the
touching action was considered as the triggering condition, and establishing
communication or launching an installed application occurred as soon as two NFC
devices were touched. From a higher perspective, this behaviour not only simplifies
the communication process but also enables and promotes ubiquitous computing
(Coskun, et al., 2012).
Last but not the least is its well supported interoperability. The integration
and application of the NFC technology is well governed by various standards and
specifications with support from the international standardisation bodies and industry
entities (Coskun, et al., 2013). This assures the interoperability of the NFC
technology and its functionalities despite having many stake holders in its ecosystem
(Clark, 2015). For example, any two devices compliant with version 1.3 of the
Logical Link Control Protocol (LLCP) specification are able to establish peer-to-peer
unauthenticated secure connection and exchange AES encrypted LLCP messages as
soon as they are brought together (ibid).

6.1.5

Potential issues of NFC for the proposed solution
With all these governing standards and specifications, NFC’s interoperability

at the end-user level is excellent. Tap virtually any two NFC-enabled smartphones
and they will establish a connection and exchange data almost instantaneously,
requiring nothing more than being kept very closely together. However, NFC’s
interoperability at the software development level is not so seamless. Among various
NFC card reader/writer devices produced by many manufacturers, only the Sony
FeliCa card readers/writers are recognised as proximity devices and operate well for
application development for Windows 8+ (i.e. Windows 8 or higher) platforms using
Windows Proximity APIs, a set of classes in the Windows operating system runtime
that support connections between devices within close distance.
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This is the result of the joint venture between Sony (i.e. the FeliCa
technology) and XNP Semiconductors (i.e. Mifare technology) to enable the global
adoption of contactless smart card applications in mobile phones (“NXP and Sony
announce joint venture”, 2006). At present, NXP Semiconductors is the only
hardware vendor that made Windows 8+ (i.e. Windows 8 or higher) compatible
proximity drivers publicly available (Sharief, 2013). For the rest of the NFC card
reader/writer devices, application development for Windows 8 or higher had to resort
to using other, less generic, approaches such as low-level socket programming,
instead of making use of the Windows Proximity APIs provided by the Windows
Runtime.

6.1.6

Conclusion
Use of NFC for the electronic prescription transfer is likely to be well

accepted by users as they have already been introduced to using the same technology
in ticketing, loyalty card programmes and even in performing more mission-critical
operations such as financial transactions (i.e. mobile payments).
NFC is widely supported by most device manufacturers and it has an
excellent end-user level interoperability. However, this pre-experiment study of the
technology found that there is room for improvement in software development on
Windows platform to make use of the Window Proximity APIs provided by the
Windows Runtime.
This shortcoming was likely to result in having to use a less generic approach
such as low-level socket programming, and the solution ended up being less
interoperable and portable. Nonetheless, whether NFC technology has the necessary
security measures and is practical (i.e. from development and deployment of the
solution perspectives) to be an alternative secured transfer mechanism for electronic
prescriptions in the Australian healthcare industry is yet to be determined by the
experimentation in the following section (Experiment 2: NFC – Security of the data
in transit).
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6.2

Experiment 2: NFC – Security of the data in transit

6.2.1

Overview
Since the preliminary study in section 6.1 found the NFC technology to be

the potential secured transfer mechanism for the proposed mobile ETP solution from
various aspects (i.e. widespread support by various smartphone manufacturers,
excellent interoperability and convenience of use), this experimentation began with
the NFC technology verifying its suitability for the proposed mobile ETP solution.

6.2.2

Experiment details
NFC was selected as the transfer mechanism for exchanging electronic

prescription data between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the
client’s/patient’s smartphone and the electronic dispensing system (EDS) at the
pharmacy because of its widespread support by the majority of the smartphone
manufacturers, excellent interoperability between devices, adequate support for
security and its ease of use in establishing communication with another device as
long as both devices are NFC enabled.
Since the majority of both the Clinical Management Systems used at the
primary care clinics and the Pharmacy Management Systems in Australia run on
Windows operating system platform, it is envisaged that the transfer of the electronic
prescription

from

the

prescriber’s

electronic

prescribing

system

to

the

client’s/patient’s smartphone, and from the client’s/patient’s smartphone to the
pharmacy’s electronic dispensing system, will be NFC communications between
Windows machines/PCs and Android smartphone.
Therefore, the proposed solution envisioned that this communication will
occur between a NFC reader/writer device attached to the prescriber’s EPS or
dispenser’s EDS and the client’s/patient’s Android smartphone, as the use of an NFC
reader/writer device is more practical than acquiring a new computing device, laptop
or tablet with NFC capability. An experimental prototype was developed using the
C# .NET programming language, taking full advantage of the Windows Proximity
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APIs supported by the Windows Runtime (WinRT) to leverage its efficiency,
reliability, portability and security.
Among many generic NFC card reader/writer devices produced by various
manufacturers, the researcher procured a USB ACR122U contactless RFID
smartcard reader/writer from Advanced Card Systems (ACS) due to its widespread
use in various industries. The NFC reader/writer device was shipped with an
installation CD containing the device driver software and Software Development Kit
(SDK). However, the following error occurred when the device driver software was
installed from the provided installer CD.

Figure 6.6: NFC device driver installation error on Windows 8.1

After some investigation and analysis, the researcher discovered that some
discussion forums suggested that the error is likely to be resolved by using a newer
version of the driver software than the one shipped with the device. Therefore, as
shown in the following Figure 6.7, a newer version of the installer was acquired and
installed from the ACR122U’s Product page (i.e. “http://www.acs.com.hk/en/
products/3/acr122u-usb-nfc-reader/”) of the ACS website and then successfully
installed.
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Figure 6.7: ACR112U device’s product page

On Windows 8.1 systems, the ACR122U NFC reader/writer was correctly
detected even before the device driver installation. However, Figure 6.8 indicated
that it will not function properly as the Windows operating system could not
determine the right driver software for it.

Figure 6.8: Windows Device Manager (no driver for NFC reader/writer)

Installing the newer version of the driver software downloaded from the ACS
website rectified this issue and the following Figure 6.9 showed that the correct
driver software for the NFC reader/writer was detected by the Windows operating
system and the device was ready to function.
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Figure 6.9: Windows Device Manager (driver found for NFC reader/writer)

Once the driver issue was resolved, the Software Development Kit (SDK) for
the device was installed from the provided CD. The SDK installation process was
simple and successfully completed after following on-screen prompts. The
researcher’s verification of the installed components from “Programs and Features”
windows of the “Control Panel” is displayed as in the Figure 6.10.

Figure 6.10: Programs and Features (after ACR122U SDK installed)

With the researcher’s limited knowledge of NFC application development at
that point in time, the setup of the NFC reader/writer was considered to be
successfully completed and the development of the prototype had commenced.
According to the research plan, the prototype was developed as a Window Store App
in Visual Studio 2013 using C# .NET framework and Window Proximity API.
Instead of creating a Windows Desktop application, the prototype was created as a
Windows Store App because access to the WinRT Features such as Proximity APIs
is more seamless and less restricted from Windows Store Apps (Xavier, 2012).
Using WinRT in C# .NET framework, accessing the NFC devices began with
instantiating a ProximityDevice object using the ProximityDevice class. This
instantiation was done by invoking the “GetDefault” static method of the
ProximityDevice class in the Windows.Networking.Proximity package. Once a
ProximityDevice object was instantiated, it was used by the application in handling
events such as an NFC device getting within the communication range and leaving
the communication range by subscribing to DeviceArrived and DeviceDeparted
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events. However, as shown in the following Figure 6.11, the GetDefault static
method of the ProximityDevice class always returned a null object in this prototype,
preventing any further development.

Figure 6.11: Issue in using Proximity Library

After some in-depth research it was found that “FeliCa” NFC card
readers/writers from Sony were the only devices that could be recognised as
Proximity devices by the WinRT on Windows 8 and higher versions. Figure 6.12
presents how a Sony’s FeliCa NFC card reader/writer appeared as a proximity device
in the Windows Device Manager panel.

Figure 6.12: FeliCa NFC device in Windows Device Manager (“NFC Troubleshooting Guide”, n.d.)

The reason for this is that NXP Semiconductors, Sony’s joint venture partner
in enabling the global adoption of contactless smart card applications on mobile
phones (“NXP and Sony announce joint venture”, 2006), is the only provider of
proximity driver software compatible with Windows 8 and above (Sharief, 2013).
Therefore, application development using any other NFC card reader/writer devices
for Windows 8 or higher versions required resorting to less generic approaches, such
as low-level socket-based connection, instead of making use of Windows Proximity
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APIs, the more abstract and portable approach provided by the WinRT. Use of
socket-based connections required reserving certain IP addresses and ports for the
communication purpose between the devices. Such requirement could result in
imposing some issues, such as IP and port conflict etc., as the application could be
interacting with multiple devices dynamically.
Unlike Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sales (EFTPOS) systems, where
both hardware and software are provided by the same vendor, usually by a financial
institution, this research does not picture that a specific brand of NFC reader/writer
devices, pre-configured to use certain IP address and port, will be provided by the
software vendor of the Electronic Prescribing System (EPS) or Electronic Dispensing
System (EDS) for the mobile electronic prescription transfer.
In addition, there may be various applications and peripherals devices
installed at the prescriber’s or dispenser’s facility, potentially resulting in some of
those required IP addresses and ports already being occupied. Therefore, in order to
be a vendor agnostic solution in this primary health care environment, use of lowlevel socket-based connections in implementing the mobile electronic prescription
transfer application is likely to be impractical in reality.
Despite the fact that the prototype development was deterred by the lack of a
publicly available proximity driver for the NFC card reader/writer being used, this
experiment found another aspect of limitation in NFC’s interoperability. The NFC
Data Exchange Format (NDEF) is the most widely supported format by various
manufacturers and it was the format in which most NFC devices and applications
exchange data with one another.
According to the NDEC specification, the capacity of the NDEF payload was
232-1 (i.e. approximately 4GB) but it was mostly limited by the storage capacity of
the NFC tag or device participating in the data exchange. However, if the data to be
exchanged was in a non-NDEF format, the interoperability would be severely limited
because defining the protocol stack for exchanging data was entirely up to the
application developer (“Advanced NFC”, n.d.). This not only severely impacted the
application’s interoperability but also inherently introduced security-, reliability- and
efficiency-related risks.
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6.2.3

Experiment 2: Results/Outcomes.
Despite how it initially appeared, this experiment found that interfacing with

the NFC readers/writers (i.e. except for the FeliCa NFC card readers/writers)
required the use of the software development kit (SDK) provided by the hardware
manufacturer. This severely limited the solution’s portability (i.e. interfacing with
different NFC readers/writers by various manufacturers) and interoperability (i.e.
integration with EPS and EDS developed by various software vendors). On the other
hand, the necessity to use a specific brand of NFC reader/writer (i.e. the FeliCa NFC
card readers/writers) for all the Electronic Prescribing Systems (EPS) and all the
Electronic Dispensing Systems (EDS) was too limiting and impractical for the
Australian healthcare industry. In fact, this experiment discovered that use of NFC
technology failed to be both device manufacturer agnostic and EPS and EDS
software vendor agnostic from the perspectives of application development,
portability and interoperability.
Therefore, this experiment deemed that the NFC technology was not a
suitable alternative transport mechanism for transferring electronic prescriptions
between the EPS, the EDS and the client’s/patient’s smartphone.

6.2.4

Experiment 2: Lessons Learnt.
The tools and sample applications provided by the manufacturer were

primarily designed for configuring the security settings of the NFC cards and the
device itself and for reading/writing the data to and from the NFC cards at the block
and segment levels.
NFC has the best interoperability at the end-user level for exchanging
photographs, contacts and web URLs. However, this experiment found that
development of NFC application in C# for the non-mobile environment, such as
Desktop or Windows Store App environments, was not as efficient and portable as
its mobile counterparts. The NFC application development was the most efficient
and best supported in the mobile environment where the driver software, along with
the hardware, is provided by the manufacturer. Essentially, any issues between the
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hardware and the driver software were taken care when the device was manufactured
with inbuilt NFC capability. However, application development for NFC in the
Windows desktop environment, including the Windows Store Apps, is yet to mature
and still has room for improvement.
Although the exchange of NDEF-type data between various NFC devices and
applications are widely supported among various NFC devices and applications,
exchanging the non-NDEF data requires defining the protocol stack and thus has
very limited interoperability compared to the NDEF data.

6.2.5

Experiment 2: Modifications.
Since this experiment proved that the NFC technology is not suitable for

transferring electronic prescriptions between the EPS, the EDS and the
client’s/patient’s smartphone, the researcher has commenced the next iteration by
conducting a detailed literature review on Bluetooth, the rival technology in short
range radio communication. The next section (Section 6.4) describes the detailed
literature review on Bluetooth technology and is followed by Section 6.5 in which its
suitability for transferring electronic prescription information in the proposed fully
electronic mobile ETP solution is verified through an experimentation.

6.2.6

Conclusion
Despite the findings from the preliminary study, this experiment proved that

use of NFC technology is not suitable (see sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 for details) for the
proposed mobile ETP solution. The experiment found that only the Sony’s FeliCa
NFC reader/writer can be programmed using C# .NET and Windows Proximity API,
and the rest of the NFC reader/writer devices required the use of SDK from their
device manufacturers. This is mainly due to the hardware manufacturers not making
the proximity driver of their devices publicly available for software development and
integration.
This experiment concluded as a failure because, if developed using any of
these vendor-specific SDK, the solution would work only for those specific devices,
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thereby introducing a portability issue that invalidates the use of NFC technology as
a practical solution for the Australian healthcare industry.

6.3

Learning from the Research
Despite NFC technology’s widespread support from most mobile device

manufacturers, excellent end-user level interoperability and explicit acceptance by
users even in mission critical operations such as financial transactions (i.e. mobile
payments), this experimentation found that it has much room for improvement in the
software development from the perspectives of interoperability and portability.
The NFC application development was best supported in the mobile
environment where the driver software and libraries were provided by the
manufacturer alongside with the hardware. However, application development to
interact with NFC devices in Windows environment (i.e. as extensions of EPS and
EDS to communicate with its mobile counterpart) was yet to mature and still has
much room for improvement.
The tools and utilities provided by the NFC device manufacturers are mainly
designed to configure the security settings of the NFC cards/devices and to perform
the read/write operations at the block and segment levels (i.e. low-level data access
operations). At present, only the FeliCa NFC readers/writers are recognised as
proximity devices on Windows 8.1 and later operating system platforms in order to
leverage the use of Window Proximity API for software development. Application
development for the other NFC devices necessitated resorting to using less
generic/portable approaches such as low-level socket programming and vendor
provided SDKs. Therefore, the application ends up being less interoperable and
portable. These experiment outcomes have a severe impact on the practicality of the
proposed mobile ETP solution for the Australian healthcare industry, where it was
intended to be device manufacturer (i.e. NFC reader/writer) agnostic as well as EPS
and EDS software vendor agnostic.
Furthermore, in this environment it is impractical to have an application
which requires certain IP addresses and ports reserved solely for its communication
purpose, as these may potentially be occupied by various other applications and
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peripherals installed at the prescriber’s or dispenser’s facility. Therefore, the use of
NFC technology is deemed not suitable as the alternative transport mechanism for
the proposed mobile ETP solution and hence the researcher commenced another
iteration of experimentation on the next potential candidate rivalling NFC in short
range radio communication; Bluetooth.

Research Thesis - 135 of 269

6.4

Bluetooth

6.4.1

A brief history and how it works
Bluetooth, named after the 10th century King Harald Blåtand (i.e. Harold

Bluetooth in English) of Denmark, is a low-power, short-range radio communication
technology for point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications (“Bluetooth
fact or fiction”, 2016). The men behind this technology were Sven Mattisson and
Jaap Haartsen from Lund Ericsson Lab in 1998. It was initially called MultiCommunicator (MC) Links and was conceived as a low-cost wireless solution to
replace RS-232 standard cables.
Bluetooth technology was the first low-power radio communication
technology to wirelessly connect various accessories (i.e. devices such as wristband,
headset and portable speaker etc.) from different industries (i.e. telecommunication,
entertainment, health, sports and fitness etc.) (“Bluetooth fact or fiction”, 2016)
enabling the building of Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN).
This technology unlocked many new opportunities for various devices and
changed the consumer perspective permanently. In fact, Bluetooth has transcended
its usual/intended applications by permeating various other devices across all
industries and markets such as smart home, wearables and location-based
technologies. Emergence of Bluetooth version 4, also known as Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE), enabled this permeation even further and its market growth can be
witnessed in the following two figures (Kaye, 2014).
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Figure 6.13: Bluetooth’s market growth (Kaye, 2014)

Figure 6.14: Bluetooth devices worldwide ("Bluetooth SIG 2014 Annual Report", 2015)

Bluetooth makes use of the spread spectrum frequency-hopping technology
and shares the same frequency band, 2.4 GHz, with Wi-Fi and many other household
appliances such as microwave oven and cordless phone (“What can an attacker do”,
2013).
From its very early days, Bluetooth technology was governed and guided by
the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). Bluetooth SIG was initially founded with
five companies (i.e. Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba) and now it has over
33,000 members worldwide ("Wireless History Timeline", 2016; "Member
Directory", 2016). Bluetooth version 3 (i.e. not the latest version but the most widely
used version in current market) supports a data transfer rate up to 24 megabits per
second (Mbps) and has three connection types: Asynchronous Connection-Less
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(ACL), Synchronous Connection-Oriented (SCO) and extended Synchronous
Connection-Oriented (eSCO). The ACL connection is used for both asymmetric and
symmetric data transfer and the integrity of data is ensured by the packet
retransmission (IEEE, 2005). SCO connection is symmetric and used for real-time
two-way voice communication. The voice can be distorted when the Bit Error Rate
(BER) is high as SCO does not use packet retransmission. The eSOC is symmetric
and is also used for real-time two-way voice transmission. However, it ensures the
data integrity by using retransmission packets. This assurance of data integrity
enables eSOC connection to carry data packet as well (ibid).
When Bluetooth devices communicate with one another, the connection
initiator becomes the piconet master and the remaining devices become slaves. A
piconet is a tiny network composed of two or more Bluetooth devices occupying the
same physical channel (i.e. synchronised to a common clock and hopping sequence)
(Haataja, et al., 2013; "Communications Topology", 2016). Each Bluetooth-enabled
device may participate in more than one piconet simultaneously and a slave in one
piconet can be a master in another piconet. Within a piconet all communications go
through the piconet master, and the piconet master is also in charge of the frequency
hopping and synchronisation with the slave devices. When piconets share a common
device between them, the common device relays the data between the different
piconets and together they form a scatternet. These common piconet members are
called scatternet members and it is how Bluetooth extends its data transmission range
restriction (ibid). This network topology and how it works is roughly depicted in the
following diagram, Figure 6.15.
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Scatternet

Figure 6.15: Bluetooth network topology (Mahmoud, 2003)

Current Bluetooth architecture allows up to seven active slaves in a piconet,
with many more connected in parked state in which slaves enter reduced power mode
but remain synchronised with the master, ready to be active and part of the piconet
again (“Baseband Architecture”, 2016; Blankenbeckler, 2010; "Communications
Topology", 2016).

6.4.2

Architecture and Security
Bluetooth architecture consists of the core system and specific profiles based

on the intended use case or application. Each Bluetooth profile states possible
applications and defines the general behaviours of how it will communicate with
other devices in order to achieve its function. Therefore, a Bluetooth-enabled device
must be able to interpret certain Bluetooth profiles to perform its intended functions.
Fundamentally, Figure 6.16 depicts the Bluetooth core system specified by
both Bluetooth SIG and IEEE Std 802.15.1-2005. The diagram also shows that the
lowest three layers (i.e. Link Manager, Baseband and Radio layers) of the Bluetooth
core system are grouped into a subsystem called Bluetooth Controller.
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Logical Link control & Adaptation
Protocol (L2CAP)

Bluetooth Controller

Host Controller Interface (HCI)

Figure 6.16: Bluetooth core system ("Core System Architecture", 2016)

Just as the lowest three layers of the Bluetooth stack are grouped into the
Bluetooth Controller subsystem, the rest of the layers, except the Application Layer,
are grouped together as the Bluetooth Host subsystem. The interoperability between
the two subsystems, Bluetooth Controller and Bluetooth Host, is supported by
defining the common interface (“Core System Architecture”, 2016).
There is a wide range of Bluetooth profiles, each describing many different
types of applications or use cases for devices, and the Bluetooth-adopted
specification section of the Bluetooth SIG website lists a wide range of supported
profiles for each specific Bluetooth core specification version. Interoperable or
compatible applications are to be designed and developed by following the guidance
provided by these specifications and profiles ("Adopted specifications", 2016).
Figure 6.17 provides a high-level perspective on how the Bluetooth profiles and the
core system fits together to form the entire Bluetooth protocol stack.
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Figure 6.17: Bluetooth protocol stack ("Bluetooth core specification", 2016)

Due to the way they are illustrated, the prior two diagrams (Figure 6.16 and
6.17) do not clearly show how they fit together. Therefore, Figure 6.18 emphasises
on showing how they are related and integrated.

Figure 6.18: Bluetooth protocol stack and core system mapping ("Bluetooth core specification",
2016; "Core System Architecture", 2016)
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In Figure 6.19, the IEEE Std 802.15.1 compares the OSI 7 layers model with
the Bluetooth’s protocol stack. The diagram also includes IEEE 802.2 as a
transitioning step between the two models as it shows the division of Data Link layer
of the OSI model into MAC and LLC layers.

Figure 6.19: OSI layers and Bluetooth protocol stack mapping (IEEE, 2005)

The IEEE Std 802.15.1 specified Bluetooth’s security in terms of encryption,
authentication and key generation schemes. In order to support usage protection and
information confidentiality, security measures are provided at both Application
Layer and Link Layer. Although user information is protected by encrypting the
packet payload using a stream cipher called E0 which is resynchronized for every
payload, the IEEE Std 802.15.1 dictates that the access code and packet header shall
never be encrypted (IEEE, 2005).
Bluetooth’s

security

fundamentals

are

Bluetooth

Device

Address

(DB_ADDRESS), two secret keys and a pseudo-random number which will be
generated for each new transaction. Table 6.3 summarises each of those entities and
their sizes (ibid).
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Table 6.3: Bluetooth security entities and their sizes (IEEE, 2005)

The Bluetooth Device Address (BD_ADDR) is the primary identifier of a
Bluetooth device, similar to Ethernet Media Access Control (MAC) address, and is
acquired by the user interactions or via the automatic enquiry routine by a device.
This 48-bit number uniquely identifies a Bluetooth device among peers in the
piconet. Both secret keys, the authentication key and encryption key, are derived
during the initialisation. The authentication key is often referred to as the link key,
underlining its importance to the link/connection.
As described in Table 6.3, the authentication key is a 128-bit random number
shared between two or more parties as the base of all security transactions between
these parties. The link key is not only used in the authentication routine but is also
one of the parameters in deriving the encryption key. Whilst the encryption key and
authentication are completely different keys, the encryption key is derived from the
authentication key during the authentication process and each time encryption is
activated. The piconet master can use separate encryption keys for each slave device
in a point-to-multipoint configuration with ciphering activated. The random number
is generated by a random or pseudo-random process in the device as a nonrepeating
(i.e. it is highly unlikely that the value will repeat within the lifetime of the
authentication key) and randomly generated (i.e. the chances of predicting its value is
not significantly greater than zero) number (“Baseband Architecture”, 2016;
Blankenbeckler, 2010; "Communications Topology", 2016; IEEE, 2005).
Utilising these fundamental security components, Bluetooth Security
Manager (SM) provides the Bluetooth protocol stack to generate and exchange
security keys to create encrypted link for secure communication among peers. It
defines two roles, Initiator and Responder, and supports three security procedures:
Pairing, Bonding and Encryption Re-establishment. The Pairing procedure generates
a temporary security key or short-term key (STK) and creates an encrypted link.
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However, the generated security key is not stored and thus cannot be reused for later
connections. The Bonding procedure on the other hand, which also includes the
pairing step, creates a permanent association by sharing the security key which will
be used for later connections until deleted by either side of the connection. Once
bonded, the Encryption Re-establishment procedure defines how to re-establish a
secure encrypted connection without having to go through the Bonding (i.e. Pairing
and Bonding) procedure (IEEE, 2005; Townsend, et al., 2014). These Pairing and
Bonding processes are depicted in the Figure 6.20.

Figure 6.20: Bluetooth pairing and bonding (Townsend, et al., 2014)

6.4.3

Governing Standards
All the Bluetooth specifications were formalised by the Bluetooth SIG upon

its establishment in 1998. Soon after that, in early 1999, Bluetooth was also adopted
as IEEE Std 802.15 by the Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks
within IEEE ("Wireless History Timeline", 2016; IEEE, 2005).

6.4.4

Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution
Although this research could not find a consolidated list of mobile

smartphones that support Bluetooth technology, the support for Bluetooth on mobile
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smartphones is no less than that of NFC ("iOS: Supported Bluetooth profiles", 2015;
"Any Android phones that do not support Bluetooth", 2012).
Bluetooth technology has a longer communication range compared to NFC
and this exposes the radio signal to signal interception attacks. However, its spread
spectrum frequency-hopping behaviour, in addition to encryption, provides extra
security against such threat. Using Adaptive Frequency Hopping (AFH), Bluetooth
hops 1600 times per second between 79 channels within 2.4 GHz and 2.48 GHz ISM
band (i.e. Industrial, Scientific and Medical radio bands) (“What can an attacker do”,
2013).
Using the Bluetooth technology, establishing connection between devices is
less seamless, requiring extra steps to be performed manually, compared to using the
NFC technology. However, from the perspective of mobile electronic prescription
transfer application, this requirement to pair the devices (i.e. between prescriber’s
device, client/patient’s smartphone and dispenser’s device) can be considered an
additional security measure. Moreover, this pairing is not required for subsequent
operations once the devices have been paired and bonded.
From its early days, implementation and compliance of the Bluetooth
technology has been closely governed and guided by the Bluetooth SIG. With
manufacturers strictly adhering to the relevant profile specification of the device
type, the interoperability between devices by different manufacturers from various
industries is well supported. Moreover, with the release of version 4.x, Bluetooth
also helped change the face of the healthcare industry as its increased use in many
medical devices enables consumers to control and manage their own health.

6.4.5

Potential issues of Bluetooth for the proposed solution
Like any other wireless communication technology, Bluetooth is vulnerable

to some security threats inherently. First of all, although Bluetooth’s standard
communication range is 10 metres, it is not guaranteed that the radio signal is not
accessible beyond that distance. This characteristic exposes Bluetooth’s signals to be
easily interceptable by would-be attackers.
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Along with its popularity and widespread uses, there are malware and worm
programs exploiting Bluetooth design and/or implementation vulnerabilities. The
Caribe worm and Bluejacking would be the less harmful form of these whilst
Bluebugging can be more dangerous as it allows the attacker to remotely access the
compromised phone and use its features, such as making/forwarding/listening calls
and text messages.
The Caribe (also known as Cari and Cabir.B) is the world’s first wireless
worm which runs on the Symbian Operating System (Millard, 2004). Whilst most
Internet-delivered content (i.e. primary source of various malware) is filtered by the
telecommunication carrier for security, the Caribe worm replicates over Bluetooth
connections in the form of a file called "caribe.sis" in the phone’s messaging inbox.
When the user clicks the file and chooses to install it, the worm infects the device
and starts looking for other Bluetooth-enabled devices to infect over Bluetooth
connection (ibid). The worm scans for other Bluetooth-enabled devices and attempts
to send itself onto the first device found every time the device is powered off and
back on (i.e. propagation is triggered by the device activation). Setting a device to
non-discoverable mode protects the device from being infected by the Cabir worm.
However, once compromised, even disabling Bluetooth does not stop an infected
device from infecting the other devices ("Bluetooth-Worm:SymbOS/Cabir", 2017;
"SymbOS.Cabir", 2017).
Bluejacking, also known as Bluespamming, allows the sending of unsolicited
messages to other Bluetooth-enabled devices via Bluetooth. Despite the name, it
neither hijacks nor steals information from the device. This technique uses the basic
Object Exchange Stack that was used for "beaming" business cards and applications
via Infrared on Palm OS and exploits the discoverability feature of Bluetooth
devices. Whilst it generally poses minimal security risk, it can be extremely
bothersome because the message alerts the recipient to take action such as reading,
responding or deleting it (Leyden, 2003; Tan, 2007).
Bluebugging on the other hand is taking full control of the device without the
owner’s knowledge by exploiting the outdated firmware with faulty/vulnerable
Bluetooth implementation. This attack begins by first gaining the trusted device
status, potentially using the business-card transfer process, and then establishing a
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connection with the targeted device by tricking it into believing that the attacker’s
device is a harmless peripheral such as a Bluetooth headset. Once this is achieved,
the compromised device and the data within are at the mercy of the attacker since
most functions of the device can be controlled by the attacker via the AT command
codes (i.e. the ATtention command set, also known as the Hayes command set,
which is typically used by developers and service technicians). Fortunately, the
vulnerability to Bluebugging attack was addressed in the later firmware upgrades
(Doherty, 2015).
Essentially, just as Doherty (2015) mentioned, Bluetooth presents a trade-off
between convenience and security, and it will always be vulnerable to the limitations
of user education and user risk awareness. Since this research is not about
Bluetooth’s security, it relies on the relevant authorities producing security patches
and necessary firmware upgrades, white-hat hackers exposing the vulnerabilities
before the black-hat ones exploiting them. The experiment in Section 6.5 is to
determine whether Bluetooth is a suitable electronic prescription transfer mechanism
alternative to using the Internet for the proposed fully electronic mobile ETP
solution.

6.4.6

Conclusion
Bluetooth is the first widely used radio technology for wireless peer-to-peer

connection and with its constant advancements over the time, such as the advent of
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), it is still going strong after almost two decades.
Basically, Bluetooth technology is the global standard enabling the Internet-ofThings (IoT) by assuring the connectivity between various devices from various
industries (“Bluetooth”, 2016). Its widespread uses in various applications
familiarises consumers with how the technology works, its security and reliability.
Based on this familiarity and trust, built over a period of almost two decades, use of
Bluetooth technology for mobile electronic prescription transfer is likely to be well
accepted by the users.
Bluetooth is well supported by most mobile smartphone manufactures and
has an excellent interoperability between devices, which is assured by the Bluetooth
SIG ("iOS: Supported Bluetooth profiles", 2015; "Any Android phones that do not
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support Bluetooth", 2012). It is strongly supported by a large development
community, with a variety of frameworks and tools/utilities on various hardware
and/or software platforms.
Compared to NFC, Bluetooth also has better support from the device
manufacturers and software vendors. The research findings so far indicate that
among all the current wireless communication technology Bluetooth is likely to be
the most suitable transfer mechanism for the mobile electronic prescription transfer
application. Nevertheless, whether it actually possesses adequate security measures
to be an alternative secured transfer mechanism for electronic prescriptions and its
practicality (i.e. from development and deployment of the solution perspectives) is
yet to be determined by one of the experimentations in the next section (Experiment
3: Bluetooth – Security of data in transit).
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6.5

Experiment 3: Bluetooth – Security of the data in transit

6.5.1

Overview
Prior experiment was conducted using NFC technology as the transfer

mechanism for exchanging electronic prescription data between devices. Despite its
widespread support and excellent interoperability between devices at the end-user
level, support for software development by the product manufacturers, such as
availability of software drivers and software development frameworks, are still fairly
limited. An example of this limitation is the fact that only the Sony FeliCa NFC card
readers/writers are recognised as proximity devices by the Windows 8 and later
versions, due to unavailability of the proximity driver for the products manufactured
by other vendors.
The necessity to use a specific brand of NFC reader/writer devices for both
the primary care’s Electronic Prescribing System (EPS) and the pharmacy’s
Electronic Dispensing System (EDS) is too limiting and this research does not deem
it practical in reality for the Australian healthcare industry.
Therefore, to come up with a more vendor agnostic and practical solution in
this primary healthcare environment, another experiment for transferring the
electronic prescription data between the PCs (i.e. primary care’s EPS and pharmacy’s
EDS systems) and the mobile smartphone (i.e. client’s/patient’s phone) is conducted
using a more mature short-range wireless communication technology, Bluetooth.

6.5.2

Experiment details
In this experiment, Bluetooth technology was used in transferring electronic

prescription data between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the
client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone and the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing
system (EDS). It is a mature technology with widespread support by almost all
mobile smartphone manufacturers, an excellent interoperability among supported
devices and adequate support for security. Although establishing connection between
supported devices is not as seamless as using NFC since it requires manual pairing,
this can also be considered an additional security feature in this application.
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As per the prior experiment, this experiment was conducted using Windows 8
operating system platform since the majority of the Clinical Management Systems
used at primary care clinics and Pharmacy Management Systems in Australia run on
Windows operating system platform. Therefore, despite the change of technology in
transferring the electronic prescription data, both the desktop application and its
mobile counterpart will remain using the same operating system platforms, Windows
8 and Android. However, instead of using a desktop PC with external USB Bluetooth
adaptor/dongle, similar to using the USB NFC card reader/writer as in the prior
experiment, this experiment was conducted using a laptop with inbuilt Bluetooth
capability to communicate with the mobile smartphone.
The Windows metro application for the transfer of the electronic prescription
from the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (i.e. most likely a desktop PC or a
laptop) to the client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone via Bluetooth can be implemented
using various frameworks such as 32feet.NET open-source library from CodePlex or
the PeerFinder class from the “Windows.Networking.Proximity” class library of the
.NET framework. CodePlex is Microsoft’s open-source project hosting website
where people from various professions and industries share projects and ideas. Since
many resources and support can be found from various sources for utilising these
libraries and frameworks, implementation of the Windows 8 metro application was
not the focus of this proof of concept prototyping experiment. On the other hand, due
to the limited processing power, storage space and supported features on mobile
devices compared to those of PCs, encryption/decryption of the prescription may not
actually be practical even if transferring the electronic prescription via Bluetooth is
achievable. Therefore, this experiment will focus on the development of the
application prototype for transferring the electronic prescription from the
client’s/patient’s Android smartphone to the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing
system (EDS) from achievability and practicality perspectives. As a result, an
experimental prototype is to be developed for Android platform utilising full capacity
of Android’s native support for the transfer of electronic prescription via Bluetooth
communication with encryption for adequate levels of efficiency, reliability,
portability and security.
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The Android application development environment on Windows 8 platform
was completed as part of Experiment 1 (i.e. experiment for 128-bit symmetric
encryption on Android for security of prescriptions from the data at rest perspective),
and therefore allows this experiment to begin straight after Experiment 2 (i.e.
experiment on transferring electronic prescription via NFC connection from a
Windows 8 metro application to Android phone). Initially, based on prior experience
in programming for Android, the researcher attempted to suppress the Bluetooth
pairing dialog screen in order to make the connection establishing process as
seamless as it was in NFC.
As shown in the following Figure 6.21, an attempt was made to suppress the
Bluetooth pairing dialog screen by directly writing the destination device’s address
into to the content provider.

Figure 6.21: Suppressing the Bluetooth pairing step on Android

At runtime, however, the above program code (Figure 6.21) generated the
error shown in Figure 6.22. Despite having the correct access permission as
illustrated in Figure 6.23, the debugging process (see Figure 6.24) identified that the
error originated from accessing the Bluetooth share. Furthermore, the investigation
revealed that, despite the application being granted the appropriate permissions to
access the Bluetooth share, direct manipulation (i.e. writing) of the content provider
is now protected for better security since Android version 4.1 (“Android Bluetooth
print stopped working on 4.1”, 2012). In Bluetooth 4.1 and later versions, sharing of
file over Bluetooth was achieved as shown in Figure 6.25.
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Figure 6.22: Android runtime error (suppressing Bluetooth pairing)

Figure 6.23: Android permission for Prototype

Figure 6.24: Debugging the Bluetooth error

Figure 6.25: Sharing file over Bluetooth (Bluetooth 4.1 and later versions)

However, when approach shown in Figure 6.25 was taken, a dialog box
popped up listing all the devices paired with the mobile phone in order to pick one
for the destination. In favour of more seamless operation, the researcher attempted to
suppress

this

dialog

box

by

overriding

the

“android.bluetooth.devicepicker.action.LAUNCH” intent and broadcasting the
“android.bluetooth.devicepicker.action.DEVICE_SELECTED” message in response
to it. Unfortunately, it was found that broadcasting these messages has been internal
since Android 4.1 and thus only the Android system itself can send those intent
(“Caused by: java.lang.SecurityException: Permission Denial”, 2014).
Aside from these two failed attempts by the researcher in making the use of
Bluetooth more seamless as if using the NFC, the development of the prototype went
well and the selected sample CDA file was successfully sent via Bluetooth to the
paired laptop. Figure 6.26 shows where the selection was made for the use of the
attached device (i.e. via a USB cable) or the emulator when the prototype was
executed in the Android Studio.
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Figure 6.26: Device selection in Android Studio

Except for a few preliminary steps, all the testing in this experiment was
conducted using an actual Android device connected via USB connection instead of
the software emulator. Once the selection was made to use the connected Android
device, the prototype was executed on that device as shown in the figure 6.27.

Figure 6.27: The prototype running on an Android device

In the prototype, the textbox with the red background is to display the
encrypted content of the select CDA file and that with the green background will
show the decrypted content of the previously encrypted file shown in the red textbox.
Clicking on the “Select File” button will invoke a list of applications, as depicted in
Figure 6.28, for selecting a file from various sources such as the Android file system
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or the Dropbox. However, before any file is selected from the Android mobile
prototype application to be sent to the paired laptop via Bluetooth, the laptop needs
to be set to receive the file via the Bluetooth connection as shown in Figure 6.29.
This step is only required in this experiment because the prototype application does
not have the desktop/PC/laptop side counterpart representing the application
operating at the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing system (EDS) end with which to
receive the electronic prescription file from the client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone.
The dialog shown in Figure 6.30 will be displayed once the “Receive a File”
selection is made in Figure 6.29.

Figure 6.29: Receiving the file

Figure 6.28: Selecting the file

The dialog displayed on the laptop in Figure 6.32 indicates that it is ready to
receive the transmission so that the prototype running on the Android phone can
transmit the CDA file via the Bluetooth connection to the laptop. Once the file to be
sent is selected in the mobile prototype application, a dialog box will be displayed
listing all the devices paired with phone (i.e. as the researcher’s attempt to broadcast
the message has failed) as shown in Figure 6.30.
When a destination is selected from the list, the prototype will commence
encrypting the selected file. It will then save the encrypted content on the Android
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file system, display the encrypted content in the UI’s red textbox and then decrypt
the same content, to be displayed in the green textbox. The encrypted file written to
the Android file system will then be sent to the selected destination via Bluetooth
connection. Figure 6.31 depicts the prototype application after a file has been sent to
the paired laptop.

Figure 6.30: Selecting destination device

Figure 6.31: Encrypted and decrypted content

Figure 6.32: Awaiting the file transfer
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At this point in time, the laptop will have received the file and a dialog box
similar to the one shown in Figure 6.33 will be displayed awaiting user’s input on
where to save the received file.

Figure 6.33: File received via Bluetooth (Windows 8.1)

Despite the fact that the process of establishing connection using Bluetooth is
not as seamless as using NFC, the development of the prototype application went
well without any issue. In addition to that, the prototype developed using the HTC
One mobile works well on the Samsung Galaxy A3, with no changes or
reconfiguration required. This experiment had no software driver related issue, and
no special or vendor specific Software Development Kit (SDK) was required for
using Bluetooth during the development of this prototype. Some modifications for
improved security in the Android version 4 and later versions, such as making intents
and messages protected, had an impact on the user-friendliness of the prototype;
however, it was more of a nuisance in the connection establishing process than a
critical deal breaker.

6.5.3

Experiment 3: Results/Outcomes.
This experiment found that the development of the prototype went well,

neither experiencing any software driver related issue nor having to use
manufacturer-specific SDK for using Bluetooth. The sample CDA file was
successfully transferred from the mobile device to the paired laptop via Bluetooth
with no performance issue. In addition, this experiment was successfully repeated on
the Samsung Galaxy A3 phone (i.e. a device by different manufacturer) without any
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changes or reconfiguration. This proved that unlike the prior experiment, Experiment
2, use of Bluetooth as the alternative transfer mechanism will not suffer portability
and interoperability issues.
Due the fact that the research context is highly proprietary, the detailed
information on encryption mechanism used or security protocols employed in the
current transfer mechanism using the Internet (i.e. security from data in transit
perspective) is not public available. Therefore, this research was only focusing on the
standards applied by and strict governance of the relevant authority bodies over the
technology. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures and standards are strictly governed
by Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and IEEE standard 802.15.1-2005, and
strict governance by these two reputable authority bodies can be considered having
an adequate governance for an alternative electronic prescription transfer
mechanism.
Therefore, this experiment concluded that the use of Bluetooth technology as
the alternative transfer mechanism in the proposed mobile ETP solution is not only
practical but also provides comparable assurance to the current approach (i.e. using
the Internet) for the Australian healthcare industry. Although it was not the first
choice of short-range wireless communication technology for this research, this
experiment has proven that the Bluetooth technology provides adequate functionality
and performance with sufficient security assurance for transferring electronic
prescriptions between the EPS, EDS and client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone.
In general, use of Bluetooth technology made it possible to implement a
prototype of a mobile electronic prescription transfer application that is both device
manufacturer agnostic and EPS and EDS software vendor agnostic.

6.5.4

Experiment 3: Lessons Learnt.
Support for Bluetooth on mobile smartphones is no less than that of NFC and

it comes with better support by the vendors from the software development
perspective. As a mature technology, the use of Bluetooth in the development of this
prototype required neither any vendor specific software development kit (SDK) nor
software driver update. Another benefit of using this mature technology is an
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excellent portability and interoperability as this prototype works well on another
Android smartphone by a different manufacturer without any issue and
communicates seamlessly with the paired laptop exactly in the same way.
Bluetooth’s requirement to pair the devices before data transfer operation was
initially considered unintuitive and undesirable as it is the opposite of ubiquitous
computing. However, since the pairing is not required for subsequent operations once
the devices have been bonded, this experiment deemed the requirement for pairing as
an added security feature for this application.
Although this experiment was conducted using a laptop with in-built
Bluetooth capability, a USB Bluetooth adaptor/dongle can be used for this
communication at the clinic or pharmacy instead of using a desktop PC or laptop
with in-built Bluetooth capability. Bluetooth SIG’s strict specifications and influence
over the industry assures that it is vendor agnostic and the use of USB Bluetooth
dongle will work just as well as the in-built Bluetooth feature.

6.5.5

Experiment 3: Modifications.
No further modification is required as this experiment succeeded in proving

that the Bluetooth technology is suitable to be the transfer mechanism for exchanging
electronic prescription data between devices such as a prescriber’s EPS system, a
patient’s mobile device and a pharmacy’s EDS system.

6.5.6

Conclusion
For this research, Bluetooth was not initially the preferred short-range

wireless communication technology for transferring electronic prescription between
the ETP participant devices (i.e. prescriber’s EPS system, patient’s mobile device
and pharmacy’s EDS system). However, this experiment proved that Bluetooth is
suitable for such purpose in the proposed mobile ETP solution because it not only
offers comparable security assurance to using the Internet but also provides a
practical solution from the development, portability and interoperability perspectives
(see Section 6.5.3 for details). It has a few inconveniences such as having to pair the
devices for the first time use. However, use of other tool/technology such as NFC
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tags or QR codes can streamline this pairing process, and as an added benefit this
pairing process can even be considered as an additional security measure.

6.6

Learning from the Research
Bluetooth is a mature technology with widespread support from almost all

mobile smartphone manufacturers and has an excellent interoperability among
supported devices with adequate support for security. Using Bluetooth, the process of
establishing connection between supported devices is not as seamless as using NFC
as it requires manual pairing for the first-time use. However, this pairing is not
required for subsequent operations once the devices have been paired and bonded,
and the extra step can in fact be considered an additional security feature in this
application.
This experimentation’s attempt to make the initial pairing process as seamless
as in NFC by suppressing the pop-up dialog box (i.e. which lists all the devices to
pair with) has failed due to the changes made in Android 4.1 and Bluetooth 4.1 for
better security against harmful operations. Despite this minor hindrance, the
development of the prototype went well and the sample CDA file was successfully
transferred via Bluetooth to the paired laptop requiring neither vendor specific
software development kit (SDK) nor software driver update. The prototype also
executed well on another Android smartphone by a different manufacturer without
issue and communicated well with the paired laptop in exactly the same way. From
the compliance perspective, the strict compliance specifications and influence of the
Bluetooth SIG and IEEE over the industry assures that it remains vendor agnostic
with excellent portability and interoperability. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures,
widespread support by device manufacturers, excellent interoperability and
portability and strict compliance governance make it a suitable candidate technology
for securely transferring electronic prescriptions.
In addition, Experiment 3 succeeded in proving that Bluetooth technology is
a suitable wireless communication technology for exchanging electronic prescription
data for the proposed mobile ETP solution. Finally, this experimentation outcome
proved Bluetooth to be a secure, vendor-agnostic and practical transfer mechanism
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for exchanging electronic prescription data between the prescriber’s EPS system,
patient’s mobile device and pharmacy’s EDS system in the Australian healthcare
industry. Since no further revision or repetition was required, this iteration of the
experimentation was successfully concluded, and this conclusion led to the next
phase of the thesis; Discussion of Results.
The paper produced at the end of this stage (i.e. Research Paper 3 in
Appendix A) briefly describes the outcomes of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 for
securing electronic prescription information in the proposed mobile ETP solution
from the data in transit perspective. Subsequently, the paper proposed Bluetooth
wireless communication technology to be the secured transfer mechanism alternative
to using the Internet for transferring electronic prescriptions as part of the proposed
mobile ETP solution. The research findings presented in Research Paper 3 (in
Appendix A) and produced at the end of this stage were verified by the “tripleblinded peer review” process.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2017). Security of ePrescription:
Data in Transit Comparison Using Existing and Mobile Device Services. In
Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference.
Geelong, Australia. ACM, doi: 10.1145/3014812.3014870
Contributions: Htat (75%), Williams (20%) and McCauley (5%)
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CHAPTER 7.
7.1

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Overview
This chapter begins with the collation of the experimentation outcomes from

Chapters 5 and 6 into the Analysis Matrix partially populated in Chapter 4 (i.e. Table
4.2). It then provides further discussion built upon the literature review findings
(Chapter 2), research results (Chapter 4) and the experimentation outcomes (Chapters
5 and 6) from a more holistic perspective. The purpose and use of handwritten
signatures are then discussed, along with those of their electronic counterparts,
digital certificates, and their potential role as more than a mere digital equivalence of
handwritten signatures, actively preventing fraudulent activities in the first place.
Subsequently, a framework to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP
solution in compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian
healthcare industry is constructed using the outcomes and knowledge obtained from
the research activities conducted. Such knowledge is later extended further and
another framework is derived for assessing Android mobile ETP solutions for their
compliance with the security mandates. The last part of Section 7.3 mentions that
despite this research’s focus on Android OS both frameworks are mostly applicable
to mobile ETP applications on any mobile operating system such as iOS. Finally, this
section is concluded by a reflection on the Research Questions from a holistic point
of view, based on the research outcomes.
The paper produced during this stage (Research Paper 4) compares the
current ETP implementation with the proposed Android mobile ETP solution from a
more holistic perspective and it was verified by the “triple-blinded peer review”
process.
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2016). Future of Australia’s eTP:
Script Exchange, Script Vault or secure mobile alternative. In Proceedings of
the 14th Australian Information Security Management Conference, Perth,
Australia (pp. 52-59). doi: 10.4225/75/58a69d860a643
Contributions: Htat (80%), Williams (15%) and McCauley (5%)
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7.2

Collation of Experimentation Results (Analysis Matrix collation)
To this point, analysis of the regulatory mandates and iterative

experimentations of the candidate technologies has contributed to understanding of
the security requirements and how well these candidate technologies comply with
those requirements. The experiments focused on securing the electronic prescriptions
from the data at rest and data in transit perspectives while they are being stored and
transferred between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the
client’s/patient’s Android smartphone and the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing
system (EDS). These experiments have provided sufficient materials and knowledge
to construct a vendor agnostic experimental proof-of-concept prototype focusing on
the security, interoperability, portability and practicality in the industry.
Using a rigorous analysis of the legislation, standards and regulatory
mandates, Table 4.2 lists a set of security requirements for electronic prescription in
the Australian healthcare industry. The experiments conducted in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6 provide data for further assessment and discussion on each candidate
technology for their compliance with relevant security requirements and practicality
in the industry. To enable such assessment, the following Table 7.1 collate the
security requirements initially recorded in the Table 4.2 together with relevant
experimentation outcomes. The right-most column of the Table 7.1 (i.e. “Technology
conforming to the mandated requirement”) briefly described the outcomes from the
experiments conducted for each security requirements.
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Table 7.1: Analysis matrix of Experiment outcomes for each security requirements of electronic prescription information

No. Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

Security requirements mandated

Technology conforming to the
mandated requirement

Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective
1

2

Encryption of the
electronic prescription

Nationwide

Saving the DAK and
any of its derived keys
on any permanent
storage

Nationwide

ATS 4888.2-2013
section 5.3.6

ATS 4888.2-2013
section 7.3.3

The electronic prescription is to be
encrypted using a symmetric key
derived from DAK

The proposed solution also uses
the same DAK and the
prescription information is
encrypted using a symmetric
key derived from the DAK

Minimum of 128-bit encryption for
storing DAK or any of its derived
keys on any stable storage

The experiment 1 proved that
the Android platform supports
the 128-bit symmetric
encryption mandated by the
specification.
The experiment also found that
the time taken for encrypting
and decrypting the keys on the
mobile devices is practical (i.e.
acceptable). Please refer to the
experiment 1, section 5.2.1, for
further details.

3

HL7 message structure
for electronic

Nationwide

AS 4700.3-2014

Mandated HL7 message structure
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Theoretically, achieves better
interoperability when comply

No. Feature or usage

Jurisdiction

Governing regulations,
standards & specifications

prescription

Security requirements mandated
for the electronic prescription

Technology conforming to the
mandated requirement
with this standard. But, only one
of the current PES services,
Script Vault from MediSecure,
uses HL7 messaging protocol.

Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective
4

Security of electronic
prescription

Nationwide

ATS 4888.2-2013
section 5.3.5

Security of data in transit between
ETP service participants are
specific to the implementation
‘platform’

Bluetooth’s inbuilt security
measures and standards are
specified by the Bluetooth
Special Interest Group (SIG)
and IEEE standard 802.15.12005.
Strict governance by these two
reputable authority bodies
ensure an appropriately high
level of security.
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Table 7.1 together with Table 4.1 describes the essential security
requirements for the electronic prescription and documents the research outcomes
(i.e. analysis of the legislation, standards and regulatory mandates followed by a
series of experiments) addressing each of those requirements for security
compliance. It establishes the data from which the final conclusions were drawn after
further deliberation in the next chapter, Chapter 8.

7.3

The Proposed Solution and Framework
The proof of concept prototype proved that by using the security compliance

matrix, a mobile ETP application, compliant with security requirements, can be built
using the Android OS and Bluetooth. This proof of concept prototype was presented
merely to strengthen practicality of the research findings and was not intended to be
a fully functional application demonstrating the end-to-end functionalities.
The Acts and Regulations governing the prescription of schedule drugs in all
states and territories support the use of electronic prescription without requiring any
amendments or changes. However, acceptance of an electronic/digital signature in
place of a prescriber’s handwritten signature in prescribing is still unclear (i.e.
neither explicitly accepted nor rejected) in the Australian Capital Territory, New
South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory. Regulations of these jurisdictions
require the prescriber’s signature to be present on the prescription but do not
explicitly specify whether it has to be a handwritten signature of the prescriber or can
be its digital equivalence. Another regulatory change required to support a fully
electronic prescription system is found in sections 41(1) and 88(1) of the NSW
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008, which mandate that the supplying
personnel/pharmacist’s endorsement of details, such as the prescription reference
number, address and date the substance is supplied, be written on the prescription
itself in ink. Such requirement cannot be met once the entire prescribing process is
done electronically. However, these regulatory constraints and uncertainties do not
concern the current ETP implementation because, along with the electronic copy of
the prescription (i.e. the one uploaded to the PES server), it also produces a printed
prescription which is signed by the prescriber, this signature satisfying these
regulatory requirements. The printed prescription also accommodates the NSW
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prescription endorsement process. This is entirely due to the fact that the current ETP
implementation was designed and built for the current legislation with changeaverting as its highest priority, rather than designed for what was needed for the ETP
process. This failure of process in the current ETP implementation imposed various
obstructions in moving towards a fully electronic ETP solution from both regulatory
and IT infrastructure perspectives. The ideal approach for ETP implementation
would have been the simultaneous amendment of each jurisdiction’s legislations and
regulations in accordance with the outcomes from a proper, purpose-oriented
problem identification and design process and the putting in place of the supporting
eHealth infrastructures and facilities at Commonwealth and jurisdiction levels. In
reality however, instead of a solution such as this, in which provisioning for future is
put in place while the legislation is changed accordingly over time, the implemented
solution was built solely for the current legislation, with change-averting as its
highest priority. Therefore, transitioning to the fully electronic prescribing systems
may require some regulatory changes in some jurisdictions as the fully electronic
implementation eliminates the presence of prescriber’s handwritten signature from
the prescriptions.
Primarily, the purpose of a signature is to authenticate the content of the
document to which it is applied to and one of the definitions provided by the
Cambridge Dictionary for signature says “…to show that something has been
written or agreed by you”. Various mechanisms such as the use of wax seals from
ancient Mesopotamia to the use of rubber stamps in fairly recent days have been
employed to authenticate the content of the document to which it is applied. A
handwritten signature accomplishes this authentication process passively and is not a
useful mechanism in preventing fraudulent activities; however, the use of digital
certificates has the potential to achieve much more. Whilst forging a signature makes
the fraudulent activity a criminal offence when prosecuted, the use of digital
certificates can prevent the fraudulent activity in the first place, or at least make the
signature less vulnerable to forgery, since possession of the private key is vital to
producing a digital certificate (Fillingham, 1997). In addition, since other highly
regulated and critical sectors of government such as Department of Immigration and
Border Protection and Australian Taxation Office have already widely adopted the
use of digital certificates in their processes, the acceptance of digital certificates in
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place of handwritten signatures in the Australian healthcare industry is inevitable; it
is merely a matter of how soon this change will take place. Moreover, the Electronic
Transaction Act has recognised and approved alternatives to using handwritten
signatures for the purpose of identifying a person and indicating the approval of the
information contained/communicated (“The Electronic Transactions Act 1999”,
n.d.).
For that reason, despite some non-definitive results from investigating
Subsidiary Research Question 1 (i.e. study from the legislative and regulatory
perspectives) and the proposed mobile solution (i.e. any fully electronic prescribing
process in this case) being not fully compliant with some jurisdictions’ regulatory
mandates due to the absence of the prescriber’s hand written signature, this research
proceeded further by conducting experimentations to answer Subsidiary Research
Question 2 (i.e. iterative experimentations on the proposed solution’s candidate
technologies; the Android’s encryption and the security of NFC and Bluetooth
against each security requirements identified in prior stage). Except for the absence
of the prescriber’s handwritten signatures, the experimentation outcomes proved that
the proposed Android mobile solution complies with all the security requirements
mandated by the standards and specifications currently in place and implemented by
the existing ETP implementation. Therefore, this research progressed further still by
proposing a fully electronic mobile alternative to the current ETP implementation
that not only has comparable security assurance but is also a cheaper – in fact,
potentially cost-free – alternative, making use of the patient’s Android smartphone as
the substitute secured transfer medium. Hypothetically, the security of electronic
prescriptions can even be potentially enhanced by using smartphone’s unique ID in
the proposed mobile ETP solution. Such feature not only provides audit trail but also
can be used to prevent cloning of prescriptions.
The proposal of such mobile solution also aligns well with the Australian
Digital Health Agency’s (ADHA) recent work on a mobile enablement program
which is designed to allow information to be extracted from the MyHR into thirdparty applications, and to create a way to upload data back into the MyHR system at
a later time as this program progresses further.
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of two security models (PES vs Mobile implementation)
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Figure 7.1 compares the security model of the current ETP implementation
(using PES services) with that of the proposed mobile solution. Despite the
controversial difference in the transfer mechanism employed for the electronic
prescription, Figure 7.1 demonstrates that the changes introduced by the proposed
solution have minimal impact on the ETP participants with whom it is interacting
(i.e. minimal impact on the EPS and EDS). From Figure 7.1 it is also evident that the
printing of the DAK barcode is no longer necessary in the proposed solution as it
transfers the electronic prescription itself along with the DAK instead of just
transferring the prescription notification carrying the DAK barcode which is later
used in downloading the electronic copy of the prescription form PES server. This
change eliminates the use of the printed DAK barcode, along with the use of the
Provider Identifier component of the DAK itself. Since the prescription is directly
transferred from the patient’s mobile smartphone to the pharmacy’s EDS system, this
proposed solution can operate with limited or no internet connection for simple
dispensing purposes (e.g. no script owing, PSB claiming or NPDR update operations
etc.). However, the proposed solution currently is incapable of supporting certain
features such as Script Request (e.g. in a script owing scenario) due to its
disconnected nature. It would have to employ certain messaging service (e.g. SMS or
email) to support such a feature, potentially introducing associated costs.
In current ETP specifications, the Dispense Record is primarily used for
updating the Dispensing State of the prescription, issuing Dispense Notification to
the prescriber and recording the dispense information to the National Prescription
and Dispense Repository (NPDR). However, the automatic Dispense Notification
service to the prescriber is currently disabled at the request of RACGP (McDonald,
2013a) and it is therefore irrelevant for the proposed solution to support this feature.
In the proposed ETP model, the recording of the dispense information to the NPDR
will be integrated into the pharmacy’s EDS functionalities along with the other
secondary use of the prescription information such as PBS online claiming. Hence,
the proposed solution has minimal impact on the other ETP process participants. The
security of the prescription information in the proposed mobile solution is governed
by ATS 4888.2 in the same way as in the current implementation using PES services.
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In the proposed solution, the potential issue for information sharing is
reduced by strictly conforming to AS 4700.3-2014 and ATS 4888.3-2013 for
electronic prescriptions. The implementation of the Dispense Record firmly adheres
to ATS 4888.4-2013 for better information sharing. On the other hand, ATS 4888.52013

(Platform

implementation

specific

prescription

request

HL7

CDA

implementation guide) is not relevant for the proposed solution since it does not
support Script Request functionality. Similarly, ATS 4888.6-2013 (Platform
implementation specific web service) is also irrelevant for the proposed solution
because at this point in time it does not make use of the web service for any of its
functionalities. However, this technical specification is potentially applicable in
future for implementing additional features and functionalities.
In addition, and as described in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4, the proposed mobile
electronic prescription transfer application also functions as a mobile repository of
the patient’s medication history. With the interface integrating the patient’s mobile
smartphone with the Hospital Information System in place, the patient’s complete
medication history can be transferred from their mobile smartphone directly to the
Hospital Information System. This feature can be utilised to share the medication
information with the other healthcare providers such as GPs and specialists. The
ability to access such information enables the healthcare professionals to deliver
better quality care, benefiting both patients as well as the healthcare providers.
The knowledge accumulated in and findings drawn from this intellectual
investigation are subsequently utilised in constructing a framework to guide the
development of a fully electronic Android mobile ETP application in accordance
with security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare industry. Figure
7.2 depicts this framework, which is the primary focus of this thesis.
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Security Requirements from
Compliance Matrix (Table 4.1 & 7.1)

Identify governing Acts
and Standards

Each jurisdiction s
regulatory mandates

Translate regulatory
mandates into security
requirements

Security requirements
(data-at-rest)

Security requirements
(data-in-transit)
Repeat for each
security requirement

Begin

Find a candidate technology potentially
complies with each security requirement

Experiment the candidate technology for
security compliance

No
Comply? + Practical?
Yes

Enough to build an
alternative solution

No

Yes
End

Build a mobile eTP
solution

Figure 7.2: The proposed framework for developing a security compliant ETP solution
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Moreover, such knowledge gained from this research is further utilised by
deriving another framework (Figure 7.3) for assessing Android mobile ETP solutions
for their compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Acts,
regulations and standards in the Australian healthcare industry. Figure 7.3 explains
how to undertake such compliance assessment for Android mobile ETP applications.
Security Requirements from
Compliance Matrix (Table 4.1 & 7.1)

Identify governing Acts
and Standards

Investigate how
security is
implemented

Each jurisdiction s
regulatory mandates

Technologies used in
securing prescription
information

Translate regulatory
mandates into security
requirements

Technologies/Features
(data-at-rest)

Technologies/Features
(data-in-transit)

Security requirements
(data-at-rest)

Security requirements
(data-in-transit)

Security requirements
for eTP
Repeat for each technology used and security
requirement

Experiment to assess the technology
for security compliance

No

Yes

Comply? + Practical?

Populate analysis matrix with the
successful experiment outcome

Populate analysis matrix with the failed
experiment outcome

Determine the security conformance based
on the matrix s content

Figure 7.3: The proposed framework for assessing Android mobile ETP application for security
compliance

Research Thesis - 172 of 269

Although the framework in Figure 7.3 is an additional product of the
research, it represents significant and particular usefulness within the health industry
that is highly regulated but lacking in detailed guidelines for assessing the security
compliance of ETP applications. Despite the fact that all the research activities
conducted in this research are limited by the scope of this research (i.e. technologies
and features available to the Android operating system), both frameworks are in fact
mostly applicable to any fully electronic implementation of ETP application in the
Australian healthcare industry. Certainly, some additional effort is required to
generalise these frameworks so that they are fully applicable to other operating
systems (e.g. iOS), technologies and features available on those operating systems.
Whilst such line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this research, it introduces
compelling future research potential within this ETP context.

7.4 Analysis Matrix
The derivation of the above two frameworks was made possible by the data
analysis process, consisting of three integrated activities: data reduction, conclusion
drawing and verification, all performed on the two analysis matrixes, Table 4.1 and
Table 7.1. The investigations conducted and translation of the regulatory mandates
into security requirements as part of answering the Subsidiary Research Question 1
populated the entire Table 4.1 (Analysis matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for
fully electronic ETP solution) and the first five columns of Table 4.2 (Analysis
matrix of security requirements for electronic prescription information). Rows 1, 2,
6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Table 4.1 indicate that the acts and regulations of Western
Australia, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania support not only the use of
electronic prescriptions but also the absence of the prescriber’s handwritten signature
from the electronic prescriptions. While some states’ regulations recognise the use of
digital/electronic signatures, others’ imply the same meaning by stating that a
prescription that is not issued electronically shall be signed by the prescriber in his or
her own handwriting. For instance, while sections 79 (7) and 190 (5) of Queensland’s
Health (Drugs and Poisons) Regulation 1996 explicitly stated that as “The
prescriber must sign a paper prescription or electronically sign an electronic
prescription”, sections 37 (1A) (1B) and 51 (1A) (1B) of Western Australia’s
Poisons Regulation 1965 rather imply the same in a more deductive logic approach.
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Nevertheless, despite their differing ways of wording, these jurisdictions are ready to
progress towards fully electronic implementation of ETP from a regulatory
perspective and therefore the proposed mobile ETP solution will work well without
any regulatory change in these states. In the meantime, the rest of the jurisdictions’
Acts and regulations (i.e. rows 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Table 4.1) mandate the
prescriber’s signature on the prescription in various ways; some are more
straightforward while others are in more confounded statements. Sections 35 (2) and
80 (2) of NSW's Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008 clearly state that
“…the prescription must be signed by the person by whom it is issued” while section
40 (a) and section 40’s “Note” of the ACT's Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic
Goods Regulation 2008 imply that electronic prescriptions also require prescriber’s
signature. However, none of these mandates explicitly state whether the prescriber’s
signature must be in handwritten form or its electronic/digital equivalence. These
mandates, therefore, do not necessarily prohibit the use of a fully electronic ETP
solution which makes use of electronic/digital signature of the prescribers, and hence
the use of the proposed Android mobile ETP solution in these states may be possible
without requiring regulatory changes.
In Table 7.1, Analysis matrix of Experiment outcomes for each security
requirement of electronic prescription information, both rows 1 and 2 are about
securing the prescription information while the data is at rest. Row 1 reveals that
section 5.3.6 of the ATS 4888.2-2013 mandates that the electronic prescription be
encrypted using a symmetric key derived from DAK. Since the proposed mobile ETP
solution is designed to use the same DAK and the prescription information is
encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the DAK, it conforms to this security
requirement. The right-most column of row 1 briefly recorded this for future use (i.e.
analysis, discussion and framework derivation). Row 2 of the analysis matrix brings
to light the fact that section 7.3.3 of the ATS 4888.2-2013 requires a minimum of
128-bit encryption for storing DAK and any of its derived keys on any permanent
storage medium/device. Experiment 1 (i.e. Encryption – Security of data at rest),
conducted in response to Subsidiary Research Question 2, proved that the Android
platform supports the 128-bit symmetric encryption thereby conforming to the
security mandates imposed by ATS 4888.2-2013. The experiment also found that the
time taken for encrypting and decrypting the CDA document on the mobile devices
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is also practical (i.e. acceptable). Row 3 of the Table 7.1 reveals that HL7 message
structure is recommended by the AS 4700.3-2014 for the electronic prescriptions,
although the more prominent PES operator, Script Exchange from eRx, does not
conform to this standard due to the fact that it was live nationwide seven months
before the NEHTA published the first draft of the standard (“ETP Standards”, 2016).
Since the proposed mobile ETP solution conforms to this recommendation, it will
have better interoperability when interacting with other healthcare software
components. The last row of Table 7.1, row 4, focuses on the security of the
prescription information from the data in transit perspective. Section 5.3.5 of the
ATS 4888.2-2013 mentions that security of data in transit between ETP service
participants is specific to the implementation “platform”. This research finds no
further details on the recommended approach or how this should be implemented.
Therefore, the Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted to establish whether the use of
NFC or Bluetooth wireless technology provides security assurance comparable to the
current transfer mechanism of using the Internet.
The preliminary study finds NFC to be a potentially suitable wireless
communication technology for the proposed mobile ETP solution’s prescription
transfer mechanism due to its widespread support by various smartphone
manufacturers, its well-known interoperability and convenience of use and its close
proximity communication range. However, Experiment 2 reveals that the use of NFC
technology in the proposed mobile ETP solution will result in having a portability
issue in practice. This research finds that, with the exception of Sony and NXP
Semiconductors, the NFC device manufacturers do not make the proximity driver of
their products available to the public. Therefore, only the Sony’s FeliCa card
readers/writers can be programmed using the Windows Proximity API, and the rest
of the NFC devices in the market require the SDK from the hardware manufacturer
to interface with. Use of a specific SDK restricts the application to that particular
hardware/device and this portability issue will severely impact the practicality of
using the proposed mobile ETP solution in the industry. An ETP solution with such
portability issue is impractical for the healthcare industry in Australia as the current
electronic prescribing systems (i.e. a component of clinic management software)
generally runs on existing hardware and system software platforms rather than on a
vendor-provided hardware and software configuration. Therefore, the use of NFC
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technology is deemed not suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution, and as a
result, this research conducted another round of experimentation. The next
experiment, Experiment 3, focuses on investigating whether the use of Bluetooth
technology for transferring electronic prescriptions provides comparable security
assurance to that of the current implementation. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures
and standards are strictly governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)
and IEEE standard 802.15.1-2005. The strict governance by these two reputable
authority bodies can be considered comparable to those of the current ETP
implementation using the Internet. Unlike the outcome of Experiment 2, the
development of the proof-of-concept went well without any portability issue, and the
performance is also acceptable. This experiment effectively reveals that the use of
Bluetooth technology in the proposed mobile ETP solution not only provides
comparable assurance but is practical for the healthcare industry. However, the use
of Bluetooth requires pairing of the devices (i.e. patient’s mobile smartphone with
the prescriber’s and dispenser’s devices) for the first-time use (i.e. at the first visit to
either the clinic or the pharmacy). As an added benefit, this extra step can be
considered as an additional security measure rather than a mere nuisance. Moreover,
this process can be streamlined by using other tools or technologies such as NFC or a
QR code. Since every technology has its strength and vulnerabilities, however, this
step should only be taken after a thorough investigation. Such line of inquiry is
outside the scope of this research, but it suggests a compelling subject for further
investigation with a view to extending this research.
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7.5

Reflection on the research questions
This section reflects on the Research Questions by discussing how they came

about, what actions were taken in response to them and how they have driven the
progression of the research through the meticulous document analysis and vigorous
iterative experiments and reflection.

7.5.1

Main Research Question

Can a technical framework be constructed to serve as a guide for the development of
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer applications in compliance with the
security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare laws, regulations and
standards?
The literature review and the preliminary study reveals that the current ETP
implementation is tailored to suit the current regulatory requirements instead of being
designed to facilitate the most beneficial healthcare outcome for patients and
clinicians. While the current ETP implementation enabled the nation as whole to
progress towards using electronic prescription with minimal legislative and
regulatory changes, this change-averting solution has posed many obstructions in
reaching the full potential benefits of eTP. Therefore, this research proposes an
alternative solution with comparable security assurance which also tackles the
shortcomings of the current ETP implementation, and creates a framework to guide
the development of such solution in compliance with the security requirements.
Answering this Research Question involves devising two additional
supporting questions. The first question endeavours to translate the regulatory
mandates into security requirements for later integration into a framework. The
second question takes on the investigation of how this framework can be used in
assessing Android mobile ETP application for their security conformance, ultimately
deriving a framework to guide the development of such mobile application in
compliance with security requirements. Based on the research findings from these
supporting questions, the Primary Research Question is answered by proving that it
is possible to build a framework to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP
application compliant with the Australian healthcare industry’s security mandates.
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This research not only draws the conclusion that it is possible to build the framework
with which to guide the development an Android mobile ETP application in
compliance with security mandates, but it also builds the framework that is derived
from the proof-of-concept prototype developed as part of this research. Such
framework, as well as the proof-of-concept prototype, is a significant contribution
towards the national eHealth program’s expansion into a mobile ETP context.
The preliminary study found little literature on existing proven theoretical
frameworks and methodologies for use in this integrated field of medical informatics,
public health and information security. Such lack of literature on the existing proven
theoretical frameworks and methodologies drives the researcher to explore for a
suitable theoretical framework and methodology to minimise (or prevent completely
if possible) the unreliable research findings, and guide this research on track towards
successful completion. The nature of this research (i.e. creating a technical
framework based upon the decisions from law and opinions) drives its use of mixed
methods, mixing exploratory qualitative research, iterative experimentation and
reflection. The research employed to answer the first supporting question is of
exploratory nature. Its endeavour to interpret legal text and explanations into a set of
security requirements, providing a practical understanding for real-life application,
fits well with the method selected for its earlier stage, this being the document
analysis approach derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle. Answering
the second supporting question follows an iterative experimentation and reflection
approach for examining how the security requirements constructed in the prior stage
can be used in assessing Android mobile ETP solutions for their security
conformance. For better and in-depth understanding of the findings, all the studies
and experimentations performed for this research are conducted from two different
perspectives; the security of the prescription information both in data at rest and data
in transit.
The content of Table 4.1, populated by answering Supporting Question 1,
indicates that although the Acts and regulations of various jurisdictions support the
use of electronic prescription, the use of a digital/electronic signature in place of the
prescriber’s handwritten signature is not recognised by all the jurisdictions, as
discussed earlier in section 7.3. However, since none of these mandates for the
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presence of prescriber’s signature explicitly mention that it must be in handwritten
format, they do not necessarily prohibit the use of a fully electronic ETP solution as
long as it makes use of the electronic/digital signature of the prescribers. Since the
proposed Android mobile ETP solution makes use of the prescriber’s Medicare
digital certificate, it may be possible to use the proposed Android mobile ETP
solution in these states without any regulatory changes. Therefore, this research
progresses further by proposing the Android mobile ETP solution and deriving the
framework from it.
The proposed Android mobile ETP solution from which the framework is
derived makes use of the patients’ Android smartphone as the alternative transfer
medium to using the PES services. Such a controversial solution requires proving
that the proposed Android mobile ETP solution is as secure as – if not more secure
than – the current ETP implementation using the PES services, thereby putting an
end to the archaic belief that mobile applications are not secure enough for use in the
healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich & Bromwich, 2016). Once the
regulatory mandates have been translated into security requirements and recorded in
the analysis matrices (i.e. row 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1), it becomes
evident that the electronic prescription is to be encrypted using a symmetric key
derived from DAK, and the operating system running the mobile ETP application
will need to support minimum of 128 bit symmetric encryption to store the electronic
prescription, its associated DAK and other derived keys from DAK. Another crucial
but vaguely defined security requirement recorded in the analysis matrices (i.e. row 4
of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1) effectively implies that the transfer mechanism used in
the proposed solution is required to provide comparable security assurance to that of
the Internet for transferring the electronic prescriptions. Further information on how
the security is implemented from the data in transit aspect in the current ETP
implementation is unavailable, as the research context turns out to be not only highly
regulated but also highly proprietary. Therefore, prevented from comparing the
implementation details such as the file transfer protocols (e.g. FTP, HTTP, HPPTS or
other files sharing) used in current implementation versus the ones used in the
proposed solution, this research endeavours to find an alternative transfer mechanism
(i.e. a wireless communication technology) that is comparable in security measures
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to using the Internet from a more holistic perspective (i.e. using a more “black-box”
approach).

7.5.2

Subsidiary Research Question 1

How can the security requirements imposed by the relevant laws regulations and
standards in the Australian healthcare system be integrated into a framework for the
assessment of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications?
As part of the bigger undertaking, this supporting question focuses on
translating the regulatory mandates into a set of security requirements prior to
integrating them into a framework. The objective is to interpret the legislative and
regulatory requirements mandated by the relevant Acts, regulations and standards
into a set of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) to be complied with by
the native security features, third-party tools and technologies available on the
Android operating system platform for the development of a proof-of-concept
prototype ETP mobile solution.
This is the part of the research governed by the document analysis approach,
derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle, for deciphering the true
meaning of what the legal texts imply and then interpreting them into a set of
security requirements. This research is far more than a mere interpretation of text
however, as it also endeavours to build a relationship between the legal explanation
and their practical understanding for real-life applications. The research findings (i.e.
translated security requirements) from answering this supporting question populate
the analysis matrices (i.e. Table 4.1, column 1 to 4 of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1),
leaving the last column of Table 4.2 to record the investigation and experimentation
outcomes from the next stage of the research; iterative experimentations. Although
not all the research finding are 100% in favour of the use of the proposed mobile
ETP solution (i.e. any fully electronic ETP application in general in this case) due to
the inherent absence of the prescriber’s handwritten signature, this research indicates
that there is no obstacle from legislative or regulatory perspectives which explicitly
opposes its use, since the proposed ETP solution uses the prescriber’s Medicare
digital certificate in signing and encrypting the DAK associated with the electronic
prescription.
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Once the relevant regulatory mandates have been interpreted and recorded in
the analysis matrices accordingly, the next stage of the thesis is commenced as a
series of experimentations, followed by reflection based upon the experimentation
outcomes against the identified security requirements.

7.5.3

Subsidiary Research Question 2

How can the assessment criteria framework from Subsidiary Research Question 1 be
used in assessing the native security features and third-party tools on the ANDROID
for the security compliance of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications?
The emphasis of this second supporting Research Question is to explore and
verify which of the native security features, third-party tools and technologies
available on the Android operating system comply with the security requirements for
the development of mobile ETP solution. Such verification was performed through a
series of experiments and reflection on whether the experimentation outcome
conforms to the security requirements identified in the prior stage. These iterative
experimentations and reflection are conducted from the perspectives of both data at
rest and data in transit in order to provide better and in-depth understanding of the
findings.
The exploration and verification activities conducted are governed by the
iterative experimentation and reflection approach. In fact, every iteration of the
experimentation is based on the Williamson’s (2002) depiction of the typical action
research cycle, with a few alterations specific to this research. Such adaption of the
experimentation and reflection approach from action research is supported by
Williamson (2002) and it fits well for the nature of this research. The
experimentation outcomes are recorded in the last column of Table 7.1 and are used
in determining whether the candidate technology of the proposed mobile ETP
solution conforms to the security requirements.
Experiment 1 confirms that the Android operating system supports the 128bit symmetric encryption and hence conforms to the security requirements recorded
in rows 1 and 2 of Table 7.1 (i.e. security from data at rest perspective). In addition,
the proposed Android mobile ETP solution also conforms to the requirement
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recorded in row 3 of Table 7.1, since it is designed to operate using CDA documents.
This will also minimise any interoperability issues when interacting with other
software components within the health sector. However, this does not seem to be a
crucial requirement currently as only one of the current PES services (i.e. Script
Vault from MediSecure) complies with this standard. Experiment 2 verifies whether
the use of NFC for transferring electronic prescriptions between ETP participants
provides comparable security assurance to that of the use of the Internet in the
current ETP implementation. The research initially found the use of NFC technology
to be a viable alternative transfer mechanism compliant with the security
requirements for electronic prescription transfer, as well as a realistic solution in
practice from end-user perspective. Regrettably, however, further experimentation
reveals that the use of NFC technology imposes some unrealistic constraints for the
development and deployment of the solution, and will have portability issues in
practice. These subsequent findings render the use of NFC technology an impractical
solution for the Australian healthcare industry. Therefore, another experiment (i.e.
Experiment 3) is conducted to investigate whether the use of Bluetooth for
transferring the electronic prescription offers security assurance comparable to that
of using the Internet. This experiment shows that the use of Bluetooth not only offers
comparable security assurance but also presents a practical solution for the
Australian healthcare industry.

7.6

Summary
The proof-of-concept prototype developed as part of the iterative

experimentation in this research is far from complete as it only focuses on the
encryption and prescription transfer components critical for security conformance.
However, the security requirements recorded in the analysis matrices are operating
system and programming language agnostic, and in fact these matrices are applicable
to any fully electronic ETP implementation whether a mobile or desktop application.
During the iterative experimentations, Experiment 2 failed to prove that NFC
technology is suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution. That said, however, this
technology should be kept under close observation as this situation could change
drastically once the NFC device manufacturers make their devices’ proximity drivers
openly available to the public.
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The goal of this research is the construction of a framework to guide the
development of an Android mobile ETP solution in compliance with security
requirements for the Australian healthcare industry. In addition to the achievement of
this, this research derived another framework for assessing Android ETP applications
for their security compliance. Although an unintentional additional product of the
research, this second framework has no less value for the emerging eHealth industry
than the first (i.e. the framework for the development of Android mobile ETP
solution). As more eTP-related enhancements and innovations are developed for the
mobile platform, the eHealth industry will be in critical need of a tool that can
quickly and effectively assess the security compliance of mobile ETP applications,
and the second framework devised in this research fills that need.
In summary, this research establishes the fundamental groundwork for future
enhancements and innovations in a fully electronic ETP context for both mobile and
desktop platforms in general. The proposed solution is perhaps somewhat limited,
but the research effectively demolishes the archaic belief that mobile applications are
not secure enough for use in the Australian healthcare industry, and this knowledge
alone paves the way for countless opportunities and innovations in the mobile ETP
context.
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CHAPTER 8.
8.1

CONCLUSION

Thesis Overview
In Chapter1, this thesis establishes the research journey with the statement of

the problem in the use of electronic transfer of prescriptions in the Australian
healthcare industry. The background and significance of the research are then
discussed, followed by the establishment of the three Research Questions which
dictate the research and are eventually answered through a series of steps. The
literature review in Chapter 2 further elaborates on the issue mentioned in the
problem statement and Chapter 3 discusses the selected theoretical framework and
methodology that shapes the design of the research. Chapter 4 details the research
results from answering the Research Questions, proposes the alternative mobile ETP
solution and reviews the candidate technologies for use in the proposed mobile
solution. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 feature a series of experimentations conducted on
the proposed solution’s candidate technologies and their outcomes verify whether or
not the proposed solution is viable from the perspectives of both practicality and
security of data at rest and data in transit. These experimentations confirm that the
proposed solution is both practical for use in the Australian healthcare industry and
compliant to the security requirements detailed in the analysis matrices shown in
Table 4.1 of Chapter 4 and Table 7.1 of Chapter 7.
Chapter 7 presents further discussion, from a more holistic perspective, of the
research results, the proposed mobile solution and the experimentation outcomes.
Also examined in Chapter 7 is the purpose and use of handwritten signatures and
their electronic counterparts, digital certificates, the potential of these electronic
signatures as more than a mere digital equivalence of handwritten signatures, and
they could be put into practise. Also in this chapter a framework is derived from the
analysis matrices with which to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP
solution in compliance with the security requirements of the Australian healthcare
industry. An additional framework is derived from the analysis matrices for the
assessment of Android mobile ETP solutions for their security compliance. This
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chapter concludes with the reflection on the Research Questions based on the
research outcomes. Chapter 8 summarises the research by highlighting the
significance of the outcomes and its potential impact on the ETP in the Australian
healthcare industry, stating its contribution to the body of knowledge. Future
research to extend this study is also listed in Chapter 8. The last part of the thesis (i.e.
Appendix A) documents the four publications arising from this thesis research in
chronological order by the date submitted (i.e. not by publication dates). The first
paper is the outcome from the literature review. The second paper compares the
security of the prescription information, from the data at rest perspective, between
the current ETP implementation and the proposed Android mobile ETP solution.
Whilst also focusing on the comparison of security measures between the current
ETP implementation and the proposed Android mobile ETP solution, the third paper
considers the comparison from the data in transit perspective. The last paper briefly
discusses the potential changes in the ETP context (e.g. Commonwealth subsidy
criteria, the number of prescriptions per year etc.) and proposes the Android mobile
solution, built upon the findings and technologies published in the second and third
papers, as an alternative electronic prescription transfer mechanism.

8.2

Research Summary
The primary focus of this research was to devise a framework to guide the

development of an Android mobile ETP application in compliance with the security
requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare industry. In order to achieve
this, the research began by studying the relevant Acts, regulations and standards
governing electronic prescribing in the various jurisdictions of the Australian
healthcare industry. These regulatory mandates were then transformed into a set of
security requirements. This transformation made the regulatory mandates more easily
understandable by non-regulatory experts and simplified the requirements that need
to be fulfilled by the subsequent stages of the research. Next, mobile operating
systems and wireless communication technologies were explored in search of an
alternative solution which would be more cost-effective with comparable security
measures. A series of experimentations were subsequently conducted to verify the
candidate technologies for use in the proposed mobile solution, which proved that the
proposed Android mobile ETP solution conforms to the security requirements
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mandated by the Acts, regulations and standards. Finally, a framework for the
development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application in
compliance with security requirements was derived from the analysis matrices
constructed and collated throughout this research.
Since this research was conducted in an emerging field which intersects the
medical informatics, public health and information security, where there was very
little literature about theoretical frameworks previously employed for a similar study
within this context. The first part of the research was a study which embarked on
interpreting and revising the knowledge of legal constraints and interpreting them
into technical specifications, with the second part proposing a viable alternative
mobile solution through a series of experimentations and finally deriving a
framework. Therefore, this research employed a mixture of document analysis and
iterative experimentation with reflection in exploring the potential solutions,
verifying the candidate technologies and subsequently deriving a framework to
answer the main Research Question. The process of deciphering the true meaning of
the legal texts and interpreting them into a set of security requirements was governed
by the document analysis approach, as it offers a theoretical framework for
interpretive understanding or meaning with special attention to context and original
purpose. The series of experimentations and framework derivation parts of the
research were of applied research type with exploratory nature and the iterative
experimentations and reflection approach was therefore employed when exploring
and verifying the potential alternative solution and derivation of the framework.
The proposed solution from this research was a proof-of-concept prototype
mobile ETP solution on the Android operating system platform which utilised
Bluetooth wireless technology as a transfer mechanism for the electronic
prescriptions. This proposed solution was devised from the first phase of the study
which explored the potential candidate technologies (i.e. operating systems and
wireless communication technologies) for this research. This study examined each
candidate technology’s architecture, security model and governing standards in order
to determine how well it suits the proposed solution. The first phase of the study
found that both wireless communication technologies (i.e. NFC and Bluetooth) and
the Android operating system potentially comply with the security requirements
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mandated for eTP. The experimentations conducted in the next stage of the research
verified whether these candidate technologies truly conform to the ETP security
requirements and their practicality for use in the industry.
The first experiment conducted was to verify whether the encryption
capability of the Android operating system conforms to the security requirements
from the data at rest perspective. Sections 5.3.6 and 7.3.3 of the ATS 4888.2-2013
mandates a minimum of 128-bit symmetric encryption for the electronic
prescriptions and the storage of the DAK and any of its derived keys on any
permanent storage. The prototype created for this experiment makes use of
Android’s “javax.crypto” libraries for encrypting/decrypting the sample CDA
document

with

128

bit

AES

encryption.

This

experiment

successfully

encrypted/decrypted the sample CDA document and proved that the Android
operating system has sufficient encryption capability for this research’s proposed
mobile ETP solution. The subsequent experiment examined the NFC technology for
its compliance with security requirements from the data in transit perspective. The
prototype built for this experiment was written in C# .NET using the Windows
Proximity APIs supported by the Windows Runtime (WinRT) and a USB ACR122U
contactless RFID smartcard reader/writer from Advanced Card Systems (ACS). This
experiment revealed that use of SDK from the NFC device manufacturer was
required, imposing a significant limitation on the solution’s portability. Due to the
use of non-standardised hardware and software in primary care facilities and
pharmacies, it is crucial that the proposed mobile ETP solution be hardware and
software vendor agnostic. This experiment therefore established that the use of NFC
technology in development of the proposed solution is impractical for the Australian
healthcare industry. The next experiment investigated whether the use of Bluetooth
for transferring electronic prescriptions in the proposed solution conforms to the
security mandates from the data in transit perspective. Despite the inconvenience of
having to pair the devices at the first-time use (i.e. either at the first visit to a clinic or
a pharmacy), this experiment proved that transferring electronic prescriptions
between the patient’s mobile smartphone and the EPS and EDS via Bluetooth is as
secure as using the Internet in the current implementation. Therefore, it was
concluded that the use of Bluetooth in the proposed solution is secure enough and
practical for the Australian healthcare industry.
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Further in-depth discussion of both the rationale behind the proposed mobile
ETP solution and the derivation of the framework was followed by the reflection of
the Research Questions based upon the research findings. Although the outcomes
from answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 revealed that not all the jurisdictions
are ready for a fully electronic ETP implementation (i.e. some jurisdictions require
the prescriber’s signature in prescriptions), none of them explicitly mandated the
prescriber’s signature in handwritten form. Since the proposed mobile ETP solution
uses the prescriber’s Medicare digital certificate in signing and encrypting the DAK
associated with the electronic prescription, it does not violate those jurisdictions’
regulatory mandates. In addition to examining each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully
electronic ETP implementation, this investigation also interpreted the true meaning
of legal texts into a set of security requirements and recorded them in row 1 to 4 of
Table 4.2 and 7.1. This established the acceptance criteria for the next stage of the
research; iterative experimentations for each candidate technology which potentially
fulfil those security requirements. The first experimentation outcome proved that the
Android operating system has sufficient encryption capabilities required to securely
store the electronic prescription information. The next experiment revealed that the
use of NFC as an alternative transfer mechanism for electronic prescription is not a
practical solution for the Australian healthcare industry. Therefore, the experiment
was repeated using Bluetooth. This experiment proved not only that the use of
Bluetooth is a secure alternative to using the Internet for transferring electronic
prescriptions, but that it is also a practical solution. Based upon these findings, a
framework (Figure 7.2) was constructed in response to answering the Main Research
Question for guiding the development of an Android mobile ETP application in
accordance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare
industry. Furthermore, the accumulated findings and knowledge from this intellectual
investigation was utilised to derive another framework (Figure 7.3) for assessing
Android mobile ETP solutions for their compliance with the security requirements
mandated by the Australian healthcare industry.
The scope of this research and its experimentations focused exclusively on
the Android operating system platform and NFC and Bluetooth wireless
communication technologies in its exploration of potential candidate technologies for
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the proposed mobile ETP solution. This provides considerable opportunity for future
research into various lines of inquiry and innovation within the ETP context.

8.3

Significance of Research
This research translated the relevant Acts, regulations and standards

governing the transfer of electronic prescription in various jurisdictions into a set of
security requirements and proposed a secured mobile alternative which has been
verified through a series of experimentations. As a result, this research has produced
significant outcomes from multiple perspectives: reduced healthcare expenditure,
improved patient safety and the demonstration of obsolete regulatory requirements
and processes in current ETP, the sole purpose of which is merely to conform to
obsolete requirements, as described below.
The first significant outcome of this research is its potential to reduce the
nation’s healthcare expenditure. The proposed mobile ETP solution is a cheaper (if
not completely cost-free in most cases) alternative to the current implementation with
comparable security measures. If widely used, this proposed solution would
substantially reduce the nation’s spending on electronic prescription fees. These
prescription fees currently cost the nation approximately AU$112,950 every day
(“One billion eRx electronic scripts”, 2016). The nation’s increase in the aging
population and chronic disease burden will only escalate this expenditure in the
future and use of the proposed mobile ETP solution will make a significant
contribution towards relieving this issue.
As depicted in Figure 2.3, Patient involvement in the current ETP
implementation consists of little more than delivering the Document Access Key
(DAK) from the prescriber to the dispenser for downloading the electronic version of
the prescription from the PES servers. In reality, patients can contribute a lot more by
managing their own healthcare and medication related information. Maintaining
updated drug allergy information and keeping a consolidated medication history are
contributions patients can make, and this information will enable healthcare
providers to make better informed decisions resulting in significantly improved
treatment outcomes. The proposed mobile ETP solution enables such patient
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involvement and encourages them to engage in managing their own healthcare
information and subsequent care. This proposed mobile solution can also provide
electronic Medication Management (eMM) systems with a consolidated medication
history of the patient. Moreover, additional features such as alerts for script
expiration and repeat-prescriptions can also be implemented as part of this mobile
ETP solution on an individual basis (i.e. as plug-in modules) to enhance its benefits.
The translation of ETP regulatory mandates into a set of security
requirements (see Table 4.2 for details) makes security compliance in this context
more easily understandable by non-regulatory experts. This understanding removes
the major obstacle for security experts and software developers in this context, and
indeed paves the way for numerous opportunities and innovations in the future.
Besides those future potentials, this translation of regulatory mandates also
highlighted a number of regulatory mandates which have no constructive value to
eTP. These mandates were put into effect merely to avert legislative change and its
associated implications during the early stage of adopting eHealth in the Australian
healthcare industry. Until these regulatory mandates are revised and repealed or
amended to align with the Electronic Transaction Act, they will continue to create
obstacles for any fully electronic implementation of processes (e.g. such as electronic
prescribing and electronic referral) in the healthcare industry.
As part of synthesising the proposed mobile ETP solution, Section 1.2.2 and
2.4.2 of this research revealed some features of the current ETP implementation that
could have supported for better healthcare outcomes and patient safety. These
features, such as drug allergy alerts and harmful dosage alerts, which could
significantly improve the patient’s safety, could be incorporated into the proposed
mobile solution. Incorporating these features within a patient-controlled context,
such as on their own smartphone, is more likely to ensure such alerts are not
overlooked. Adverse drug event such as the death of Mr Jared Charles Olsen in 2015
could have been prevented if such critical warning is communicated effectively
(“Inquest into the Death of Jared Charles OLSEN”, 2017).
Although it was beyond the scope of this research project, the two
frameworks constructed (i.e. one for development of Android mobile ETP
application in compliance with ETP security requirements for the Australian
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healthcare industry, and the other for assessing Android mobile ETP application for
their security compliance) could be generalised for any fully electronic
implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry on various operating
system platforms such as iOS and others.
In addition to realising those new potentials, the disconnected nature of the
proposed mobile solution (i.e. not relying on Internet connectivity for transferring
prescription) makes it suitable for use in locations such as remote regions of
Australia, where the network availability is limited or unreliable. As briefly
discussed in Section 1.2.3, This makes the proposed solution also viable for use in
developing countries with poor or non-existent Internet connectivity, provided that
there is no legislative barrier. In fact, the significant increase in smartphone usage in
emerging and developing countries indicates the potential prospect of this proposed
mobile ETP solution (Poushter, 2016).
Not only does the translation of the regulatory mandates into essential
security requirements have broader uses than the scope of this research, the proposed
mobile ETP solution also has potential to improve patient safety and healthcare
outcomes in the Australian healthcare industry as well as in other countries and
regions. Similarly, the frameworks constructed are not only applicable to the scope
of this research (i.e. Android operating system platform) but can also be relevant for
any fully electronic ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare industry.

8.4

Contribution to Knowledge
This research contributes to the current body of knowledge in the ETP

context; first by building a bridge between the regulatory mandates in ETP and the
security requirements for compliance verification; secondly by identifying the
shortcomings in realising the full potential of the current implementation of eTP;
thirdly by proposing a mobile alternative solution implemented on Android platform
which can utilise the full potential of eTP; and finally by devising frameworks for
developing and assessing such mobile solutions for security compliance as mandated
by the acts, regulations and standards governing ETP in the Australian healthcare
industry.
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As a unique contribution of knowledge to the ETP context, this research
transformed the Acts, regulations and standards governing the electronic transfer of
prescriptions in various jurisdictions into a set of security requirements for
implementation and compliance verification in the Australian healthcare industry
(see Figure 2.9, Table 4.1 and 4.2 for details). Such interpretation is essential
knowledge in bridging the gap between the high-level regulatory mandates and the
implementation-level security requirements conforming to those mandates.
Furthermore, the applicability of these security requirements for ETP is not limited to
this research’s proposed solution, implemented on the Android operating system
platform only. They are applicable to any fully electronic implementation of ETP in
the Australian healthcare industry developed on various operating system platforms
such as iOS and Windows Phone.
This research also contributes to the body of knowledge by revealing the fact
that, despite the current public impression of the advancement in electronic
prescribing, many significant features of ETP have not been realised to their full
potential (see Section 2.4.2 for details). Patients are therefore not getting the full
benefit of the current ETP implementation despite its hefty ongoing cost on the
nation. This research proposes an Android mobile solution as a way to further realise
the potential of ETP and enable patients to gain greater benefits such as safer and
better healthcare outcomes. Such a solution was created by conforming to the
security requirements explored in the prior stage of this research (see Table 4.2 for
details). Synthesising the proposed solution involved conducting a series of
experimentations, and the experimentation outcomes proved that the prototype
application developed on Android platform with Bluetooth wireless communication
provided sufficient security assurance for transfer of electronic prescriptions (see
Chapter 5 and 6 for details). This finding lays to rest the archaic belief that mobile
solutions are not secure enough for the healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich
& Bromwich, 2016). This knowledge itself potentially opens up other significant
opportunities and innovations in the mobile healthcare industry.
The next contribution made by this research is the identification of regulatory
requirements which have no actual value to the process of electronic prescription but
which remain in effect as mere hindrances. It also highlights the components in the
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current implementation of ETP which are in place merely to satisfy the
abovementioned historical regulatory requirements. These implementations pose
limitations not only to the proposed mobile solution but to any fully electronic
implementation in the Australian healthcare industry.
Finally, this research makes two unique, significant contributions by devising
a framework which guides the development of an Android mobile ETP solution in
compliance with mandated security requirements and a framework which assesses
Android mobile ETP solutions for their security compliance (Figure 7.2 and 7.3).
Although limited to the Android platform in the context of this research, both
frameworks can be generalised with minimal effort for any fully electronic
implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry developed on various
operating system platforms.

8.5

Future Research
This research can be extended in various ways. Generalising the framework

to cover not only the Android operating system platform but any mobile operating
system platform is one way to extend this research further. Since the outcomes from
answering the supporting question 1 are applicable to any fully electronic ETP
implementation, the need to translate the regulatory mandates into security
requirements would be minimal for such continued study. In addition, such future
line of inquiry could also make use of the theoretical framework and methodologies
used in this research to repeat the process should regulatory change make it
necessary to do so.
Another area in which this research can be continued is exploring the use of
other forms of secured portable storage and transfer mediums, such as smartcards
and self-encrypting storage devices. Whilst the assessment framework would require
some adjustment to accommodate such expansion, this continued research would
also be based upon the security requirements produced from this research unless
there has been regulatory change in ETP context. As mentioned above, in the face of
legislative or regulatory change such continued research would still benefit from
following the theoretical framework and methodologies used in this research.
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One future research area that would significantly improve the proposed
mobile ETP solution is the facilitation of “script owing” and “script cancellation”
features. The disconnected nature of the proposed solution made implementation of
these two features difficult. At present, SMS (Short Message Service) and the SMD
(Secured Message Delivery) facility of the eHealth infrastructure appear to be
potential candidates for implementing these features. It calls for a thorough
investigation, however, and a continued line of inquiry for this represents another
future research area.
Since the proposed mobile ETP solution makes use of Bluetooth wireless
communication for transferring electronic prescriptions between the EPS, EDS and
the patient’s mobile smartphone, pairing of the devices is required for first-time use.
The Bluetooth pairing process can be cumbersome at times, so streamlining this
pairing process is in order. Such streamlining can be achieved by using technologies
such as NFC tag or QR code to perform the pairing of the Bluetooth devices.
However, every technology has vulnerabilities and introducing a combination of
technologies may increase the risk. Such investigation opens another future line of
inquiry extending this research.
Despite the fact that the proposed mobile solution chose Bluetooth over NFC
for practicality and portability of the solution (i.e. availability of the proximity
driver), the NFC also provided sufficient security assurance in securing electronic
prescription information. Moreover, its very short communication range and
simplicity in establishing communication certainly makes NFC a technology to be
kept under careful observation for future use. Once the NFC device manufacturers
make the proximity driver for their products publicly available in the same way Sony
and XNP Semiconductors did for their FeliCa card readers/writers (Sharief, 2013),
NFC may very well become a better suited wireless transfer mechanism than
Bluetooth for electronic prescriptions exchange. Therefore, in addition to careful
observation of changes/improvements in the NFC technology, further exploration on
more portable use of NFC in software development would be another future research
with significant impact on the mobile ETP context.
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8.6

Summary
The proposed proof-of-concept mobile ETP solution and the frameworks

built from this research may influence government departments, authority bodies and
Health IT professionals to embrace modification of the current use of ETP in the
Australian healthcare industry. In addition, this research has paved the way for future
innovations and enhancements in ETP by making the regulatory mandates easily
understandable for non-regulatory experts, and by establishing the fact that an
alternative solution, in full compliance with these regulatory mandates, can be
constructed using existing technologies.
Such knowledge effectively disproves the archaic belief that mobile solutions
are not secure enough for the healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich &
Bromwich, 2016), thereby creating other opportunities and innovations in the mobile
healthcare industry. This also aligns well with the Australian Digital Health
Agency’s (ADHA) recent work on a mobile enablement program, designed to allow
information to be extracted from MyHR into third-party applications, with a view to
producing a mechanism to enable uploading data back into the MyHR system as the
program progresses further. Together with a suite of other mobile healthcare
applications such as the Healthi app by Chamonix, the MediTracker app by
Precedence Health Care, the HealthNow app from Telstra Health and Best
Practice’s patient app, the use of a mobile ETP application would make a significant
contribution to building a more complete medication history and healthcare record of
an individual. Availability of such information is a significant step towards more
effective treatments and safer outcomes, benefiting both clinicians and patients, and
with potentially less financial drain on the nation’s healthcare expenditure.
In addition to their essential role in this research, the transformation of the
ETP security requirements of the various regulatory mandates is applicable to any
fully electronic ETP implementations in the Australian healthcare industry.
Furthermore, since no previously established methodologies and frameworks have
been verified and validated, particularly in this emerging eHealth context, the
methodologies and framework used in this research may assist in future research in
this sphere.
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